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Summary 
Introduction
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management was adopted on 29 September 1997 at the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference. Finland signed the Convention on 2 October 1997 and deposited the tools of 
acceptance on 10 February 2000. The Convention entered into force on 18 June 2001. This 
report is the 7th Finnish National Report under the Joint Convention in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 32. It will be subject to review in May 2021 in the seventh Review Meeting 
of the contracting parties in Vienna. The fulfilment of the obligations of the Convention and 
the development of waste management after the Sixth Review Meeting, during the reporting 
period 2017–2019, are assessed in this report.
There are currently two nuclear power plants operating in Finland: Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants. The Loviisa plant comprises two pressurised water reactor units (VVER-440) operated 
by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (FPH). The Olkiluoto plant comprises two boiling water reactor 
units (BWR 75) operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) and a third unit, a pressurized water 
reactor (EPR) is in the commissioning phase. In addition, Fennovoima Oy (Fennovoima) has 
applied for a construction license for one pressurised water reactor (AES-2006) at Pyhäjoki.
Spent fuel from the nuclear power plant units is stored in interim pool type storages at 
the power plant sites for tens of years until disposal. The interim spent fuel storages have 
already been in operation for about 30 years. The safety of the interim storages was enhanced 
during the reporting period. The spent nuclear fuel disposal project has progressed as 
planned. The construction license for the encapsulation and disposal facility was granted by 
the Government to Posiva in November 2015 and the construction of the geological disposal 
facility started in Olkiluoto in December 2016. Fennovoima started the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) of its own spent nuclear fuel disposal in summer 2016.
Geological disposal facilities for low and intermediate level waste have been in operation 
since the 1990s in Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPP sites. In the future, the Olkiluoto facility is 
planned to be extended for operational waste from the OL3 unit and decommissioning 
waste from all reactor units at Olkiluoto. The future at Olkiluoto includes also a new near-
surface facility of the very low-level waste. Olkiluoto disposal facility is also the current route 
for radioactive waste originating from use of radiation in industrial, medical and research 
applications. The disposal facility in Loviisa will be extended for decommissioning waste from 
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the Loviisa NPP units. Fennovoima has planned to build a geological disposal facility for its 
low and intermediate level waste at the Pyhäjoki site.
Major developments in Finland since the 6th Review Meeting are as follows: there has been 
progress in construction of the spent nuclear fuel disposal facility, in addition improvements 
have been made in NPP’s Low and Intermadiate Level Waste (LILW) management and non-
nuclear radioactive waste disposal. There has been significant progress in the licensing of 
research reactor decommissioning. Furthermore, the legislative and regulatory framework has 
been enhanced. STUK has published a new strategy in 2018 covering the period of 2018–2022. 
The objective of the strategy is related to enchancing risk informed and performance-based 
regulation and oversight highlighting licensee’s responsibility for safety. More detailed 
information on the latest developments in the various topics of the Convention is provided 
in connection with the relevant articles. Section K summarises the main achievements from 
the reporting period and presents Finland’s future challenges in radioactive waste and spent 
nuclear fuel management.
Since the 6th Review Meeting
The 6th Review Meeting in 2018 identified challenges and recorded some planned measures 
to improve the safety of nuclear waste management in Finland. On request of the Review 
Meeting these issues and the responses are included in this 7th National Report of Finland. 
The challenges and planned measures to improve the safety are listed below with the related 
references provided in brackets. A summary of how Finland has proceeded with the identified 
challenges during the reporting period is given in Section K.
Finland – Challenges
• Construction and oversight of the spent fuel (SF) disposal facility (Section H, Annexes L.2 
and L.3).
• Decommissioning and waste management of the FiR 1 research reactor (Article 9, Article 26).
• Ensuring adequate resources and competence in tough economic situations (utilities, waste 
management organizations, and Government) (Article 20, Article 22).
• Communication with public and stakeholders to maintain confidence in safe waste 
management and regulatory framework (Article 20).
• Disposal of a few High-Activity Sealed Sources (HASS), which are not suitable for disposal in 
existing LILW repositories (Section J).
Finland – Planned Measures to Improve Safety
• Construction and oversight of the spent fuel disposal facility (Section H, Annexes L2 and L3).
• Renewal of the ageing infrastructure of nuclear energy related research (new VTT Centre 
for Nuclear Safety building, thermohydraulic laboratory at Lappeenranta University of 
Technology). For this purpose, the research funding between 2016 and 2025 has been 
increased. (Article 20, National research programmes).
• Licensing of FiR 1 research reactor decommissioning and preparations to dismantling 
activities starting in 2022. (Article 9, Article 26).
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Conclusion
In conclusion, based on the information presented in the report, Finland complies with 
the obligations and objectives of the Joint Convention. Challenges for the future have 
been recognized, regularly reviewed and addressed. The required efforts for continuous 
improvement have been made.
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List of acronyms
CNS VTT Centre of Nuclear Safety
DiP Decision-in-Principle by the Government, to be approved by the Parliament
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
FiR 1 Finland Reactor 1 – A research reactor currently in extended shutdown state
FPH Fortum Power and Heat Oy (NPP utility)
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
HASS High Activity Sealed Source
ILW Intermediate level waste
IRRS IAEA facilitated Integrated Regulatory Review Service
LILW Low and intermediate level waste
LLW Low level waste
LO1, LO2 Loviisa NPP units 1 and 2
LUT Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology
MEAE1 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment
NORM  Naturally occurring radioactive materials
NPP Nuclear power plant
OL1, OL2 Olkiluoto NPP units 1 and 2
OL3 Olkiluoto NPP unit 3
ONKALO®2  Former Olkiluoto Underground Rock Characterization Facility, now registered 
trademark for Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility
Posiva Posiva Oy (joint company for spent fuel disposal of TVO and FPH)
PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
R&D Research and Development
RD&D Research, Development and Design
SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel
ST Guide STUK guidance subject to radiation legislation
STUK Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
TVO Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (NPP utility)
URCF Underground Rock Characterization Facility
VAL Guide Protective Actions Guidelines in Case of Radiological or Nuclear Emergency 
VLLW Very low level waste
VTT VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd
VYR State Nuclear Waste Management Fund
YVL Guide Safety regulation issued by STUK subject to nuclear energy legislation
1 In 2016, the Ministry of Employment and Economy (MEE) changed its name to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE). The MEE was established in 2008 when the the duties of the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MTI) were transferred to the MEE.
2 ONKALO® is a registered trademark of Posiva Oy.
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SECTION A 
Introduction
Purpose and structure of the report
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management was adopted on 29 September 1997 at the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference. Finland signed the Convention on 2 October 1997 and deposited the tools of 
acceptance on 10 February 2000. The Convention entered into force on 18 June 2001. This report 
is the 7th Finnish National Report under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. It will be subject to review 
in May 2021 in the seventh Review Meeting of the contracting parties in Vienna.
The fulfilment of the obligations of the Joint Convention and the developments during 
2017–2019 are assessed in this report. The self-assessment is mainly based on Finnish 
legislation and regulations and on the status of the current and planned spent nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste management activities in Finland. The self-assessment includes also the 
plans for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the regulation and management of 
radioactive waste generated outside the nuclear fuel cycle.
The structure of the report is in accordance with the Guidelines Regarding the Form and 
Structure of National Reports (INFCIRC 604/Rev 3). The report is a stand-alone document 
and does not require familiarity with the earlier reports. The fulfilment of the obligations is 
described in general in addition to the latest developments since the 6th Review Meeting which 
are described in more detail. Table 1 provides a cross reference of the sections in this report and 
the specific reporting provisions in the Joint Convention.
TABLE 1. The content of the national report sections.
National Report Section Joint Convention Section
Section A: Introduction
Section B: Policy and Practises Article 32, paragraph 1
Section C: Scope of Application Article 3
Section D: Inventories and Lists Article 32, paragraph 2
Section E: Legislative and Regulatory System Articles 18–20
Section F: Other General Safety Provisions Articles 21–26
Section G: Safety of Spent Fuel Management Articles 4–10
Section H: Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Articles 11–17
Section I: Transboundary Movement Article 27
Section J: Disused Sealed Sources Article 28
Section K: General Efforts to Improve Safety Multiple Articles
Section L: Annexes Multiple Articles
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SECTION A INTRODUCTION
The main developments during the reporting period 2017–2019 are shortly summarised 
in Section A. The current status of the interim spent fuel storages is described in Section G. 
As Finnish legislation defines spent nuclear fuel as waste, the development of the disposal 
of spent nuclear fuel is presented in Section H. Section H also describes the developments 
in nuclear waste management, as well as development of other than nuclear energy related 
radioactive waste management, and decommissioning. Section K summarises safety issues 
identified earlier and actions to address them. It also summarises the results from the 6th 
review meeting. The identified future challenges and planned improvements are also presented 
in Section K. 
More detailed information about currently ongoing projects is included in the Annexes. 
Firstly, the legal background to nuclear waste management and radioactive waste management 
is described in Annex L.1. Annexes L.2 and L.3 describe the Posiva Oy (Posiva) spent nuclear 
fuel disposal project. L2 concentrates on the regulatory oversight of the project and L3 
describes the current status of the disposal project. The outcomes of national coordination 
group activies on radioactive waste management are presented in Annex L.4.
The nuclear energy sector is currently very active in Finland. There are two nuclear power 
plants operating in Finland at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites. The Loviisa plant comprises two 
pressurised water reactor units (VVER-440), operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy (FPH). The 
Olkiluoto plant comprises two boiling water reactors units (BWR 75) operated by Teollisuuden 
Voima Oyj (TVO) and a third unit, European Pressurized water Reactor (EPR) unit is planned 
to be commissioned in 2021 at the Olkiluoto site. In addition, Fennovoima Oy (Fennovoima) 
has applied for a construction license for one pressurized water reactor (AES-2006) in Pyhäjoki 
(Figure 1). Finland also has a research reactor called Finland Reactor 1 (FiR 1) in Otaniemi, 
which is currently in an extended shutdown state. The decommissioning license is expected 
to be granted during 2020. At the other end of the nuclear fuel cycle, a mining company 
Terrafame Oy was granted to produce U
3
O
8
 (yellow cake) by a Government decision in February 
2020. However, appeals have been made about this decision to the The Supreme Administrative 
Court of Finland and the fate of the decision is yet to be resolved.
Geological disposal facilities for low and intermediate level operating waste exist in 
Olkiluoto and Loviisa. They have been in operation since the 1990s. Fennovoima aims to build 
its own disposal facility for low and intermediate level waste at Hanhikivi site during the 
2030s. 
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The construction license of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility for spent nuclear 
fuel (deep geological repository) was granted by the Government to Posiva in November 2015. 
The construction of the disposal facility started in Olkiluoto in December 2016. Posiva is 
responsible for the preparations for and later implementation of spent fuel disposal for its 
owners TVO and FPH. The scope of disposal project and granted construction license covers 
spent fuel from five reactor units: Loviisa 1 and 2 (LO1, LO2), Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3 (OL1, OL2, 
OL3). In December 2016, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Environment (MEAE) accepted 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) programme for Fennovoima’s spent fuel disposal 
facility. Earlier in 2016, Fennovoima presented a co-operation agreement with Posiva Solutions 
Oy, a subsidiary of Posiva, to ensure that the knowledge developed during Posiva’s disposal 
project for spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste management will also be available for 
Fennovoima.
Hanhikivi NPP (Fennovoima)
• Construction licence 
application for a new NPP, AFR 
storage
• Decision in Principle for a LILW 
repository
Olkiluoto NPP (TVO)
• 2 operating units – BWRs 
880 MWe (-78, -80), AFR storage, 
LILW repository
• New reactor unit OL3 (EPR) under 
commission
• Construction licence granted for 
SNF Encapsulation and Disposal 
Facility
Sotkamo, Talvivaara
Planned U3O8
production
(Terrafame)
Loviisa NPP (Fortum)
• 2 operating units – VVERs      
496 MWe (-77, -81), AFR storage, 
LILW repository
Pyhäjoki, 
Hanhikivi
Olkiluoto, 
Eurajoki
Hästholmen, 
Loviisa
Helsinki
Otaniemi, 
Espoo FiR 1
FIGURE 1. Nuclear Energy in Finland.
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Among many energy issues, general pubic acceptance of geological disposal of nuclear 
wastes is regularly evaluated by Finnish Energy association. Repeated interviews of the public, 
extending by now to almost four decades, indicate trend-like growth of the public trust to 
geological disposal (Figure 2). In the 2019 interview, majority of answers indicated trust to 
geological disposal (37%). This was the first time when the sceptic view was in minority (36%). 
Slowly but steadily growing confidence to geological disposal is seen as a result from long-
lasting systematic work both on implementer and regulator side to communicate with public 
and other stakeholders. 
Net figure= agree % ‐ disagree%   Net
1
‐2
‐7
‐12
‐10
‐19
‐15
‐16
‐24
‐16
Fukushima nuclear accident
In 3/2011
FIGURE 2. Time series of general public opinions on the safety of nuclear waste disposal (Courtesy of Finnish Energy).
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SECTION B 
Policies and practices
Article 32 Reporting, paragraph 1
In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each Contracting Party shall submit a national report to 
each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This report shall address the measures taken to implement 
each of the obligations of the Convention. For each Contracting Party the report shall also address its:
(a) spent fuel management policy;
(b) spent fuel management practices;
(c) radioactive waste management policy;
(d) radioactive waste management practices;
(e) criteria used to define and categorize radioactive waste.
Spent fuel and radioactive waste management policy
General
The Finnish Government decided on the first principles of arranging nuclear waste 
management in 1978. According to this decision, each producer of nuclear waste is responsible 
for the management of spent fuel and other radioactive waste generated in connection with 
their operations and for the costs incurred. In the management of low and intermediate level 
operational waste (LILW), the Government prepared for domestic measures, as they were 
considered the easiest to implement. In the management of spent fuel, permanent exportation 
or exportation for reprocessing were considered primary options.
In 1983, the Finnish Government enacted a law on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) and made a general decision on the objectives and schedules of the Research and 
Deveopment (R&D) activities concerning nuclear waste management at the existing nuclear 
power plants. For the first time, the 1983 decision presented an option that power companies 
had to consider disposal of spent fuel in Finland. Later in 1991, decision by a predecessor 
to MEAE lauched more serious research and evaluation of the spent fuel disposal option 
within Finnish territory. Finally, a significant amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act in 1994 
prohibited the imports and exports of nuclear waste to and from Finland. The 1983 decision 
outlined that, if a national spent fuel disposal solution will be implemented, the disposal 
measures were to begin around 2020. Before that, the companies had to survey and select the 
disposal site by the end of 2000 and be prepared to present plans for the disposal facility and 
encapsulation plant required for the construction license. The schedule for construction plans 
was adjusted in 2003, requiring the plans to be presented by the end of 2012.
Currently nuclear and radioactive waste management policy is defined in Finnish 
legislation. The most essential laws, decrees, safety regulations and guides are listed in Annex 
L.1. At end of Annex L.1, an internet reference is also made to summary of Finnish national 
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SECTION B POLICIES AND PRACTICES
programme that has been sent to European Commission in 2015 in accordance with Article 12 
of the Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom.
Responsibilities
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9) prescribes that the generators of nuclear waste are 
responsible for all nuclear waste management measures and their appropriate preparation, 
and for their cost. The State has the secondary responsibility in case any producer of nuclear 
waste is incapable of fulfilling its nuclear waste management obligations (Nuclear Energy Act, 
Sections 31 and 32). When the licensee’s waste management obligations have ceased as the 
disposal of the nuclear waste has been carried out in an approved manner, the ownership of 
the waste is transferred to the State, which shall be responsible thereafter for the nuclear waste 
(the Nuclear Energy Act, Sections 32–34).
The Radiation Act (Section 79) provides that the organization engaged in a radiation 
practice shall take the measures necessary to render harmless any radioactive waste arising 
from its operations. Rendering radioactive waste harmless means any measure needed to treat, 
isolate, or dispose of the waste, or to restrict its use so that it does not endanger human health 
or the environment. Moreover, the responsible party utilizing natural resources containing 
radioactive substances must ensure that radioactive waste poses no hazard to health or to the 
environment neither during operations nor at their conclusion. The State has the secondary 
responsibility in case a producer of radioactive waste is incapable of fulfilling its management 
obligations (the Radiation Act, Section 80).
Political decision-making and public consultation
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 11), the construction of a nuclear facility of 
considerable general significance requires, as a first step, a Government’s Decision-in-Principle 
(DiP) to show that the construction project is in accordance with the overall good of society. 
Such facilities include major nuclear waste management facilities. Before making the DiP 
referred to in Section 11, the Government must ascertain that the municipality where the 
nuclear facility is planned to be located, is in favour of the facility (Section 14 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act), and that with the available knowledge, safety is not compromised (STUK’s 
veto right). The DiP approved by the Government must be forwarded, without delay, to the 
Parliament. The Parliament may only reverse the DiP or may decide that it will remain in force 
(Section 15 of the Nuclear Energy Act).
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The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 24) provides that an application for a DiP must be 
appended by an assessment report drawn up according to the Act on Environmental Impact 
Assessment Procedure and by a statement from the coordinating authority (MEAE). There 
must also be a description of the design criteria that will be observed by the applicant to avoid 
environmental damage and to restrict the burden on the environment. The Environmental 
Impact Assessment Procedure is a consultative and participative process facilitating public 
involvement and information transfer to the people affected as a part of good governance 
practice. It considers a wide scope of potential impacts, such as human health and comfort, the 
natural environment and biodiversity, municipal structures and the use of natural resources. 
The international hearing is conducted according to the Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991). 
Section 23 a of the Nuclear Energy Act stipulates that before granting a nuclear facility 
construction license and operating license, or a license for decommissioning a nuclear facility, 
MEAE shall reserve the public an opportunity to express their opinions in writing in the matter 
relating to the license.
Spent fuel and nuclear waste management principles
Nuclear waste is defined in the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 3) as radioactive waste in the 
form of spent fuel or in some other form generated in connection with or as a result of the 
use of nuclear energy, materials, objects and structures, which having become radioactive in 
connection with or as a result of the use of nuclear energy and having been removed from use, 
require special measures because of the danger arising from their radioactivity.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 27 a) the amount of nuclear waste generated 
in the use of nuclear energy must be kept as low as is reasonably achievable with practical 
measures, both regarding its volume and activity, without compromising the general principles 
set forth in Sections 5–7 of the Act.
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 6 a), nuclear waste generated in Finland 
must be handled, stored, and permanently disposed of in Finland. Respectively, nuclear waste 
generated elsewhere than in Finland, shall not be handled, stored, or permanently disposed 
of in Finland. There are only minor exemptions to these principles, notably concerning the 
nuclear waste arising from the use of a research reactor in Finland (Section 6 a of the Nuclear 
Energy Act). As stipulated in Section 7 b of the Nuclear Energy Decree, the spent fuel from a 
research reactor in Finland may be handled, stored, and disposed of outside Finland, if justified 
on grounds of safety or due to a significant economic or other cogent reason.
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Management principles for non-nuclear radioactive waste
Non-nuclear radioactive waste is regulated in Finnish legislation within the framework of the 
Radiation Act. According to the Radiation Act (Section 4), the term radioactive waste denotes 
radioactive substances, and various items that are of no further use and need to be rendered 
harmless due to their radioactivity. The definition also includes equipment, goods and 
materials that are contaminated by radioactive materials. Radioactive substances and radiation 
appliances containing radioactive substances are also be regarded as radioactive waste in case 
the owner of the substances or the appliances cannot be found.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 83), the operator is responsible to return the 
disused sources subject to safety license to the manufacturer or supplier or to surrender 
them to an operator holding safety license. The Radiation Act (Section 80) specifies that the 
State shall discharge the function of rendering radioactive waste harmless where there is no 
operator of the kind. In that case the operator is responsible to compensate the costs to the 
State. STUK takes care of the rendering waste harmless on behalf of the State (Section 32 of the 
Government Decree on the Ionizing Radiation).
Principles for decommissioning of nuclear facilities
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 g) requires that provisions for the decommissioning of a 
nuclear facility must be considered in its design. The decommissioning plan must be updated 
regularly as prescribed in the Act (Section 28). After the permanent shut-down of the facility, it 
must be decommissioned in accordance with the plan approved by STUK. The dismantling of 
the facility and other actions related to decommissioning may not be unjustifiably postponed.
Safety principles and control
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 a) prescribes that the safety of the use of nuclear energy 
(including waste management) must be as high as reasonably achievable. To further enhance 
safety, all actions justified by operational experience, safety research, and the progress in 
science and technology shall be taken. Additionally, nuclear waste must be managed so that no 
radiation exposure will occur after disposal that would exceed the levels considered acceptable 
during the implementation of disposal. The disposal of nuclear waste in a manner intended as 
permanent must be planned giving priority to safety and so that ensuring its long-term safety 
does not require surveillance of the disposal site (Section 7 h of the Nuclear Energy Act).
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55) designates STUK as the regulatory body for the control 
of the safe use of nuclear energy. STUK’s regulatory tasks include the oversight of safety, 
security, emergency preparedness and non-proliferation of nuclear materials. More specifically 
STUK’s tasks include participation in the licensing process (e.g. for the assessment of safety), 
issuance of general and detailed safety requirements, and the control of compliance with the 
safety requirements and license conditions. Respectively, the Radiation Act (Section 14) states 
that compliance with the Act shall be supervised by STUK. The Act (Section 48) states that 
safety licences shall be granted by STUK upon application.
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Costs and funding
The Nuclear Energy Act (Chapter 7) addresses the financial provision for nuclear waste 
management. According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9), the nuclear waste producer is 
responsible for the costs of the nuclear waste management and decommissioning and for the 
provisions of the future costs. Furthermore, based on the Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 35–36), 
nuclear waste producer is obligated to make payments and deposit securities into the State 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR Fund). The purpose of the VYR Fund is to collect, store 
and reliably invest the funds that are going to be needed to take care of nuclear waste in the 
future. The VYR fund consists of three separate funds: a major financial provision fund (this 
Article, see below) and two minor funds, i.e. nuclear safety research fund and nuclear waste 
research fund (see Section E, Article 20). The funds collected in the three separate funds can 
only be used for the purposes defined in the relevant provisions of the Nuclear Energy Act. 
The plans for carrying out nuclear waste management cover the entire planned operating 
time of the nuclear facilities. According to current plans, the decommissioning and closure of 
the nuclear waste facilities managing spent fuel would take place in approximately 100 years 
(cf. Figure 4). 
Funds are annually collected from licensees under a waste management obligation to the 
financial provision fund of the VYR Fund. The payment amounts depend on the amount of 
nuclear waste and the state of its management each year. Moreover, preparations are made 
each year for the event that the nuclear power plants in operation are decommissioned earlier 
than planned, at the end of the year in question. If the annual quantity of waste increases, the 
necessary funds must also be increased; on the other hand, implemented waste management 
measures reduce the need to increase the funds. The financial provision fund operates under 
the MEAE, and it is managed by its board and a director. 
To ensure that financial liability is fully secured, every third year the nuclear power 
companies producing nuclear waste and the operator of the research reactor are obliged to 
present cost estimates for the future management of their currently exsisting nuclear waste 
and decommissioning of facilities and must take care that the required amount of money is set 
aside in the financial provision fund. In addition, they shall provide securities to the State for 
that part of their financial liability, which is not yet secured by the Fund (Section 45). Costs of 
the waste management are not paid from the Fund, but deposited equities are returned to the 
license holder as it progresses in its waste management activities. Additionally, in the case of 
the research reactor, the operator is responsible for the planning and implementation of spent 
nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste management. In the case of the research reactor, the State 
initially funded the necessary provision from the VYR Fund.
The Radiation Act (Section 54) provides for the financial security for radioactive waste 
management for non-nuclear practices as follows: the Act ensures that the licensee meets 
the costs incurred for rendering radioactive waste harmless and for carrying out any 
decontamination measures that may be needed in the environment, and ensures that the 
licensee shall furnish collateral security if the operations produce or are liable to produce 
radioactive waste that cannot be rendered harmless without incurring substantial cost.
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Criteria used to categorize radioactive waste
The Finnish radioactive waste classification system includes two main categories: nuclear 
waste, and radioactive waste not originating from the use of nuclear energy and the associated 
nuclear fuel cycle (non-nuclear radioactive waste). Waste classification according to disposal 
route is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Spent fuel from nuclear facilities
The Nuclear Energy Act defines spent fuel from the operation of nuclear reactors as nuclear 
waste. The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 6 a) defines that the nuclear waste generated in 
connection with or as a result of the use of nuclear energy in Finland must be handled, stored 
and permanently disposed of in Finland. In practice, this means that the disposal of spent fuel 
in a permanent manner is the only waste management option for spent nuclear fuel arising 
from the use of nuclear energy. Due to its high radioactivity and heat generation, spent fuel is 
regarded as high-level waste.
The main exception to the general principles described above regard spent fuel and other 
nuclear waste that has been generated in connection with or as a result of the operation of 
a research reactor in Finland. As stipulated in Section 7 b of the Nuclear Energy Decree, the 
FIGURE 3. Classification of radioactive waste for disposal purposes
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spent fuel from the research reactor in Finland can be handled, stored, and disposed of outside 
Finland.
Very low, Low and Intermediate level waste from nuclear facilities
The classification system for the purpose of the predisposal management of LILW from nuclear 
facilities, including NPPs, is based on activity concentrations, given in Regulation STUK 
Y/4/2018. Solid and liquid waste arising from the controlled area of an NPP contain almost 
exclusively short-lived beta and gamma emitters and are grouped into the following activity 
categories:
• Very low-level waste (VLLW) refers to waste whose average activity concentration of 
significant radionuclides does not exceed the value of 100 kBq/kg and the total activity does 
not exceed the values laid down in Section 6(1) of the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) (Total 
activity < 1TBq, α-activity < 10 GBq).
• Low level waste (LLW) contains so little radioactivity that it can be treated without any 
special radiation protection arrangements. The activity concentration in the waste must 
then not be more than 1 MBq/kg, as a rule.
• Intermediate level waste (ILW) contains radioactivity to the extent that effective radiation 
protection arrangements are needed when the waste is processed. As a rule, the activity 
concentration in the waste is from 1 MBq/kg to 10 GBq/kg.
The classification for the disposal purpose is given in Regulation STUK Y/4/2018. It 
distinguishes short-lived and long-lived waste accordingly:
• Short-lived waste refers to nuclear waste of which the activity concentration after 500 years 
will be below the level of 100 megabecquerels (MBq) per kilogram in each disposed waste 
package, and below an average value of 10 MBq per kilogram of waste in one emplacement 
room;
• Long-lived waste refers to nuclear waste, of which the activity concentration after 500 years 
will be above the level of 100 MBq per kilogram in a disposed waste package, or above an 
average value of 10 MBq per kilogram of waste in one emplacement room.
The Regulation STUK SY/1/2018 provides criteria for the general clearance. Nuclear Safety 
Regulation (YVL) Guide YVL D.4 provides for the general and case-specific clearance of nuclear 
waste in more detail. Both clearance options are founded on the criteria for a trivial dose; 
the radiation protection requirement for both clearance procedures is that the annual dose 
to any member of the public or worker processing the material, must not exceed 10 µSv and 
that that otherwise the radiation exposure arising from the cleared material must be as low as 
reasonably achievable.
Mass and surface concentration-based activity values for general clearance are given by 
the Regulation SY/1/2018 and the Guide YVL D.4. One set of values is for unlimited amounts 
of material and the values are taken from IAEA Safety Guide RS-G-1.7. In addition, the Guide 
YVL D.4 provides another set of values that are applied for limited waste quantities not 
exceeding 100 tonnes per year for one NPP or other nuclear installation. For case-specific 
clearance, the activity concentration values are determined on a case-by-case basis.
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Guide YVL D.4 also covers the clearance of regulated buildings and sites in the context of 
decommissioning nuclear facilities. The radiation protection requirement for such clearances 
is that the annual individual dose must not exceed a constraint between 10 µSv and 100 µSv, 
to be determined based on optimization. The relevant IAEA safety standards and guides have 
been used as reference for the guide.
Discharges from nuclear facilities
Some liquid and airborne discharges arise from the operation of nuclear facilities. The 
discharge limits are specific to nuclides or nuclide groups and they must be in conformity 
with the annual dose constraints for the most exposed individual of the population. The dose 
constraint for NPPs is 0.1 mSv per year (Nuclear Energy Decree Section 22 b) and 0.01 mSv per 
year for nuclear waste facilities (Nuclear Energy Decree Section 22 d, YVL D.3 and YVL D.5).
Radioactive waste from medical use, research and industry
For non-nuclear radioactive waste, constraints to transfer the waste to be handled according 
to the Waste Act (646/2011) or release into sewage systems are provided in the Regulation 
S/2/2019. The criteria are based on the Basic Safety Standards Directive (2013/59/Euratom).
According to Regulation S/2/2019, liquid waste may be disposed of into a sewage system 
and solid waste may be transferred to be handled according to the Waste Act, as long as the 
activity levels are below the exemption levels. Sealed sources with activity levels below the 
clearance level may be disposed of as non-radioactive waste (Regulation STUK SY/1/2018). 
Other ways the source needs to be disposed of as radioactive waste through an operator 
holding a safety license.
Spent fuel and radioactive waste management practices and plans
The current main sources of radioactive waste in Finland are the nuclear waste generated 
from the operation of the two nuclear power plants (including four reactor units) and one 
small research reactor. Non-nuclear radioactive waste arises from several facilities using 
radioisotopes for medical, research and industrial applications. The management practices for 
nuclear and non-nuclear radioactive waste are shortly described below. A concise overview of 
the management strategies is provided in the text box.
The NPP utilities FPH and TVO themselves take care of the interim storage of spent fuel, 
of the management of LILW including disposal, and of the planning for and implementation 
of the decommissioning of the NPPs. Their jointly owned company, Posiva, takes care of 
the preparation for and later implementation of spent fuel encapsulation and disposal. 
Fennovoima has plans to construct and operate its own nuclear waste manament and disposal 
facilities. Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd (VTT) is responsible for nuclear waste 
produced during the operation of the research reactor (FiR 1) and during decommissioning. 
Producers of non-nuclear radioactive waste perform some waste management operations, 
such as initial storage, clearance and disposal into landfill type sites. According to the 
Radiation Act, recognized licensees can receive radioactive wastes and sealed sources if they 
have safety licences approved by STUK for their operations. If there are no recognized pathway 
for conditioning, storage and disposal of non-nuclear waste, then STUK will be responsible 
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NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Responsibilities
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9) prescribes that the generators of nuclear waste are responsible 
for all nuclear waste management measures and their appropriate preparation, as well as for their 
cost. The State has the secondary responsibility in case any producer of nuclear waste is incapable 
of fulfilling its nuclear waste management obligation (Nuclear Energy Act, Sections 31 and 32). 
Current and future producers of nuclear waste must take care of the interim storage of spent fuel, 
and of conditioning and disposal of low and intermediate level waste and of planning for and 
implementation of the decommissioning of NPPs. Posiva Oy, a jointly owned company by FPH 
and TVO, is responsible for the preparations for and later implementation of its owners’ spent 
fuel disposal. VTT, as an operator of the research reactor FiR 1, is responsible for planning and 
implementation of the waste management and decommissioning of the facility, including the 
arrangements for disposal of the waste. Fennovoima Oy will be responsible for its own spent fuel 
disposal as well as for other nuclear waste management and decommissioning activities.
Producers of non-nuclear radioactive waste must manage their waste within the limits of their 
technical capability while ensuring safety and security. Non-nuclear radioactive waste that cannot 
be cleared, including spent sealed sources that cannot be returned to the manufacturer, must 
be handed over to an installation licensed to receive waste for the conditioning and transfer of 
radioactive waste to a central storage operated by STUK and later for disposal.
Waste management and decommissioning objectives
Low and intermediate level nuclear waste and non-nuclear radioactive waste that meets the 
acceptance criteria for the repositories at the NPP sites must be disposed of without unnecessary 
delay. Waste that cannot yet be disposed of must be stored safely. Furthermore, other low and 
intermediate level waste, such as decommissioning waste, is envisaged to be disposed of in disposal 
facilities at the NPP sites.
Disposal of TVO’s and FPH’s spent fuel is under preparation in accordance with a strategic plan, 
which is in line with the 1983 Government Policy Decision and the 2003 Decision of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (now the MEAE). The disposal operations are expected to begin in the 2020s. 
The spent fuel disposal programme is subject to a continuous regulatory review. The construction 
license was granted in 2015. The operation license application is expected to be submitted to the 
Government by the end of year 2021. 
The prospective nuclear utility Fennovoima submitted an Environmental Impact Assessment 
Programme at the end of June 2016 for a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility of its own. At the same 
time, it presented a co-operation agreement with Posiva Solutions Oy, a subsidiary of Posiva, to 
ensure that the knowledge developed during Posiva’s disposal project for spent nuclear fuel will 
also be available for Fennovoima. Co-operation started in 2016.
The implementation of decommissioning the NPPs will be optimized considering the technical 
aspects, radiological impacts, future use of the site, availability of a competent workforce and the 
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costs. The strategy takes advantage of options for clearance of very low-level waste and structures 
of the plant and on-site disposal of decommissioning waste.
Financial provisions 
The purpose of the State Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR Fund) is to collect, store and 
reliably invest the funds that are going to be needed to take care of nuclear waste in the future. 
Through the fund, the society has a financial guarantee that nuclear waste management can be 
arranged under all circumstances.
The capital of the fund is composed of annual payments made by operators under a waste 
management obligation and the returns of the fund. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE) determines the annual fee to be paid to the fund each year, ensuring that the 
fund always has enough assets to secure the costs of all nuclear waste management measures that 
still have to be carried out.
The fund is not included in the state budget, and it operates under the MEAE. The fund was 
established in 1988 under the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987). The fund is managed by its board and 
a director. The board makes all key operative decisions.
for rendering the radioactive waste harmless. STUK may agree with the custodian of the waste 
that custody of the waste will be permanently assigned to the Government for a fixed payment 
(for more information see Section J Disused Sealed Sources).
Spent fuel management
Spent nuclear fuel from NPPs is stored at the power plant sites until it is disposed of. Initially, 
the fuel is cooled for one to five years in storage pools inside the reactor buildings. The Loviisa 
NPP has, in addition to the storage pools in the reactor buildings, a separate integrated pool 
type storage facility. The Olkiluoto NPP has a separate on-site facility for spent fuel storage 
common for all reactor units. A summary of current stored spent fuel inventory is presented in 
Section D.
In practice, before disposal, the spent fuel will be stored in water pools for 30 to 50 years. 
More details on pool storages are given in Section G. After cooling down in storage pools, 
spent fuel is going to be transported or transferred to the encapsulation and disposal facilities 
in Olkiluoto. Further details of the past and future milestones on the implementation of 
spent fuel disposal programme are given in Section H and in Annexes L.2 and L.3. In 2015, the 
granted construction license for Nuclear Disposal Facility (ONKALO) enables disposal of in 
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total 6500 tonnes of uranium (spent fuel) in Olkiluoto. The estimated total is based on the 
following expectations of operational lifetimes of LO1 and LO2 (50 years), and OL1, OL2 and 
OL3 (60 years) – cf. Figure 4.
Spent fuel is planned to be encapsulated in copper-iron canisters. The canister design 
consists of a cast iron insert as a load-bearing element and an outer container made of copper 
to provide protection against corrosion. The canisters will be emplaced into the disposal 
facility that consists of technical rooms and other auxiliary spaces, shafts and of a network of 
central and deposition tunnels (the repository), which will be constructed at a depth of 400 to 
455 m in crystalline bedrock.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS AND RESEARCH REACTOR ‐ OPERATION AND DECOMMISSIONING
LOVIISA 1‐2
OLKILUOTO 1‐2
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FIGURE 4. Timetable for the management of spent fuel from the nuclear power plants at Loviisa and Olkiluoto
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The annulus between the canister and the deposition hole walls will be filled with a 
compacted bentonite buffer material. A schematic layout of the underground disposal facility 
and the network of tunnels at Olkiluoto are illustrated in Figure 5 and an individual deposition 
tunnel with two canister emplacement variants are illustrated in Figure 6.  
FIGURE 5. A schematic presentation of the layout of the underground disposal facility and 
the network of disposal tunnels for vertical disposal option. (© 2019 Posiva Oy)
FIGURE 6. Disposal tunnel and canisters with both the vertical (KBS‑3V) 
and horizontal (KBS‑3H) disposal options depicted.
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Spent fuel from the FiR 1 is currently stored on site. The primary option for its spent fuel 
management before dismantling the research reactor is to return the fuel to the United States 
according to Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRR SNF) Acceptance Program of 
U.S. Department of Energy (DoE). A secondary option is interim storage in Finland and later 
disposal in the Olkiluoto spent fuel disposal facility. This would require that VTT shall have 
agreements with both the company responsible for the interim storage and Posiva. Currently, 
VTT and FPH have a 5-year agreement on interim storaging (starting from licensing) of the 
FiR 1 spent fuel in Loviisa. However, the operational storaging and disposal activities will also 
need granted licenses before operations can start. The total amount of spent nuclear fuel of the 
research reactor is about 340 kg (ca. 25 kgU). 
Management of LILW from nuclear facilities
The predisposal management of LILW currently takes place at the NPPs under their operating 
licences and other provisions. The waste is segregated, treated, conditioned, packaged, 
monitored and stored, as appropriate, before they are transferred to the site-specific disposal 
facilities.
At Loviisa, for the time being, the majority of wet LILW (radioactive concentrates, such as 
spent ion exchange resins, evaporator concentrates and sludges) is stored in tanks at the NPP. 
The Loviisa plant uses FPH’s innovative selective ion exchange method to reduce the volume 
of liquid radioactive waste. FPH started liquid waste solidification in 2016 in Loviisa NPP after 
STUK gave authorization for operation in February 2016. The aim is to solidify all wet waste 
stored in the tanks in the future. At Olkiluoto, wet LILW is immobilized in bitumen before 
transfer to the disposal facility. It is planned that sludge, radioactive concentrates and spent 
ion exchange resins from liquid waste treatment in Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) will be dried in drums or 
solidified in concrete.
At both currently operating NPPs, solid LLW is transferred after conditioning to the 
disposal facility. Options for the management of waste below clearance level are either general 
clearance or case-specific clearance. Such waste can be reused, recycled or disposed of in 
landfills. The Olkiluoto NPP has a landfill on site, while the Loviisa NPP has an agreement with 
a regional landfill to dispose of cleared waste. TVO is planning to replace its landfill by near-
surface disposal facility for VLLW.
Activated metal waste consists of irradiated components and devices that have been 
removed from inside of the reactor vessel. So far, this kind of highly activated waste has not 
been conditioned but is stored at the NPPs and is expected to be conditioned and disposed of 
together with similar types of decommissioning waste.
According to the strategy adopted by the Finnish nuclear power plant operators, low and 
intermediate level wastes from reactor operations should be disposed of in the bedrock at the 
power plant sites. At Olkiluoto the operation of the LILW disposal facility started in 1992 and 
in Loviisa in 1998. The disposal facilities are operated by the nuclear power plant personnel, 
FPH at Loviisa and TVO at Olkiluoto.
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The Loviisa disposal facility is located at 
a depth of approximately 110 m in granite 
bedrock. The facility consists of three halls 
for solid LLW and a cavern for immobilised 
ILW (Figure 7). Inside the cavern for ILW, the 
waste packages are emplaced in a pool-shaped 
structure made of reinforced concrete. One 
of the halls (HJT3) has been licensed only 
for storage that also facilitates the sorting 
of waste, allowing clearance from regulatory 
control of some of the waste. HJT3 is also used 
for temporary storage of the solidified waste. 
Licensing of HJT3 is planned later for the 
disposal of operational or decommissioning 
waste.
The Olkiluoto disposal facility for LILW 
consists of two silos at a depth of 60 to 95 m 
in tonalite bedrock, one for solid LLW and the 
other for bituminized ILW (Figure 8). The silo 
for solid LLW is a shotcrete rock silo, while 
the silo for bituminized waste consists of a 
thick walled concrete silo inside a rock silo 
where concrete boxes containing drums of 
bituminised waste will be emplaced. Currently, 
a licensing process is being prepared for an 
Olkiluoto VLLW near surface disposal facility. 
TVO started these plannings at the end of 
2018 and the EIA phase of the planned facility 
is about be launched during 2020. The LILW 
disposal facility will be extended in the 2030s, 
to be able to receive all the LILW from OL1, OL2 
and OL3 reactor units during their planned 
60 years of operation. Further extension 
of the disposal facility is also planned for 
decommissioning wastes of existing NPP units 
at Olkiluoto.
FIGURE 7. Loviisa disposal facility. a) Cross‑sectional 
view of the disposal facility for LILW and the planned 
extension for decommissioning waste, b) drums of LLW 
from reactor operation waste in the disposal hall and 
c) commissioned disposal hall for solidified waste.
FIGURE 8. The Olkiluoto LILW repository. Cross‑sectional view of the repository 
lay‑out (left) and LLW drums in the disposal silo (right).
a)
b)
c)
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LILW generated from the operation of the research reactor FiR 1 is currently stored at the 
reactor facility in Otaniemi. At the end of March 2020, VTT signed a contract with FPH on 
storage and disposal of operational and decommissioning wastes in Loviisa NPP site. The 
estimated total amount of decommissioning waste is about 75 tons with a total activity of less 
than 5 TBq. 
Based on Fennovoima’s plans, LILW will be collected, stored, handled and disposed of at 
the power plant site. Fennovoima has made an early estimate of amounts of different LILW 
types based on information given by the plant supplier for the chosen reactor type (AES-2006). 
The plans include waste handling methods for dry, wet, liquid and metallic waste. LILW will 
be disposed of in a disposal facility which will be constructed on the plant site at a depth of 
several tens of meters in the bedrock. Fennovoima is also considering a surface-based facility 
as an option for the disposal of VLLW. The management of the operational waste is currently 
only presented on a conceptual level. The waste management plans will be developed further 
during the next licensing phases.
Management of non-nuclear radioactive waste
An applicant for a license for the use of sealed sources is required to present a plan for the 
management of the disused sources. The two available options are either to return the sources 
to the supplier/manufacturer of the source, or delivery to the national long-term storage 
facilities operated by STUK’s Department of Environmental Radiation Surveillance. This role 
in operating the storage facilities is defined in Government Decree on the Ionizing Radiation, 
Section 32 (for more information see Section J Disused Sealed Sources).
Radioactive waste is stored in an interim storage cavern attached to the LILW disposal 
facility at Olkiluoto. Operations by STUK’s Department of Environmental Radiation 
Surveillance are conducted under the regulatory control of STUK’s Department of Nuclear 
Waste Regulation and Safeguards. The organisational structure of STUK clearly separates 
32 STUK-B 259 / OCTOBER 2020
SECTION B POLICIES AND PRACTICES
its duties in operating the centralised storage facility from its functions as the regulatory 
authority for radioactive materials and waste management. The disposal of sealed sources and 
other non-nuclear radioactive waste is included in the operating license for the Olkiluoto LILW 
disposal facility. The license was granted by the Government in 2012. The disposal of this waste 
started at the end of 2016. 
A licensee can be exempted from preparing a waste management plan if the operations 
are arranged in such a manner that the prerequisites set in the Section 28 of the Government 
Decree on the Ionizing Radiation are met. However, even in this case STUK may order 
monitoring of discharges and reporting thereof, if this is considered necessary due to 
environmental considerations, the nature of the work or the nature and amount of radioactive 
substances in use. In addition to being below the limits, all discharges to the environment 
must be kept as low as reasonably achievable.
In practice, most of the waste from the use of unsealed sources in Finland arise in such 
low activity concentrations or amounts that it is not necessary to arrange the disposal of the 
generated waste in the same way as for sealed sources. A common practice is that radionuclide 
laboratories store their short-lived radioactive waste at their premises until they have decayed 
below the levels set for discharge in the Regulation S/2/2019. However, some waste resulting 
from radiochemical research at VTT have been sent to STUK for storage in Olkiluoto. Some 
materials, e.g. reactor vessel materials used in studies conducted by VTT, are returned to the 
owners of the sample materials for their interim storage and disposal.
A specific waste issue arises from disused smoke detectors. There are currently over 3 
million detectors in use, each containing about 40 kBq of Am-241. The disposal of an individual 
detector into normal municipal waste was earlier considered, from the radiological point of 
view, as the optimum waste management option. However, the Council Directive 2002/96/EC 
of 27 January 2003 defines disused smoke detectors as waste electronic equipment subject to 
recycling requirements. Nowadays, a private entrepreneur takes care of removing the radiation 
sources from recycled smoke detectors and hands them over to an installation licensed to 
receive, condition and transfer radioactive waste to a central storage operated by STUK.
Decommissioning plans for nuclear facilities
Loviisa NPP has operational license until 2027 (unit 1) and 2030 (unit 2). FPH is currently 
evaluating feasibility for applying license for extended operation. If operation ends 
Loviisa NPP decommissioning will start during this decade. The utilities have updated the 
decommissioning plans of NPPs for regulatory review every six years (the Nuclear Energy Act, 
Section 7 g). FPH submitted an updated plan for the decommissioning of the Loviisa NPP 
for regulatory review in 2018. TVO will submit the Olkiluoto NPP decommissioning plan for 
regulatory review by the end of 2020. The decommissioning plan for the Loviisa NPP is based 
on immediate dismantling, within eleven years from shutdown while for the Olkiluoto NPP; 
a safe storage period of about 30 years prior to dismantling is envisaged. The justification for 
postponed dismantling is based on a decrease in radioactivity and the availability of nuclear 
site infrastructure, since the OL3 unit will be operational while the OL1 and OL2 units are being 
dismantled. The disposal plans for waste arising from the decommissioning of the NPPs are 
based on the extension of the existing on-site repositories for LILW. Besides the dismantling 
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waste, also activated metal components accumulated during the operation of the reactors are 
planned to be disposed of in those repositories. The engineered barriers will be selected taking 
into account the radiological and other safety related characteristics of each waste type. A 
special feature of the decommissioning plans is the emplacement of large components, such as 
pressure vessels and steam generators, in the disposal rooms as whole entities, without cutting 
them into pieces.
VTT decided to decommission its research reactor (FiR 1) due to insufficient funding for 
continued operation in 2012. The EIA procedure for the decommissioning ended in February 
2015, when the MEAE gave its statement on the EIA report. VTT applied for a license for 
decommissioning the research reactor in June 2017. The decommissioning license is expected 
to be granted during 2020. The cost estimate for the decommissioning has been updated yearly 
since 2014 as required by the MEAE. The dismantling will be regulated by STUK concerning the 
radiation and nuclear safety aspects. 
Decommissioning plans for non-nuclear facilities
Revised Radiation Act (Section 83) states that authorization is required for decommissioning 
of radiation sources facilities. VTT compiled a decommissioning plan of an old hot cell 
laboratory in 2017. It included a risk assessment and descriptions of the decommissioning 
phases, the possible demolition techniques, management and processing of radioactive and 
contaminated materials as well as radioactive waste management plans. In 2019 VTT applied 
for a safety license for decommissioning of hot cell laboratory facilities. The license was 
granted in autumn 2019 for the handling and storage of radioactive waste. The license covers 
the disposal or transfer (for further use) of radioactive research samples, removal of radioactive 
materials and contaminated equipment and structures, surface cleaning, and handling and 
storage of radioactive waste.
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Article 3 Scope of Application
This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent fuel management when the spent fuel results from the 
operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel held at reprocessing facilities as part of a reprocessing 
activity is not covered in the scope of this Convention unless the Contracting Party declares reprocessing to 
be part of spent fuel management.
This Convention shall also apply to the safety of radioactive waste management when the radioactive 
waste results from civilian applications. However, this Convention shall not apply to waste that contains 
only naturally occurring radioactive materials and that does not originate from the nuclear fuel cycle, 
unless it constitutes a disused sealed source or it is declared as radioactive waste for the purposes of this 
Convention by the Contracting Party.
This Convention shall not apply to the safety of management of spent fuel or radioactive waste within 
military or defence programmes, unless declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purposes of this 
Convention by the Contracting Party. However, this Convention shall apply to the safety of management 
of spent fuel and radioactive waste from military or defence programmes if and when such materials are 
transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes.
This Convention shall also apply to discharges as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11, 14, 24 and 26.
Reprocessing and military or defence programmes
Finland has adopted a once-through nuclear fuel cycle. There is no reprocessing facility in 
Finland. It is not permitted to send spent fuel for reprocessing to another country as the 
Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987, Section 6 a) denies it. Thus, all spent nuclear fuel, after it has 
been permanently removed from the reactor, falls in the scope of the Convention.
No spent nuclear fuel of military or defence origin exists in Finland.
Airborne and liquid discharges from nuclear and radioactive waste management facilities, 
notably from NPPs, are included in the scope of this Convention.
Naturally occurring radioactive materials
Waste outside the nuclear fuel cycle, containing only Naturally Occurring Radioactive 
Materials (NORM), except sealed radium sources, is not declared as radioactive waste for 
the purposes of the Convention. Some information on managing NORM waste related to 
conventional mining industry is given in section H. Minor legacy sites generated in prospective 
uranium extraction experiments are listed in section K.
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Article 32 Reporting, paragraph 2
This report shall (also) include:
(a) a list of the spent fuel management facilities subject to this convention, their location, main 
purpose and essential features;
(b) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this Convention and that is being held in storage and 
of that which has been disposed of. This inventory shall contain the description of the material and if 
available, give information on its mass and its total activity;
(c) a list of radioactive waste management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main 
purpose and essential features;
(d) an inventory of radioactive waste that is subject to this Convention that:
• is being held in storage of radioactive waste management and nuclear fuel cycle facilities;
• has been disposed of; or
• has resulted from past practices;
this inventory shall contain the description of the material and other appropriate information 
available, such as volume or mass, activity and specific radionuclides;
(e) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of being decommissioned and the status of 
decommissioning activities at those facilities.
The total inventory on spent fuel and radioactive waste 
The major part of the radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel has been produced in the 
currently operating nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto (OL1 and OL2) and Loviisa (LO1 and 
LO2). Small amounts of spent fuel and radioactive waste has been produced during the 
operation of the FiR 1 research reactor in Otaniemi. The total inventory of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste at the end of 2019 are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The detailed information 
on spent fuel and radioactive waste inventory and existing waste and spent fuel management 
facilities are presented in the report from IAEA Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Information 
System (SRIS) database in Annex L.5.
TABLE 2. Total spent fuel inventory.
Spent fuel Total Stored Amount Total Disposed Amount
Spent fuel from NPP’s 2261 tHM 0
Spent fuel from research reactor 21,3 kgHM 1)
1) The first option is to send the fuel back to USA according existing returning agreement.
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TABLE 3. Total radioactive inventory at the end of 2019.
Waste Class Total Stored Amount m³ Total Disposed Amount m³
VLLW 204 1)
LLW 1691 6541
ILW 1970 2117
HLW 0 0
1) Currently VLLW is disposed to LILW repository and is included in the total inventory of disposed LLW.
Non-nuclear radioactive waste 
The licensing database maintained by STUK includes source-specific information on each 
sealed source in the licensee’s possession. This information is updated continuously according 
to the licensee’s notifications and to observations made during inspections. Small users of 
radioisotopes have some radiation sources on their premises which are no longer in use but 
have not yet been declared as radioactive waste. The number of such sources is relatively 
limited, whereas it is prohibited to unnecessarily store sources for which no use is foreseen. 
Disposed non-nuclear wastes are included in Table 3.
Waste from past practices
There are no significant amounts of waste from past practices requiring further management.
Decommissioning
The decommisiong plans and the current status of of the VTT FiR 1 research reactor have 
been described in more detail in Sections A and B, and further dealt in the following Sections 
below. The estimated total amount of decommissioning waste of FiR 1 reactor is about 75 tons 
(unpacked volume about 40 m³) with a total activity of less than 5 TBq.
The decommissioning plans of the old VTT hot cell laboratory has been discussed in more 
detail in Section B. The estimated total amount of radioactive waste from dismantling of old 
hot cell laboratory is 26 m³ with total activity of 130 MBq.
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Article 18 Implementing measures
Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of its national law, the legislative, regulatory 
and administrative measures and other steps necessary for implementing its obligations under this 
Convention.
The necessary legislative, regulatory and other measures to fulfil the obligations of the 
Convention have been taken and are discussed in this report.
Article 19 Legislative and regulatory framework
Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the 
safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.
This legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:
(a) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations for radiation safety;
(b)  a system of licensing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management activities;
(c) a system of prohibition of the operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility 
without a license;
(d) a system of appropriate institutional control, regulatory inspection and documentation and 
reporting; the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of the licences;
(e) a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved in the different steps of spent fuel and of 
radioactive waste management.
When considering whether to regulate radioactive materials as radioactive waste, Contracting Parties 
shall take due account of the objectives of this Convention.
National safety requirements and regulations for radiation safety
In Finland, the legislation for the use of nuclear energy and for radiation protection was 
established in 1957. The current Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation Act were issued in 1987 
and 2018, respectively. Since, several amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act and new detailed 
regulations have been issued. The 2018 Radiation Act meant a full revision of the whole 
radiation safety legislation including all subsequent decrees and regulations.
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Nuclear legislation and regulations
The current Finnish nuclear legislation is based on the Nuclear Energy Act from 1987, together 
with a supporting Nuclear Energy Decree from 1988.
The scope of this legislation covers e.g.
• The construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities; nuclear facilities 
refer to facilities for producing nuclear energy, including research reactors, facilities 
performing extensive disposal of nuclear waste, and facilities used for extensive 
manufacturing, production, use, handling or storage of nuclear materials or nuclear waste;
• Mining and milling operations aimed at producing uranium or thorium;
• The possession, manufacture, production, transfer, handling, use, storage, transport, import 
of nuclear material and nuclear waste, and export of nuclear waste as well as the export and 
import of ores and ore concentrates containing uranium or thorium.
A significant amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act was passed in 1994 to reflect a new policy 
which emphasises the national responsibility to manage nuclear waste generated in Finland. 
In general, the export and import of nuclear waste, including spent fuel, is prohibited in the 
revised Act. A notable exception is allowed for the FiR 1 research reactor. Thus, according to 
the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 6 a) the provisions forbidding export of nuclear waste do not 
apply to spent fuel that has been generated in connection with or as a result of the operation 
of a research reactor in Finland. However, in conformance with Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 
7 b) possibility to export does not apply to any other nuclear waste resulting from FiR 1.
The nuclear energy legislation was updated and reformed in 2008 to correspond to the 
current level of safety requirements and the new Finnish Constitution, which came into 
force in 2000. The new Constitution required that the general principles for the protection of 
citizens should be provided for in the level of Acts.
In 2011 two further revisions were made to the Nuclear Energy Act. The first was due to the 
Nuclear Safety Directive (Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM) and the second one includes 
provisions on mining and milling operations aimed at producing uranium or thorium. The 
licensee’s obligation to assure the safe use of nuclear energy was already stipulated in the Act, 
but the first amendment added the requirement that the obligation may not be delegated 
or transferred to another party. The licensee’s obligation to arrange necessary training for 
nuclear safety personnel and the responsibility of the MEAE to arrange self-assessment and 
international peer reviews to evaluate the national framework were also included in the Act.
In 2012, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended to make some minor clarifications and to 
extend the role of inspection organisations.
Finland was active in the process of developing a proposal for a European Council Directive 
on the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. In 2013, the Nuclear Energy Act and 
the Radiation Act were amended to implement Directive 2011/70/EURATOM on 19 July 2011 
establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel 
and other nuclear and radioactive waste. The principles of a graded approach and maintaining 
the generation of radioactive waste to the minimum amount reasonably practicable were 
included in both Acts. In the Nuclear Energy Act the provisions of self-assessment and peer 
review were updated to also cover radioactive waste management.
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In 2012, the Finnish regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety was reviewed in 
the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) peer review process. According to the IRRS 
recommendations, some amendments needed to be considered for the legislation mainly 
concerning the independence of STUK. The Nuclear Energy Act was revised in 2015 to enable 
STUK to issue legally binding regulations. The updated Radiation Act was delivered in 2018.
Minor amendments were made in the Nuclear Energy Act in 2017 due to changes in 
environmental impact assessment legislation. Also, in 2017 the Nuclear Energy Act was 
amended to clarify the licensing of decommissioning of nuclear facilities. A decommissioning 
license was added into the legislation based on IRRS recommendations from 2012. Before 
the amendment, the decommissioning of nuclear facilities was licensed as a renewal of the 
operating license of a nuclear facility. Previously required license renewal documentation 
did not reflect the different and lesser risks of decommissioning projects. Some other minor 
amendments were also made in nuclear and radiation legislation to reflect changes in 
other legislation (e.g. labour safety, and the criminal code). Amendments in other national 
legislation have not caused essential changes to the regulatory control for waste management 
or to the safety requirements set for it.
The Basic Safety Standards Directive was implemented in Finland in 2018. Due to changes 
to the Radiation Act and related Decrees, references to said legislation were updated in Nuclear 
Energy Act in 2018.
The provisions for the use of nuclear energy in the Nuclear Energy Act also address spent 
fuel and nuclear waste management. The Nuclear Energy Act Section 9 stipulates that a 
licensee whose actions result in the generation of nuclear waste shall be responsible for all 
associated waste management operations and their related costs. Further specific requirements 
on nuclear waste management are given in Sections 27 a to 34) and requirements for the 
financial provision for nuclear waste management are specified in Sections 35–53. Sections 35 
to 53 describe the VYR Fund and its operating principles. The MEAE determines the annual 
fee to be paid to the fund each year, ensuring that the VYR fund always has enough assets to 
secure the costs of all nuclear waste management measures that still must be carried out.
Based on the Nuclear Energy Act, in 2016 STUK issued regulations which are legally binding 
according to Section 7 q of Nuclear Energy Act. The Regulations currently in force are:
• Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
(Y/1/2018)
• Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on Emergency Response Arrangements 
at Nuclear Power Plants (Y/2/2018)
• Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on the Security in the Use of Nuclear 
Energy (Y/3/2016)
• Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear 
Waste (Y/4/2018)
• Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on the Safety of Mining and Milling 
Operations Aimed at Producing Uranium or Thorium (Y/5/2016).
The Regulations Y/1/2018 (Safety of a Nuclear Power Plant, Y/2/2018 (Emergency Arrangements 
of a Nuclear Power Plant) and Y/3/2016 (Security in the Use of Nuclear Energy) are applied to 
40 STUK-B 259 / OCTOBER 2020
SECTION E LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY SYSTEM
nuclear power plants, which are defined as any nuclear facility equipped with a nuclear reactor 
and other related nuclear facilities located on the same plant site. Regulations Y/2/2018 and 
Y/3/2016 are also applied to other nuclear facilities to the extent applicable, based on the 
graded approach.
STUK’s Regulations include changes to safety requirements arising from the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident and WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association; see also 
chapter Nuclear Regulatory Guidance) Safety Objectives and Safety Reference Levels.
As described above, the nuclear legislation has been amended several times. The MEAE has 
in 2019 started an evaluation of the possible need of a comprehensive reform of the legislation.
Nuclear Regulatory Guidance
Detailed safety requirements on the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste 
resulting from the production of nuclear energy are provided in the YVL Guides. The YVL 
Guides also provide administrative procedures for the regulation. The YVL Guides are issued 
by STUK, as stipulated in the Nuclear Energy Act. The YVL Guides are rules an individual 
licensee or any other organisations concerned must comply with, unless some other acceptable 
procedure or solution has been presented to STUK through which the required level of safety 
stipulated in the Nuclear Energy Act, the Nuclear Energy Decree and STUK Regulations is 
achieved.
The procedure to apply new or revised guides to existing nuclear facilities is that the 
publication of a YVL Guide does not, as such, alter any previous decisions made by STUK. After 
having heard those concerned, STUK makes a separate decision on how a new or revised YVL 
Guide is applied to a nuclear facility in operation, or to those under construction, and to the 
licensee’s operational activities, as well as to other nuclear facilities related to nuclear waste 
management and disposal and to Finland’s research reactor. For new nuclear facilities, however, 
the guides apply as such.
Nowadays the most important references considered in the rulemaking are the IAEA safety 
standards, WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association) Safety Reference 
Levels and WENRA’s latest statement on the Safety Objectives for New NPPs. Other sources 
of safety information are worldwide co-operation with other countries using nuclear energy, 
e.g. with the member countries of OECD/NEA. The Finnish policy is to participate in the 
international discussion on developing safety standards and to adopt or adapt new safety 
requirements into national regulations. The Finnish policy is to include all WENRA Safety 
Reference Levels in the regulatory framework while updating regulatory guides through a 
systematic approach.
STUK currently has 45 YVL Guides. In the area of waste management, the most important 
changes are that the requirements concerning spent fuel interim storages were updated to 
take account of the lessons from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, and that the requirements 
concerning the decommissioning of nuclear facilities were included in the YVL guidance. 
STUK issued a new Guide YVL D.7 Release barriers of spent nuclear fuel disposal facility in 
2018. The Guide YVL D.7 addresses the detailed technical design, manufacture, construction, 
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installation, inspection, testing and verification of conformity of barriers intended for the 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel, and the monitoring of the impacts of their construction during 
construction and operation.
Legislation and regulations for the use of radiation sources
A full revision of the Finnish radiation safety legislation took place in 2018 through the 
adoption of the Radiation Act (859/2018) and subsequent legislation ja regulations:
• the Decree of the Government on Ionizing Radiation (1034/2018),
• the Decree of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on Ionizing Radiation (1044/2018), 
and
• a set of STUK regulations.
At the same time the Radiation Act of 1991 and subsequent legislation, regulations and 
regulatory guides, namely all the ST Guides, were all repealed.
The new Radiation Act authorizes STUK to issue legally binding regulations on specified 
matters. During 2018–2019 STUK issued the following regulations (list below contains only 
those in force and with relevance to radioactive waste):
• SY/1/2018 Regulation on exemption and clearance
• S/1/2018 Regulation on plans for radiation safety deviations and actions during and after 
radiation safety deviations
• S/3/2018 Regulation on security of radiation sources subject to authorization
• S/6/2018 Regulation on radiation measurements
• S/2/2019 Regulation on radioactive waste and releases in the use of unsealed sources
• S/3/2019 Regulation on practices involving exposure to natural radiation
• S/5/2019 Regulation on radiation safety of radiation sources during use and 
decommissioning of radiation sources and facilities
• S/6/2019 Regulation on practices subject to authorization.
It should be noted that the nature and contents of these new regulations are very different 
from the previous ST Guides which included both legally binding provisions but also regulatory 
guidance. Now it is foreseen that no traditional type of regulatory guides in printed form will 
be issued anymore. However, there is an on-going project to issue regulatory guidance in an 
on-line database enabling the linkage of legal provisions and regulatory guidance through 
searches on different types of practices and substance matters.
The main reason for the full revision was to bring the radiation safety legislation in line 
with the EU Council Directive 2013/39/Euratom. At the same time the concordance with the 
revised Constitution of 2000 and various other important updates to the Finnish legal system 
including the Administrative Procedure Act (434/2003) were ensured.
The new radiation safety legislation emphasizes the responsibility of the licensee in all 
respects of safety and in all phases of operations, the optimization of protection and the 
application of graded approach to regulation.
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Several upgrades regarding management of radioactive waste was established compared to 
the previous legislation ja regulations:
• Decommissioning of radiation sources and radiation sources facilities is now specifically 
addressed.
• The legislation now addresses waste which is not classified as radioactive waste but in the 
management of which provisions on the protection of workers and members of the public 
shall applied. These wastes include e.g. NORM-waste from mining and milling activities 
(those not related to the production to uranium or thorium) and waste arising from existing 
exposure situations e.g. from long term remediation activities after accidental large spread of 
contamination to the environment.
• Licensees shall conduct a safety assessment on all their activities, including waste 
management.
• Licensees shall use a radiation protection expert in matters related to waste management.
• Classification of practices based on the activity of wastes to be disposed in land fillings, 
separate heaps or among other types of waste.
• The requirement for financial security was extended to the conditioning of radioactive 
waste.
• Authorization of facilities continuously confronting orphan sources.
Licensing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management activities
The licensing of the currently operating disposal facilities for LILW at Loviisa and Eurajoki 
NPP sites were iniatiated according to the legislation that was in force before 1987. Therefore, 
their licensing processes are not comparable with the current licensing process.
The current licensing process is defined in the exisiting legislation. The construction and 
operation of a nuclear facility is not permitted without a license and licences are prepared by 
the MEAE and granted by the Government. For any nuclear reactor unit, spent nuclear fuel 
storage, nuclear waste disposal facility, or another significant nuclear facility there are four 
different licensing steps:
• Decision-in-Principle – made by the Government and ratified by Parliament
• Construction License – granted by the Government
• Operating License – granted by the Government
• Decommissioning License – granted by the Government.
The conditions for granting a license are prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 
18–20 a). The operating licences of a nuclear facility are granted for a fixed term, generally for 
10–20 years. Construction and decommissioning license do not have a fixed term. In case the 
operating license is granted for a longer period than 10 years, or 15 years in case of disposal 
facilities for nuclear waste, a periodic safety review is required to be presented to STUK. The 
periodic re-licensing or review has allowed good opportunities for a comprehensive safety 
review.
Before a Construction License for a nuclear reactor unit, spent fuel storage, nuclear waste 
disposal facility, or other significant nuclear facility can be applied for, a Decision-in-Principle 
by the Government and a subsequent ratification of the DiP by Parliament are required. The 
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EIA procedure shall be conducted prior to the application for the DiP. Also, the EIA report and 
the coordinating authority’s statement on the assessment report must be annexed to the DiP 
application. A condition for granting the Decision-in-Principle is that the construction of 
the nuclear facility in question must be for overall good of society. Further conditions are as 
follows:
• The municipality of the intended site of the nuclear facility must be in favour of 
constructing the facility (the municipality has a veto right)
• No factors must have arisen which would indicate that the proposed facility could not be 
constructed and operated in a safe manner (STUK has a veto right).
The entry into force of the Government’s Decision-in-Principle further requires ratification 
by Parliament. Based on established practice, Parliament does not make any changes to the 
Decision; it only approves or rejects it as such. The authorization process for a nuclear facility 
is described in Figure 9. In the construction and operating license application handling 
processes, the acceptance of Parliament and of the hosting municipality are no longer required.
The Decision-in-Principle procedure was implemented for the first time for a nuclear waste 
management facility during the period November 1999 – May 2001 when Posiva applied for a 
Decision-in-Principle for a disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel originating from the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. The Government made the DiP in December 2000 and 
Parliament ratified the decision in May 2001. The same DiP procedure was repeated in 2002 for 
Bidding & site preparation
Construction
Operation
Decommissioning License
Decision-in-Principle
Construction License
Operating License
Environmental Impact 
Assessment (utility)
Feasibility studies (utility)
Nuclear safety
Energy policy
FIGURE 9. Authorization of nuclear facilities in Finland.
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the extension of the capacity of the spent fuel disposal facility to include spent fuel from the 
new reactor unit OL3. Therefore, Posiva has a DiP, as well as Construction License, in force for 
the disposal of spent fuel from two reactor units in Loviisa and three reactor units in Olkiluoto.
The licensing system was assessed in the IRRS peer review mission conducted in Finland 
in October 2012. The IRRS team gave a recommendation that the Finnish Government should 
seek to modify the Nuclear Energy Act so that the law clearly and unambiguously stipulates 
STUK’s legal authority in the authorization process for nuclear and radiation safety. In 
particular, the amendments should ensure that STUK has the legal authority to specify any 
license conditions necessary for safety. The Nuclear Energy Act, Sections 23 and 25 were 
amended in 2015 for this purpose. The IRRS also recommended clarifying the licensing 
for decommissioning nuclear facilities by setting a decommissioning license, which was 
implemented into the Nuclear Energy Act in 2017.
Based on the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 16), minor licences for spent fuel and nuclear 
waste management activities (near-surface disposal facilities for VLLW, export, import, 
transfer and transport licences and licences for operations) are granted by STUK.
The licensing system for practises under the Radiation Act is described in Section 48 of 
the Act. The use of radiation requires a safety license, which can be granted by STUK upon 
application. A safety license can be issued for the different phases of a practice and can be 
subject to extra conditions needed to ensure safety. The license will be issued if it complies 
with the principles of justification, optimization and dose limitation and it is demonstrated 
through a safety assessment that the practice can be conducted safely. In addition, Sections 
49–50 provide for exemption from licensing of some minor radiation sources and exposures.
Prohibited operation without a license
The use of nuclear energy without a license provided by the Nuclear Energy Act is prohibited. 
Simarly, the unauthorized use of radiation sources that need a safety license, in accordance 
with the Radiation Act, is prohibited.
Institutional controls and enforcement of regulations
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55), STUK is responsible for the regulatory 
control of the safety of the use of nuclear energy. The rights and responsibilities of STUK 
are provided in the Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 55 and 63). The regulatory activities 
include authorization, review and assessment, inspection and enforcement, development 
of regulations and guides, national registers and inventories, information and public 
communication.
The most important documents of the nuclear facility licensee, which shall comply with the 
regulations and other safety requirements and are reviewed by STUK, are the Preliminary and 
Final Safety Analysis Reports (PSAR and FSAR), and for disposal facilities also the post-closure 
Safety Case documentation in support of PSAR and FSAR. STUK’s on-site inspections aim at 
verifying that the actual operations at the nuclear facilities comply with the regulations and 
the documents of the licensee, for example.
The Radiation Act (Section 11) provides that adherence to the Act (and thus the decrees and 
regulations issued in accordance with it) shall be regulated by STUK. The regulatory rights of 
STUK are described in the Act (Sections 176–184).
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The Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation Act define the enforcement system and rules 
for suspension, modification or revocation of a license. The enforcement system includes 
provisions for executive assistance if needed and for sanctions in case the law is violated.
Clear allocation of responsibilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management
According to the Section 54 in Nuclear Energy Act, the overall authority in the field of nuclear 
energy is the MEAE. STUK is responsible for the supervision of the safe use of nuclear energy 
according to Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55). In addition, STUK is responsible for attending to 
the supervision of security and emergency planning, and for the necessary control of the use of 
nuclear energy to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons (for more information see Article 
20).
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9), a licensee, whose operation generates or 
has generated nuclear waste, shall be responsible for all nuclear waste management measures 
and their appropriate preparation as well as for the arising expenses.
The Radiation Act (Chapter 11) provides for the management of radioactive waste from non-
nuclear applications. The responsible party (i.e. the licensee or any company or organization 
which uses radiation sources in its practices) is required to take all measures needed to render 
the radioactive waste arising from its operation harmless. In cases where a practice produces 
or may produce radioactive waste that cannot be rendered harmless without considerable 
expense, a financial security shall be furnished to ensure that these costs and those arising in 
performing any necessary environmental decontamination measures are met.
The state has the secondary responsibility in case a producer of nuclear waste (the Nuclear 
Energy Act, Sections 31 and 32) or non-nuclear radioactive waste (the Radiation Act, Section 
80) is incapable of fulfilling its management obligation.
The regulatory responsibilities are discussed under Article 20.
Article 20 Regulatory body
Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with the 
implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 19, and 
provided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its 
assigned responsibilities.
Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its legislative and regulatory framework, shall 
take the appropriate steps to ensure the effective independence of the regulatory functions 
from other functions where organizations are involved in both spent fuel or radioactive waste 
management and in their regulation.
Bodies of the regulatory framework
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, the overall authority in the field of nuclear energy is 
the MEAE. The Ministry prepares matters concerning nuclear energy to the Government 
for decision-making. Among other duties, the MEAE is responsible for the formulation of a 
national energy policy.
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According to the Radiation Act (859/2018, Section 13), the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health has the highest command and control over compliance with the Act. STUK supervises 
compliance with the Radiation Act and subsequent decrees and regulations.
The mission of STUK is ‘to protect people, society, environment, and future generations 
from harmful effects of radiation’. STUK is an independent governmental organisation for 
the regulatory control of radiation and nuclear safety, as well as nuclear security and nuclear 
materials. STUK is administratively under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Interfaces 
with ministries and governmental organisations are described in Figure 10. It is emphasized 
that the regulatory control of the safe use of radiation and nuclear energy is independently 
carried out by STUK. No Ministry can make decisions on a matter that has been defined by 
law to be on the responsibility of STUK. STUK has no responsibilities or duties which would 
conflict with regulatory control. 
The current Act on STUK was given in 1983 and the Decree in 1997. According to the Decree, 
STUK has the following duties:
• regulatory oversight of safety of the use of nuclear energy, emergency preparedness, security 
and nuclear materials
• regulatory control of the use of radiation and other radiation practices
• monitoring of the radiation situation in Finland, and maintaining preparedness for 
abnormal radiation situations
• maintaining national metrological standards in its field of activity
• research and development work for enhancing radiation and nuclear safety
STUK – Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority
Independent regulatory and expert organisation.
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FIGURE 10. Co‑operation and interfaces between STUK, ministries and other organisations.
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• informing on radiation and nuclear safety issues, and participating in training activities in 
the field
• producing expert services in the field of its activity
• making proposals for developing the legislation in the field, and issuing general guidelines 
concerning radiation and nuclear safety
• participating in international co-operation in the field, and taking care of international 
control, contact or reporting activities as enacted or defined.
STUK has the legal authority to carry out regulatory oversight. The responsibilities and 
rights of STUK, as regards the regulation of the use of nuclear energy and use of radiation are 
provided in the Nuclear Energy Act and Decree and in the Radiation Act and Decree. STUK’s 
responsibilities and rights include the following main regulatory activities: authorization, 
review and assessment, inspection and enforcement, development of regulations and 
guidelines, national registers and inventories, information and public communication. STUK 
does not grant construction or operating licences for nuclear facilities. However, in practice 
no such license would be issued without STUK’s statement, where the fulfilment of the safety 
regulations is confirmed as described in Article 19. The regulatory oversight is described in 
detail in Guide YVL A.1.
STUK’s Advisory Committee was established in March 2008. The Advisory Committee 
supports STUK to develop its functions as a regulatory, research and expert organisation 
in such a way that the activities are in balance with society’s expectations and the needs of 
citizens. The Advisory Committee can also make assessments of STUK’s actions and give 
recommendations to STUK.
The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety was established in 1988 by a Decree. This 
Committee gives advice to STUK on important safety issues and regulations. The Committee 
also gives its statements on license applications. The Committee has two international sub-
committees, one for reactor safety (RSC) and one for safety issues related to radioactive waste 
(NWSC). In addition, an Advisory Committee on Radiation Safety has been established. 
The committee gives statements on important radiation safety issues and regulations. The 
members of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety and the Advisory Committee on 
Radiation Safety are nominated by the Government.
To assist STUK’s work in nuclear security, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security was 
established in 2009. The members of the committee come from various Finnish authorities, 
and the nuclear licensees also have their representatives as experts. The duties of the 
committee include the assessment of threats in the nuclear field as well as consulting STUK on 
important security issues. The committee also aims to follow and promote both international 
and domestic co-operation in the field of nuclear security issues. The members of the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Security are nominated by the Government.
To assist STUK’s work in nuclear security, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security was 
established in 2009. The members of the committee come from various Finnish authorities, 
and the nuclear licensees also have their representatives as experts. The duties of the 
committee include the assessment of threats in the nuclear field as well as consulting STUK on 
important security issues. The committee also aims to follow and promote both international 
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and domestic co-operation in the field of nuclear security issues. The members of the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Security are nominated by the Government.
STUK is responsible communicating with the public and media on radiation and nuclear 
safety. STUK aims to communicate proactively, openly, timely and understandably. A 
prerequisite for successful communication is that STUK is known among media and general 
public, and the information given by STUK is regarded as truthful. Communication is based on 
best available information. STUK’s own web site is an important tool in communication. STUK 
also uses social media platforms for two-way public communication. Internal communication 
informs the personnel about STUK’s activities, and this supports STUK’s capability to 
communicate with public.
STUK’s role and responsibilities have been assessed by a peer review. An IRRS mission 
(IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service) was carried out in October 2012 and a follow-up 
mission in June 2015.
In June 2015, the follow-up mission, 5 international experts and 4 IAEA staff members 
reviewed regulatory activities in Finland based on IAEA Safety Standards, international best 
practices and experiences and lessons learned from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. 
The purpose of the IRRS follow-up was to review the measures undertaken following the 
recommendations and suggestions of the 2012 IRRS mission. The scope of the follow-up 
mission was the same as in 2012, i.e. to cover nuclear facilities, except the research reactor FiR 1 
(due to the decision on decommissioning), radiation sources and transport.
As a result of the follow-up mission the review team concluded that the recommendations 
and suggestions from the 2012 IRRS mission have been implemented systematically in a 
comprehensive action plan. Significant progress has been made in most areas and many 
improvements have been implemented in accordance with the action plan. The IRRS team 
determined that 7 out of 8 recommendations and 19 of 21 suggestions made by the 2012 IRRS 
mission had been effectively addressed and therefore could be considered closed.
The recommendation left open in the 2015 follow-up mission deals with STUK’s position 
related to the Government which will be discussed further in Finland but for the time being 
without changes in STUK’s position. Two new recommendations were raised to amend the 
legislation to clarify that the decommissioning of a nuclear installation and closure of a 
disposal facility require a license amendment; and to address the arrangements for research in 
radiation safety.
Recommendation on clarifying the legislation related to decommissioning of nuclear 
installations and closure of a disposal facility is partly addressed. Decommissioning license 
was introduced to the Finnish legislative framework in the beginning of 2018. Future work 
needs still to be carried out for clarifying the licensing of closure of disposal facilities.
To establish a sound base for radiation protection research, the co-operation with Finnish 
universities and international research platforms has been reinforced. Research funding 
opportunities have been exploited and STUK is in an active role in shaping research agendas 
of many of these platforms to ensure that national aspects of research funding are considered 
at European level. STUK has also set up an internal research funding mechanism. The income 
from expert services is partly reserved for research projects and researchers can apply funding 
for their projects biannually.
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One of the open suggestions in the 2015 IRRS follow -up mission was related to STUK’s 
management system. The evaluation of the management system has been started as indicated 
in Article 23.
The next IRRS mission is planned for 2022. Also, the IAEA mission Integrated Review 
Service for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Decommissioning and 
Remediation (ARTEMIS) has been agreed to take place in 2022. The next IAEA International 
Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission has been invited and will be carried out 
in 2021.
Finance and resources of the regulatory body
The organisational structure and the responsibilities within STUK are described in the 
Management System of STUK. Additionally, processes for regulatory oversight and other 
activities of STUK are presented in the Management System. The organisation of STUK is 
described in Figure 11.        
In 2019, the overall costs of STUK were 41.5 million €, and it received about 40% of its 
financial resources through the State budget. However, the costs of nuclear regulatory 
oversight are charged in full of the licensees. The model for financing the nuclear regulatory 
work is called a net-budgeting model and it has been applied since 2000. In this model, the 
licensees of the nuclear industry pay the regulatory oversight fees directly to STUK. In 2019, the 
cost of the regulatory oversight for nuclear safety was 18.4 million €. The cost of the regulatory 
oversight of the use of radiation and non-nuclear waste was 3.3 million € in 2019. This was 
covered partly by licensee fees and partly by state budget.
STUK has adequate resources to fulfil its responsibilities in regulatory oversight. The net-
budgeting model makes it possible, for example, to increase personnel resources flexibly based 
on needs.
At the beginning of 2020, the number of staff in the department of Nuclear Waste 
Regulation and Safeguards came to 25. The regulatory oversight of waste management facilities 
is supported by the Nuclear Reactor Regulations department with 123 experts from different 
disciplines. At the beginning of 2020, the number of staff in the Radiation Practices Regulation 
Department was 58. Non-nuclear radioactive waste is mainly regulated by the Radiation in 
Industry section, which has a staff of 12. The expertise of STUK covers all the essential areas 
needed in the oversight of the use of nuclear energy. As needed, STUK orders independent 
analyses, reviews, and assessments from technical support organisations to complement its 
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FIGURE 11. Organisation of STUK. The total number of staff in January 2020 was 350.
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own review and assessment work. The main technical support organisation of STUK is VTT, 
but also Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology (LUT) and Aalto University (former 
Helsinki University of Technology) are important. Furthermore, international technical 
support organisations and experts are used.
Ensuring competence of the regulatory body
The management of STUK highlights the need for a competent workforce. To this end STUK 
has adopted a competence management system. Nuclear and radiation safety and regulatory 
competencies are also emphasised in STUK’s strategy. Implementation of the strategy is 
reflected in the annual training programmes, on the job training and new recruitment. The 
national nuclear safety (SAFIR) and waste management research (KYT) programmes play an 
important role in the competence building for all essential organisations involved in nuclear 
energy. The funding of the programme according to the Nuclear Energy Act (Articles 53 d and 
53 e) comes from the license holders via the VYR. These research programmes have two roles: 
firstly, ensuring the availability of experts and tools for regulatory oversight, and secondly, 
ensuring the on-line transfer of research results to the organisations participating in the 
steering of the programmes and fostering the expertise. STUK has an important role in the 
steering of these programmes.
Most of the professional staff at STUK conducting review, assessment and inspections hold 
a university level degree. The average experience of the staff is about 15 years in the nuclear 
field. A competence analysis is carried out on a regular basis and the results are used as the 
basis for training programmes and new recruitments. The training programme includes 
internal courses as well as courses organised by external organisations. On average, 5% of the 
annual working hours have been used to enhance competence.
An induction programme is set up at STUK for all newly recruited inspectors. In addition 
to administrative issues, the induction programme includes familiarisation with legislation, 
regulatory guidance and regulatory oversight practices. The programme is tailored to each new 
inspector and its implementation is followed by the superior of the employee. STUK has also 
participated in the preparation and execution of a basic professional training course on nuclear 
safety and nuclear waste management with other Finnish organisations in the field (described 
in more detail in Article 22).
National research programmes
During the recent years, the total volume of nuclear energy research in Finland has been at a 
level 75 million € annually (estimate of MEAE). Over 70% of these funds are direct investments 
of power companies to nuclear energy research, and around two thirds of the total volume 
focus on nuclear waste management.
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2003 to ensure (see Section B) funding for a long-
term nuclear safety and nuclear waste management research in Finland. Funds are collected 
annually from the license holders to special funds. Regarding nuclear safety research, the 
amount of money is proportional to thermal power of licensed power plants. In regard nuclear 
waste research, those who are responsible for nuclear waste management pay annually a 
fixed portion of their respective assessed total liability. In 2016, the Nuclear Energy Act was 
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amended, and a temporary increase of the payments collected to the nuclear safety research 
fund was introduced. The purpose of the temporary increase of the research funding is to 
renew the ageing infrastructure for the nuclear safety related research. The increased funding 
is collected in between the years 2016 and 2025. At the first stage the additional funding has 
been allocated for the hot cells at VTT Centre of Nuclear Safety (CNS) and at the second 
stage it will be allocated for the thermohydraulic laboratory at Lappeenranta University 
of Technology. Since the year 2016, the annual funding of NPP nuclear safety projects has 
been around 9 million €, of which around 5 and 4 million € are used for infrastructural 
improvements and research, respectively. During recent years, the annual level of funding of 
the nuclear waste management has been around 3 million €.
The funds collected are used for national publicly funded safety research programs called 
SAFIR2022 (nuclear safety) and KYT2022 (nuclear waste). The research projects in these 
programs have been selected so that they support and develop the competence in nuclear 
safety and nuclear waste management and create preparedness for the regulator to be able 
to respond to safety issues. However, research projects also do have supplementary funding 
mostly from research institute budgets.
Most national publicly funded research takes place at VTT, which is the largest research 
organization in the field of nuclear energy. Other major research institutes include Aalto 
University, LUT, Geological Survey of Finland, Finnish Meteorological Institute, and 
Universities of Helsinki, Jyväskylä and Tampere.
The objective of KYT2022 is to ensure the enough and comprehensive availability of nuclear 
technological expertise and other capabilities required by the authorities when comparing 
different nuclear waste management approaches and implementation methods.  The new 
KYT2022 programme was planned and initiated in year 2018. The programme continues the 
traditions of previous periods with the main research areas of:
• safety research in spent nuclear fuel management
• near-surface disposal
• low and intermediate nuclear waste management
• decommissioning
• new and alternative technologies in nuclear waste management and
• social science studies related to nuclear waste management.
National competence in radiation protection research is strengthened via consortium of 
Finnish Universities, VTT and STUK. The purpose of the consortium is to coordinate and 
strengthen the radiation safety research in Finland. It also maintains the national radiation 
safety research programme that describes the research needs and the role of each member. 
STUK is an active member of European radiation research platforms and European association 
of national metrology institutes and participates in shaping their strategic research agendas at 
the European level. In addition, STUK has set up an internal research funding mechanism. The 
income from expert services is partly reserved for research projects and researchers can apply 
funding for their projects biannually.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and regulatory practices are in accordance with 
Article 20.
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Article 21 Responsibility of the license holder
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of spent fuel or radioactive 
waste management rests with the holder of the relevant license and shall take the appropriate steps to 
ensure that each such license holder meets its responsibility.
If there is no such license holder or other responsible party, the responsibility rests with the Contracting 
Party which has jurisdiction over the spent fuel or over the radioactive waste.
The responsibility for safety rests with the licensee as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
Also, according to the Act (Section 9), each licensee, whose operations generate or have 
generated nuclear waste, are responsible for all nuclear waste management measures and their 
appropriate preparation, and are responsible for their costs. If the license holder is found not 
to be capable of carrying out the waste management completely or partly, the Government 
shall order that such nuclear waste be transferred to the responsibility of the State. The waste 
management obligation of the licensee will expire when the disposal of nuclear waste has been 
completed and STUK has confirmed that the nuclear waste is permanently disposed of in an 
approved manner (Sections 31–34 of the Nuclear Energy Act).
Furthermore, the licensee is responsible for security and emergency preparedness 
arrangements and other necessary arrangements for the limitation of nuclear damage. The 
authorities regulate these arrangements, but the responsibility belongs to the licensees. To 
ensure that the financial liability for the future management and disposal of nuclear waste 
and for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities is secured, the licensees under a waste 
management obligation must fulfil the financial provision obligation by making payments 
into the VYR, and furnish the State with securities as a precaution against insolvency. Further 
information about funding arrangements are given in Section B.
As a precondition for granting a safety license for the use of radiation, the Radiation 
Act requires (Section 51) that the applicant presents valid proof on the safe management 
of any radioactive waste which may be generated. Further, the Radiation Act (Section 79) 
requires that the responsible party must organize the practice so that it meets all radiation 
safety requirements prescribed in the Act and must take all the measures needed to 
render radioactive waste arising from its operation harmless. The Act also provides for the 
responsibility for decontamination of the environment if radioactive material is released to 
such an extent that the resulting health or environmental hazards require action (Section 138). 
According to the Act (section 147), in the utilization of natural resources containing radioactive 
materials, the responsible party shall ensure that radioactive waste does not pose any health 
or environmental hazard during operations, including measures taken while finally stopping 
these activities.
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The Radiation Act (Section 80) provides that if the responsible party does not meet the 
requirements set for radioactive waste management, the State has the secondary obligation 
in managing the radioactive waste or residues. The same applies if the origin of the waste is 
unknown, or no primary responsible party can be found.
It is the responsibility of the regulatory body to verify that the licensees fulfil their 
responsibilities set in the regulations. This verification is carried out through safety reviews 
and assessments as well as inspection programmes established by STUK.
Article 22 Human and financial resources
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(a) qualified staff are available as needed for safety-related activities during the operating lifetime of 
a spent fuel and a radioactive waste management facility;
(b) adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of facilities for spent fuel and 
radioactive waste management during their operating lifetime and for decommissioning;
(c) financial provision is made which will enable the appropriate institutional controls and 
monitoring arrangements to be continued for the period deemed necessary following the closure of a 
disposal facility.
Human resources
The licensee has the prime responsibility for ensuring that his employees are qualified and 
authorized for their jobs. According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 55) STUK shall set 
qualification requirements for persons involved in the use of nuclear energy, including 
activities important to nuclear safety, and also verify that the requirements are met. The 
regulatory requirements for human resources are stated in the Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 7 i, 
7 k, 7 l, 7 p, 19 20 and 20 a), Nuclear Energy Decree (Sections 119, 122 and 125), STUK Regulations 
(STUK Y/1/2018 and STUK Y/4/2018) and Guide YVL A.4.
The requirements for the licensees’ personnel are set out in the Nuclear Energy Act Section 
7 i, which stipulates that the personnel should be well suited for their duties, competent and 
well trained. Further according Nuclear Energy Act Section 7 k, a nuclear facility must have a 
responsible director for construction, operation and decommissioning of the nuclear facility. 
According to Section 7 i, licensee must have responsible persons for emergency preparedness, 
security and safeguards and their deputies – all approved by STUK. Sections 7 l and 7 p contain 
regulatory requirements for security organisation and emergency response organisations, 
respectively. Nuclear Energy Decree (Sections 119, 122 and 125) specifies and clarifies the 
requirements set in the Nuclear Energy Act.
Human resources are also verifed in the licensing phases of nuclear facilities. According 
to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 19), a necessary condition for granting a construction 
license for a nuclear facility is the availability of the necessary expertise. According to the 
Nuclear Energy Act (Section 20), an operating license of a nuclear facility may be granted if the 
applicant has the necessary expertise available and, in particular, the operating organisation 
and the competence of the operating staff are appropriate. According to the Nuclear Energy 
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Act (Section 20 a), a license for decommissioning of a nuclear facility may be granted if the 
applicant has the necessary expertise available, and especially if the competence of the nuclear 
facility personnel and the organisation of the nuclear facility are appropriate and suitable for 
decommissioning.
According to Section 25 of the STUK Regulation STUK Y/1/2018 and Section 38 of the 
STUK Regulation STUK Y/4/2018, significant functions with respect to safety within nuclear 
power plants and disposal facilities shall be designated, and the competence of the persons 
performing these functions shall be verified. The licensee shall have a sufficient number of 
competent personnel suitable for the related tasks for ensuring the safety of the nuclear 
facility. The licensee shall have access to the professional expertise and technical knowledge 
required for the safe construction, operation and decommission of the nuclear facility, the 
maintenance of equipment important to safety, and the management of accidents. In addition, 
the licensee of disposal facilities shall have access to the professional expertise and technical 
knowledge required for the long-term safety of disposal, including closure.
The Guide YVL A.4 sets out the requirements for qualifications and training of the 
personnel working in functions that are important for facility safety. The Guide also has more 
specific requirements for safety critical positions, e.g. for the responsible director and persons 
responsible for safeguards, emergency preparedness and security arrangements. It also has 
specific requirements on management and leadership competences. The guide is also applied 
for the waste management company, Posiva, as it is a licensee of a nuclear facility.
NPP utilities and Posiva have special training programmes including waste management 
for their personnel. Staff training at Posiva is based on personal training and development 
plans in addition to company-level plans, which are updated annually. In addition, Posiva 
co-operates with other European waste management organizations in the framework of the 
Technology Platform for Implementing Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste (IGD-TP) and 
has bilateral agreements or understandings on international co-operation with several research 
and implementing organizations acting in the area of nuclear waste management. Posiva also 
participates in the EURATOM projects under the Horizon 2020 research framework programme 
and in various working groups and projects of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD.
STUK’s inspection programmes are one of the key instruments for regulatory oversight 
of construction, commissioning and operation of licensees and license applicants. The 
overall functionality of lisensee’s management system, organization structure, processes, and 
procedures are included in STUK’s inspection programmes for the different phases of nuclear 
facility project.
In activities related to the use of radiation and nuclear energy, the Radiation Act (Sections 
33 and 34) and the Nuclear Energy Act (Sections 7 i and 20) prescribe that the responsible party 
is required to ensure that all workers participating in radiation or nuclear activities or whose 
duties otherwise require special expertise in radiation protection, have competence required 
by the operation and duties as well as radiation protection training and introduction to the 
duties. The responsible party must also ensure that workers participating in radiation activities 
will have supplementary radiation protection training adequately and on regular basis.
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In all activities requiring a safety license, the responsible party shall consult a radiation 
safety expert when planning, implementing and monitoring radiation safety measures 
concerning workers and members of the public in accordance with the nature and extent of the 
responsible party’s activities according to Section 32.
According to Section 28, the responsible party must appoint a radiation safety officer to 
assist the responsible party to carry out implementation of radiation protection arrangements. 
In safety license application, the applicant must provide documents proving qualifications of 
the radiation safety expert and the radiation safety officer (Section 51).
The competense requirements and requirements for qualifications of radiation safety 
experts and officers are set in Chapter 6 in Radiation Act. More detailed requirements of 
radiation safety experts and officers as well as further training of workers are given in the 
decree of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health on ionizing radiation.
STUK performes regulatory oversight of human resources in use of radiation according to 
Radiation Act (Section 14). STUK also accepts the radiation safety experts on request (Section 
39), if the requirements set in Section 37 is met.
Strengthening and maintaining competence building in Finland
Ensuring an adequate national supply of experts in nuclear science and technology and a 
high-quality research infrastructure is recognized as a continuous challenge in Finland as 
the resource need in the nuclear area is currently high due to many ongoing projects in the 
country (e.g. the OL3 project, the new reactor project Hanhikivi 1, and the spent nuclear fuel 
disposal project and decommissioning of the research reactor). The long timescales especially 
associated with the spent fuel disposal also underline the importance of the availability of 
qualified domestic experts in the field in the future. The availability of competent human 
resources has been instigated by training young experts in the nuclear safety field in different 
ways, e.g. on doctoral programmes and separately arranged courses. Also, as indicated at 
the end of Section E, one of the objectives of publically funded safety research programmes 
(SAFIR2022, KYT2022) is to ensure availablility of nuclear safety and technology experts for 
Finnish society. Further information about the challenges related to competence building are 
also given in Section K.
The basic training on nuclear area is provided by LUT and in the metropolitan area by 
Aalto and Helsinki universities. LUT offers M.Sc. Major program in Nuclear Engineering; Aalto 
University offers a minor program in nuclear engineering, and Helsinki University offers 
degrees in radiochemistry.
The main organisations in the nuclear energy area in Finland have developed and organized 
the basic professional training course on nuclear safety and nuclear waste management (“YJK 
course”). The course is annualy held approximately 6-week training programme for students 
and staff members of the participating organisations (STUK, nuclear power companies, nuclear 
waste management companies, universities providing basic training on nuclear area and the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment).
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YJK course was built from former YK and YJH courses starting from autumn 2017. The 
first YK course on nuclear safety commenced in September 2003 and it was an annually held 
approximately 6-week training programme. During the 14 years, over 900 newcomers and 
junior experts participated in the courses. The first YJH course on nuclear weaste management 
commenced in 2010. The course with a six-day curriculum ran since 2011 for around 20–25 
students at a time with around 100 participants altogether by the end of 2016.
When noticing the former cources, 17th YJK cource started in the autumn of 2019. To date, 
over 1200 newcomers and junior experts have participated in these courses. The content 
and structure of the course have been enhanced according to feedback received from the 
participants. The merged YJK cource has brought training and education of nuclear waste 
management to larger audience.
During 2010–2012 a committee set up by the MEAE worked on a report to provide 
recommendations and steps to be taken until the 2020s for ensuring competence and 
resources needed for the nuclear sector. One of the recommendations of the committee was 
that the future needs and focus areas for research in the Finnish nuclear energy sector must 
be accurately defined and a long-term strategy must be drawn up for further development of 
research activities. This calls for a separate joint project among research organisations and 
other stakeholders in the field. The competence review was updated in 2017 to reflect the 
current changes in the operating environment. The updated competence review (http://urn.
fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-327-410-5) revealed that there is still a clear need for development of 
competent human resources in the nuclear waste management sector.
There is a sustained common view among institutional and industrial parties in Finland 
that 1) nuclear energy research shall be wide-ranging and safety relevance based, 2) scientific 
level of national research shall to be high, 3) active participation to international research 
and multidisciplinary collaboration is vital for national research, 4) continuous support to 
doctoral level education is needed, and 5) possibilities for feasible business opprotunities, 
and international activities should to be supported with instutional instruments or securities 
whenever possible. The MEAE calls and sets up in an irregular manner working groups of 
interested parties to consider national research and development strategies. A joint conclusion 
of a working group has been published e.g. in 2014 (MEAE report “Nuclear Energy Research 
Strategy”).
Financial resources
In Finland, each licensee and responsible party is responsible for all on-going costs caused by 
nuclear and non-nuclear radioactive waste management including the future decommissioning 
of the facilities. If a licensee or a responsible party is unable to fulfil its obligations, the Finnish 
Government will take care the costs.
Finnish Government has prepared measures to make sure that nuclear waste management 
can be arranged under all circumstances. Preparations are made by collecting funds to VYR 
Fund. The funds are collected from the nuclear waste generators during the operating lifetime 
of their nuclear power plants. Thus, the society has a financial guarantee that nuclear waste 
management can be arranged under all circumstances.
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The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 35 to 53) provides detailed regulations for the funding 
arrangements and provisions for nuclear waste management and the Nuclear Energy Decree 
(Section 86 to 98) further specifies the system for financial provisions. The financial provisions 
are described in greater detail in the Government Decree on Financial Provisions for the Cost 
of Nuclear Waste Management (991/2017).
The producers of nuclear waste are obliged to present justified estimates every three years of 
the future cost of managing their existing nuclear waste, including spent nuclear fuel disposal 
and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The MEAE annually confirms the assessed liability 
and the fund target. The waste generators annually pay the difference between the fund target 
and the amount already existing in the Fund. The payments can also be reimbursed if the 
funded amount exceeds the targets. The waste generators must provide collateral securities to 
MEAE for the portion of assessed liability that is not yet secured by the Fund. The VYR Fund 
store and reliably invest the funds. The tasks of the VYR Fund are described in detail in the 
Government Decree on the State Nuclear Waste Management Fund (161/2004).
In 2012, the VTT, which operates the research reactor (FiR 1), decided to shut down the 
reactor and the planning of the decommissioning phase started. VTT is responsible for 
observing the same requirements for funding as described above. As the decommissioning 
proceeds, VTT will be reimbursed.
The current estimates, including costs from the management of existing waste quantities 
and from the decommissioning of current NPPs and the research reactor, amounted to about 
2723 million Euros at the end of 2019. The Fund has enough assets to secure the costs of all 
nuclear waste management measures that still have to be carried out for the currently existing 
waste, if needed.
The Radiation Act (Section 54, 55) provides that responsible party must lodge a financial 
security to ensure that the costs of radioactive waste management and any environmental 
decontamination measures can be paid for. For example, a security must be lodged if the 
operator´s safety license is for a high-activity sealed source or several sources with total 
activity corresponding to a high-activity sealed source, or if the action generates or may 
generate radioactive waste with considerable management costs. Decision on lodging a 
security as well as on the amount and verification of the security are made by STUK.
Financial provisions for post-closure
One of the main principles of radioactive waste disposal is that it shall be passively safe and 
active measures are not needed. In principle post-closure monitoring or other similar measures 
are not needed from safety perspective. According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 32), a 
condition for the expiry of the obligation for waste management of a nuclear waste generator 
is that the waste has been permanently disposed of in an approved manner and a lump sum to 
the State for the further control of the waste has been paid. Thereafter, the State is responsible 
for the necessary waste management measures and the incurred costs.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 80), the responsible party and others who have 
taken part in producing or handling the radioactive materials or waste must compensate 
the State for the costs incurred by the measures taken to render the waste harmless and to 
decontaminate the environment.
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Article 23 Quality assurance
Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate quality assurance 
programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management are established and 
implemented.
Regulatory requirements regarding management systems
According to Section 38 of STUK Regulation (STUK Y/4/2018), organisations participating in 
the design, construction, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear facility or in closing of 
a repository shall employ a management system for ensuring safety and the management of 
quality. The objective of such a management system shall be to ensure that safety is prioritized 
without exception, and that quality management requirements correspond to the safety 
significance of the activity and function. The management system shall be systematically 
assessed and further developed. The quality management system must cover all functions 
that influence to safety of a nuclear facility. Further on, licensees are required to ensure that 
all their suppliers, sub-suppliers and other partners participating in functions that affect 
nuclear and radiation safety adhere to the quality management system. Along with the 
management system, the STUK Regulation sets requirements for documentation of the roles 
and responsibilities of management and monitoring of the operations.
Guide YVL A.3 sets general requirements for management systems regarding quality 
and safety management. Guide YVL A.3 refers to the ISO 9000:2015 definition of quality 
management according to which quality management consists of quality planning, quality 
control, quality assurance and quality improvement. Guide YVL A.3 adheres to IAEA Safety 
Requirements GSR Part 2 Leadership and management for safety. Requirements for quality 
management of system design are established in the Guide YVL B.1. Further requirements 
related to specific technical areas are presented in the corresponding technical guides.
STUK also has a dedicated YVL guide concerning nuclear facility construction and 
modifications, i.e., Guide YVL A.5. In this guide, there are requirements on construction and 
modification phases in addition to requirements concerning for example project and risk 
management. The management systems of the licensees and applicants are subject to approval 
by STUK.
According to the Guide YVL A.3, any safety-significant revisions to the management 
system must be submitted for approval to STUK, but minor revisions are only submitted 
for information prior to their use. STUK has during the period 2016–2018 revised the YVL 
requirements concerning management systems and quality management taking into account 
experiences, feedback and development of quality standards (e.g. ISO 19443).
According to the Radiation Act (859/2018), organizations that need a safety license for 
use of radiation sources are also subject to management system requirements. The Radiation 
Act stipulates that these organisations need to have e.g: 1) documented management system, 
2) means to verify identified personell qualifications, education and induction, 3) adequate 
knowledge on safety and security critical duties with defined responsibilities, 4) measures to 
keep and develop good safety culture measures, and 5) availablility to utilize the expertises of a 
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radiation safety and a medical physics expert. Some further details regarding radiation safety 
management systems are presented in the radiation safety regulation S/6/2019.
Measures taken by license holders
Holders of nuclear and radiation safety licences are plenty. Holders do have different 
approaches how management systems are documented and implemented. In a broad 
sense, management systems are agreements how organisations are managed (strategies), 
developed (visions), and how organisation activities are supported (processes). Usually ISO 
standards have been used as guidelines with consideration of e.g. resources, quality assurance, 
environmental, worker healthy, safety, security, and ethical aspects. A management system 
needs to be fit for license holders’ purpose, and STUK’s interest is to verify that management 
system meets the nuclear and radiation safety and security needs relevant for the company. 
The following gives an introductory example on Posiva’s management system.
Posiva’s management system documentation consists of a Management Manual, 
Organisation Manual and other manuals, and instructions related to all these. The 
Management Manual presents Posiva’s vision, mission and values, company policies, 
organisation and areas of responsibility, general operational principles, quality assurance 
principles for functional processes, and general descriptions of resources. The Organisation 
Manual comprises more detailed descriptions of the functional processes, prinsiples and 
responsabilities. Posiva’s management System complies to the requirements of the Guide YVL 
A.3 and ISO 9001:2015.
The functions and responsibilities of Posiva’s organisations and personnel are described in 
detail in the Posiva’s Administrative Rules, in the Organisational Manual and in the manuals 
and instructions of individual organisational units.
Posiva is actively developing the management system due to preparing for operating 
license. Current management system is valid until the end of the construction phase. For 
operating license, the updated management system shall be implemented completely 
early enough before operations. Organizational changes at Posiva are safety evaluated by 
management.
The Posiva integrated Management System ensures that nuclear safety significance is 
recognised and considered when making decisions and determining procedures.
Posiva aims at ensuring the supply chain quality management using a document specifying 
the requirements set for the quality management systems of the subcontractors and by 
auditing suppliers and manufacturers.
Management system of the regulatory body
STUK’s management system documents include safety and quality policy, description of the 
management system, organisation and management, roles and responsibilities, personnel 
policy as well as description of processes and procedures. The results of management reviews, 
internal audits, self-assessments and international evaluations are used as lessons learned 
and inputs for the continuous improvement of the management system at STUK. STUK´s 
management system encompasses core processes and procedures that are specified and applied 
for regulation and oversight of nuclear facilities. The departments within STUK organisation 
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regulating nuclear facilities are Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Waste and Materials 
Regulation.
STUK has recently developed an internal procedure and a supporting tool further to 
improve regulatory processes and functions based on regulatory experience gathered from 
various sources. These have been applied since the beginning of 2019 and the experiences seem 
promising. In the future, the established procedure will developed be further e.g. including 
practices for sharing the lessons learnt with interested parties.
In accordance with the IRRS 2015 follow-up suggestions STUK’s management decided, at 
the end of 2018, that an in-depth evaluation of STUK’s management system will be performed. 
After the evaluation a development plan for a management system with more integrated 
approach will be prepared and implemented.
In conclusion, Finnish regulations and practices comply with Article 23.
Article 24 Operational radiation protection
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a 
spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility:
(a) the radiation exposure of the workers and the public caused by the facility shall be kept as low as 
reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account;
(b) no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed national 
prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards on radiation 
protection; and
(c) measures are taken to prevent unplanned and uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials into 
the environment.
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that discharges shall be limited:
(a) to keep exposure to radiation as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being 
taken into account; and
(b) so that no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed 
national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards on 
radiation protection.
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of a 
regulated nuclear facility, in the event that an unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials 
into the environment occurs, appropriate corrective measures are implemented to control the release and 
mitigate its effects.
Basic radiation protection requirements
The principles of justification, optimisation and dose limitation are included in the Radiation 
Act (859/2018) (Sections 5 to 7). Occupational dose limits and dose limits for the general public 
are set forth in the Government Decree on Ionising Radiation (1034/2018) (Sections 13 to 15). 
These limits conform to the ICRP 103 Recommendation (2007), ICRP 119 Recommendation 
(2012) and the Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM. The implementation of the Council 
Directive 2013/59/EURATOM (replacing the Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM) in Finnish 
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legislation was completed in 2018. The principle requirements for the safe use of nuclear 
energy are given in the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and decree (161/1988).
According to the Government Decree on Ionising Radiation (Section 13), the effective 
dose from occupational exposure must not exceed 20 mSv per year. Medical surveillance of 
employees of NPPs and other working places, where employees are engaged in radiation work, 
is performed following the Radiation Act and subsequent legislation implementing the related 
provisions of the Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM.
The Radiation Act (Section 10) states that for radiation practices and radiation sources 
in generally used the detailed regulations on the dose constraints and potential exposure 
restrictions and their use, as well as on demonstration of the justification and the optimization 
of radiation protection shall be issued by STUK. According to the Government Decree on 
Ionising Radiation (Section 14), the limit for the general public is 1 mSv/a. There are individual 
cases that dose constraints are set lower than the maximum values, if such constraints are 
needed to take account of the radiation exposure originating from different sources and 
to keep the exposure as low as reasonably achievable. In addition, Nuclear Energy Decree 
(Sections 22 b and 22 d) sets annual dose constraints for the member of the public of nuclear 
power plants and facilities.
Dose limits
The maximum values for radiation exposure caused to the population in the vicinity of a 
NPP and a nuclear waste facility, including spent fuel storage, spent fuel encapsulation, 
operation of the disposal facility, anticipated operational occurrences or accidents, as well 
the maximum values of long-term radiation exposure caused by the disposal of nuclear waste 
are given in the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988). The annual dose of the most exposed 
individual among the population arising from the normal operation of a nuclear waste facility 
must be insignificantly low (more specific in the guides YVL D.4 and YVL D.5). According to 
Section 22 d of the Nuclear Energy Decree, the normal operation of a waste facility and the 
decommissioning of a waste facility shall be so designed that the annual dose for the member 
of the public may not exceed the 0.01 mSv constraint. The annual dose limit from the normal 
operation of an NPP is higher and that is 0.1 mSv. Other annual dose limits for anticipated 
operational occurrences and accidents are the same for both NPPs and nuclear waste facilities. 
The limit for an anticipated operation occurrence is 0.1 mSv, while the limit for a Class 1 
postulated accident is 1 mSv, and the limit for a Class 2 postulated accident is 5 mSv and the 
limit for a design extension condition is 20 mSv per year. The dose limits are defined for the 
entire nuclear facility, including all nuclear facilities on the site.
The STUK Regulation (STUK Y/4/2018) provides more specific requirements for the disposal 
of spent nuclear fuel and facilities for handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel and other 
nuclear waste that are not part of a nuclear power plant. For example, the amount of spent 
nuclear fuel stored at any one time at a nuclear waste facility intended for the handling of 
spent nuclear fuel must be limited in a manner that involves no extensive measures to protect 
the public or which would impose long-term restrictions on the use of extensive land and 
water areas as a result of an accident situation.
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STUK has issued several YVL Guides dealing with radiation protection regarding the design 
and operation of NPPs (Guides YVL C.1, C.2, C.3, D.3 and D.4). These also cover spent fuel 
storage, on-site waste management facilities and other nuclear waste facilities, including the 
operational period of disposal facilities for both LILW and spent fuel. The Guides define the 
level of safety required and form the basis for the regulatory review of the license application 
as well as for review and inspection during commissioning and operation.
Nuclear facilities must have a written programme (the ALARA action programme) to keep 
doses low. Based on the principle of continuous development, the programme must include 
both short-term and long-term plans and measures to limit the doses of occupationally 
exposed workers. From the overall viewpoint of radiation protection, the action programme 
must take into account the facility’s operation, water chemistry, plant modifications, materials, 
decontamination, waste management, testing and inspections etc. The programme must 
include target limits for the highest individual annual and collective dose (for an NPP: manSv/
GW net electric power) that must not be exceeded, and this limit must be continuously 
developed. The ALARA action programme must be kept up-to-date and submitted to STUK for 
information.
A licensee of a nuclear facility must present an analysis of the radioactive releases and 
radiation exposure to the population arising from the normal operation and from anticipated 
operational occurrences of the plant and for potential accidents. The reports must also 
demonstrate that the radiation exposure arising from the operation of the plant is as low as 
reasonably achievable (ALARA) and that radioactive releases to the environment are limited by 
employing the best available techniques (BAT).
In the YVL Guides, reporting requirements concerning exceptional situations including 
exceptional releases are given. Release rate limits are also given in the Guides, ensuring actions 
to be taken already before a release limit is reached. The Guides also stipulates requirements 
concerning the monitoring of release pathways and monitoring the environment of a nuclear 
facility.
Operational experiences
Experience gained from the operation of Finnish nuclear facilities shows that the dose 
constraints have not been exceeded, and that the ALARA principle has been followed. The 
results of environmental radiological monitoring programmes show that the amount of 
radioactive materials in the environment at the NPP sites, originating from the Finnish nuclear 
facilities, has been very low. The calculated radiation exposures to a representative person 
in the environment at the NPPs are currently less than one per cent of the dose constraint 
(Figure 12). The new NPP unit, OL3, will have advanced liquid and gaseous effluent treatment 
systems and it is expected that the discharges from the entire Olkiluoto NPP will remain at 
the current low level after the commissioning of the new unit. It should also be noted that 
the dose constraints and actual doses discussed above apply to the entire operation of the 
NPP and the contributions due to long-term spent fuel storage and waste management are 
insignificant fractions of the total exposure: the occupational collective doses resulting from 
waste management, decontamination and spent fuel management activities at the both NPPs 
maximum some hundredths of manSv per year.
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FIGURE 12. Committed doses (mSv/a) to a representative person in the vicinity of Finnish NPPs due to 
annual discharges of radioactive substances. The constraint for the annual dose is 0.1 mSv/a.
Article 25 Emergency preparedness
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive 
waste management facility there are appropriate on-site and, if necessary, off-site emergency plans. Such 
emergency plans should be tested at an appropriate frequency.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency 
plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a spent 
fuel or radioactive waste management facility in the vicinity of its territory.
On-site emergency preparedness
The emergency preparedness plans for spent nuclear fuel storages and existing radioactive 
waste management facilities are included in the plans and arrangement for NPPs. The 
preliminary plans for emergency preparedness for disposal facilities for spent nuclear fuel were 
presented as part of Posiva’s construction license application as required by the Nuclear Energy 
Decree (Section 35). In the preliminary emergency plan Posiva has described the planning of 
emergency arrangements, preparedness and actions in emergency situations and so on. STUK 
has approved Posiva’s preliminary emergency plan in April 2014. According to the Nuclear 
Energy Act (Section 20), adequate on-site emergency preparedness arrangements are required 
before starting the operation of a nuclear facility. The basic regulations for on-site emergency 
preparedness for nuclear installations are given in STUK’s Regulation on Emergency 
Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants (STUK Y/2/2018) and the detailed requirements by 
STUK in Guide YVL C.5. The regulation (STUK Y/2/2018) and YVL Guide C.5 also apply to other 
nuclear facilities and transportations as required by the danger they pose.
The licensee is responsible for the on-site emergency response arrangements. STUK’s 
Regulation states e.g. that emergency planning must be based on an analysis of a nuclear 
facility’s behavior in emergencies and on the analysis of the consequences of emergencies. 
Action in an emergency must be planned to take into account the controllability of events as 
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well as the severity of their consequences. Therefore, emergencies are classified and described 
briefly in the emergency plan of a nuclear facility. In the Regulation (STUK Y/2/2018), the 
design basis for emergency planning is a simultaneous accident at the site’s nuclear facilities 
and the Regulation also requires that appropriate training and exercises are arranged to 
maintain operational preparedness. Training exercises must be arranged in co-operation with 
the authorities concerned.
Emergency training and exercises are arranged annually for the emergency response 
organization of the nuclear facilities. The emergency training includes classroom and group-
specific practical training, as well as special training, such as first aid, fire and radiation 
protection training. In addition to severe accidents, emergencies covered by the emergency 
response exercises must also include conditions classified as alerts. The content and scope of 
the training as well as feedback obtained from the training are assessed in the inspections of 
the STUK’s periodic inspection programme.
On-site emergency exercises are conducted at the NPPs annually so that at least the licensee 
personnel, local off-site emergency management group and STUK participate in them. There 
are always observers from STUK and several other organizations to assess the performance of 
the exercising teams. The scenarios have varied from severe reactor accidents to alert-status 
events, which involve alerting the nuclear power plant emergency organization to the extent 
necessary to ensure the safety level of the plant. Additionally, exercises for other situations, 
such as security-related incidents are regularly conducted. STUK verifies the preparedness of 
the organizations operating nuclear power plants in yearly on-site inspections, as well as by 
supervising the licensee’s emergency training and exercises. Emergency preparedness at the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto power plants meet the regulatory requirements. Posiva must deliver 
the emergency plan in its operating license application, and during the commissioning of 
Posiva’s nuclear waste facilities the emergency arrangements must comply with the emergency 
plan. Furthermore, an emergency exercise must take place before spent fuel is transferred or 
transported into the site area of the encapsulation plant.
Concerning the small users of radiation sources, the Radiation Act (Section 130) stipulates 
that STUK has to be notified immediately in case of any abnormal occurrence connected to the 
use of radiation and substantially detrimental to safety at the place where the radiation is used 
or in its environment. In addition, STUK shall be promptly informed of the disappearance, 
unauthorized use and possession of a radiation source requiring a safety license.
Off-site emergency preparedness
In addition to the on-site emergency plans established by the licensees, off-site emergency 
plans required by the rescue legislation (379/2011) are prepared by the regional authorities. 
The requirements for off-site plans and activities in a radiation emergency are provided in the 
Decree of the Ministry of Interior (612/2015). STUK acts as an expert body who supports and 
provides recommendations to authorities responsible for making decisions and implementing 
protective actions in case of nuclear or radiological emergency.
STUK publishes VAL Guides for emergency responses. The recent Guide update (2020) VAL 1 
“Protective Measures in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency” has been accepted for usage and 
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it provides detailed guidance. In the case of an accident the local authorities are alerted by the 
operating organization of the plant.
The Ministry of Interior has published a guide “Nuclear or Radiological Emergencies” (MI 
publication 10/2016), which contains detailed information on the arrangements in Finnish 
society in the case of a nuclear or radiological emergency.
STUK has an Emergency Preparedness Manual for its own activities in case of a nuclear 
or radiological emergency. STUK has an expert on duty on a 24/7 basis. Notifications of an 
exceptional event (alarm) may be received from the operating organisations of the facilities, or 
from the automatic radiation monitoring network that covers the whole country (approx. 250 
measuring stations), or from foreign authorities.
The off-site emergency plans include provisions to inform the population in the case of an 
accident. Written instructions on radiological emergencies, emergency planning and response 
arrangements have been provided to the population living within a 20 km Emergency Planning 
Zone. These instructions are regularly updated and distributed.
The regulations and guides are tested in full-scale off-site emergency exercises conducted 
every third year at both operating Finnish NPPs with the participation of all organizations 
with a role in the emergency response. In addition, the NPPs run smaller-scale exercises with 
the Rescue Service and STUK at least once every year.
The rescue planning is enhanced by the co-operation between the nuclear power plant, 
regional rescue services, regional police departments and STUK. There are permanent 
coordination groups for both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs to ensure coordinated and consistent 
emergency plans, as well as to improve and develop emergency planning and arrangements and 
to share lessons from the exercises, regulations and other information. Furthermore, extensive 
training is arranged by these groups.
Early notification and communication
The on-site and off-site plans include provisions to inform the population in case of an 
accident. In addition, written information on radiation emergencies, emergency planning and 
response arrangements have been provided to the population. Such information can also be 
found on the internet pages of regional rescue services. Citizens living near nuclear facilities 
are regularly provided with more detailed written information on nuclear accidents and 
protective measures needed during emergencies.
STUK is the National Warning Point and the National Competent Authority in Finland for 
any kind of situation which might result in actual or potential deterioration of radiation safety 
of the population, environment or society. STUK is able to give advice to local, regional and 
governmental authorities on any required emergency response actions 24 hours a day.
Finland is a Contracting Party to the International Convention on Early Notification of a 
Nuclear Accident, as well as to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident 
or Radiological Emergency, both signed in Vienna in 1986. Furthermore, as a Member State 
of the European Union, the Council Directives and Regulations and Decisions concerning 
accident situations apply in Finland. In addition, Finland has respective bilateral agreements 
with Denmark, Germany, Norway, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. Accordingly, arrangements have 
been agreed on to directly inform the competent authorities of these countries in the case of 
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an accident. Similar arrangements ensure direct notification to the authorities of Estonia. The 
bilateral agreements also cover the exchange of relevant information on nuclear facilities.
The Nordic countries have published two joint documents that detail the co-operation 
arrangements in case of a radiological emergency. The Nordic Manual (updated 2015) describes 
practical arrangements regarding communication and information exchange to fulfil the 
stated obligations in bilateral agreements between the Nordic countries. The arrangements 
described in this document include all phases of events, including intermediate and recovery 
phases. The second document, the Nordic Flag Book (published 2014), describes joint 
guidelines, including operational intervention levels, for protective measures concerning 
the population and functions of society in case of nuclear or radiological emergencies. These 
guidelines agreed by radiation and nuclear safety authorities in Denmark, Iceland, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden form a unique document as it includes harmonised and practical 
criteria for early protective measures, as well as recovery actions after contamination. The 
Nordic Manual and Nordic Flag Book ensure that the response to any nuclear or radiological 
emergency in the Nordic countries is harmonised and consistent between the countries.
In addition to the domestic nuclear emergency exercises held annually on each nuclear 
power plant sites, STUK has taken part in international emergency exercises. STUK has also 
participated as a co-player in emergency exercises arranged by the Swedish and Russian 
nuclear power plant operators and authorities. Neighbouring countries have been actively 
invited to take part in the Finnish exercises.
Article 26 Decommissioning
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the safety of decommissioning of a 
nuclear facility. Such steps shall ensure that:
(a) qualified staff and adequate financial resources are available;
(b) the provisions of Article 24 with respect to operational radiation protection, discharges and 
unplanned and uncontrolled releases are applied;
(c) the provisions of Article 25 with respect to emergency preparedness are applied; and
(d) records of information important to decommissioning are kept.
Regulatory requirements
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 g) states that the design of a nuclear facility must provide 
for the facility’s decommissioning and that the related decommissioning plan should be 
presented. The decommissioning plan for a nuclear facility must be sent to STUK for approval 
as part of construction, operating and decommissioning license application for the facility 
(Sections 35, 36 and 36 a in the Nuclear Energy Decree). During operation, the licensee is 
obligated to prepare decommissioning plans for regulatory review every six years (Section 
7 g in the Nuclear Energy Act). These plans aim at ensuring that decommissioning can be 
appropriately performed when needed and estimates for decommissioning costs are provided. 
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 g), when the operation of a nuclear facility has 
been terminated, the facility must be decommissioned in accordance with a plan approved by 
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STUK. The dismantling of the facility and other measures taken for the decommissioning of 
the facility may not be postponed without due cause.
Guide YVL D.4 includes specific requirements for decommissioning. It requires that 
provision for the decommissioning of the nuclear facilities must already be made during 
the design phase. During the design phase, the license applicant must establish the 
decommissioning strategy. This strategy must be regularly evaluated and if necessary, updated 
during the operation of the facility. The limitation of radioactive waste generation and of the 
radiation exposure of workers and the environment arising from decommissioning must be 
considered.
The licensees are responsible for the implementation and costs of decommissioning. As 
described in Section F, Article 22, assets are collected in the VYR Fund. The State has the 
secondary responsibility in case the licensee is incapable of implementing its responsibilities. 
In this case the costs are secured by assets collected in the Fund and by the securities provided 
by the licensees.
Also, in the case of using radioactive sources subject to the Radiation Act, the licensee is 
responsible for decommissioning. The licensee must provide evidence that all disused sources 
have been transferred from the site appropriately, and, where appropriate, that there is no 
remaining contamination. Sections 54 and 55 of the Radiation Act prescribe practices subject 
to a financial provision in the licensing phase to ensure the availability of sufficient funds to 
secure the decommissioning costs.
Decommissioning plans
The four nuclear power plant units in Finland have been in operation for 37 to 41 years at the 
end of 2019. These units are planned to operate up to an overall operation period of 50 (LO1 
and LO2) and 60 years (OL1 and OL2). The first Loviisa NPP unit has an effective operating 
license until 2027 (LO1). If FPH will not apply a license for extended operation, then the first 
commercial NPP decommissioning project is about to start at the end of this decade.
The most recent update of the NPP decommissioning plan made by FPH was issued at the 
end of 2018. The next revision of the decommissioning plan for the OL1 and OL2 will be sent 
for review by the end of 2020. The decommissioning plan for OL3 was submitted to STUK as a 
part of the operation license application of the plant in 2016. Fennovoima has also submitted 
the preliminary decommissioning plan for STUK’s approval as part of a construction license 
application of Hanhikivi 1 unit in 2015. Decommissioning plans for OL3 and Hanhikivi 1 are 
approved by STUK as part of the licencing processes. The decommissioning plan of FiR 1 
research reactor was approved by STUK as part of the decommissioning license application 
review in 2018.
The decommissioning plans include assessments of the occupational and off-site 
radiological safety of the operations. The plans include detailed descriptions of the required 
dismantling and waste management operations, including estimates of the workforce and 
other resources needed. The plans are based on the actual designs of the facilities and take into 
account the facility activity inventories. The contamination levels in the facilities are followed 
by means of specific monitoring and recording programmes.
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The first nuclear facility decommissioning project in Finland is the decommissioning of 
VTT’s research reactor FiR 1. The research reactor went in extended shutdown stage in June 
2015. The EIA process for decommissioning was conducted in 2013–2015. VTT submitted the 
license application for the decommissioning in June 2017. STUK gave its statement of the 
license application to the MEAE in spring 2019. STUK’s safety assessment was finalised at the 
same time. The main conclusion was that the license for the decommissioning can be granted 
and detailed safety requirements can be fulfilled, but there are issues that needs to be solved 
until the actual dismantling of the research reactor can start:
• The plans for the decommissioning phase are still partly unfinished and the fulfilment of the 
detailed safety requirements shall be evaluated before the dismantling works can be started. 
VTT shall provide the finalised FSAR with detailed decommissioning plans for approval to 
STUK. The actual dismantling works cannot be started until STUK has approved the FSAR.
• The current plan for managing radioactive waste is not detailed enough to ensure safe and 
smooth handling, storage and disposal of radioactive wastes. The overall evaluation of 
the radioactive waste management plans is on the responsibility of the MEAE. STUK has 
proposed for setting up a license condition for the waste management planning to ensure 
the adequate development of the waste management solutions for the decommissioning 
phase.
Currently the license application for the decommissioning of FiR 1 research reactor is waiting 
for approval from the Government. The license application process was interrupted due to 
unresolved issues on VTT’s nuclear waste management plans. VTT initiated a two-phase 
procurement procedure for dismantling works and nuclear waste management solution 
in spring 2019. The contract was signed with FPH at the end of March 2020. In addition to 
planning and implementing of dismantling works, the contract contains the handling, storage 
and disposal of the radioactive waste at the Loviisa NPP site both from the operation and 
dismantling of the FiR 1 reseach reactor and VTT’s old hot cell laboratory. It also contains 
an option to store the spent fuel at the Loviisa NPP site until it can be shipped back to USA 
according to the existing return programme (see more details Section D, Article 32). As the 
unclear issues related to nuclear waste management are now resolved, the license application 
process for decommissioning of FiR 1 can continue at the government level. According to the 
current estimate, the Goverment handling of the license application for decommissioning 
could be possible in autumn 2020.
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Safety of Spent Fuel Management
Article 4 General safety requirements
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of spent fuel 
management individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological 
hazards. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:
(a) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during spent fuel management are 
adequately addressed;
(b) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste associated with spent fuel management is kept to 
the minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel cycle policy adopted;
(c) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in spent fuel management;
(d) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying at the 
national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of its 
national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards;
(e) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with spent 
fuel management;
(f) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater 
than those permitted for the current generation;
(g) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.
Scope and principal regulations
Finland has adopted the once-through strategy for spent nuclear fuel management as 
described in Section B. Spent fuel is currently stored at the NPPs’ spent fuel interim storage 
facilities and at the FiR 1 research reactor. The discussion in this Section is limited to the 
interim storage of spent fuel whereas the encapsulation and disposal plans for spent fuel are 
discussed in Section H, Safety of radioactive waste management.
The general regulations for the safety of spent fuel storage are included in the STUK 
Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018). More specific technical requirements are given in YVL Guides 
such as YVL D.3.
Criticality and removal of residual heat
According to the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018), the handling and storage of spent nuclear 
fuel, maintenance of subcritical conditions, integrity of fuel cladding, adequate heat removal 
and radiation shielding shall be ensured with a high degree of certainty. The Nuclear Energy 
Act, Guides YVL A.1 and YVL D.3 require that NPPs shall have enough space and adequate 
systems for the safe handling, treatment, storage and inspection of fresh and spent fuel. 
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Sub-criticality requirements are given in Guide YVL B.4. Sub-criticality of the spent fuel 
during interim storage must be ensured primarily through structural design solutions. The 
requirements concerning handling and storing spent fuel are given in Guide YVL D.3. Fuel 
damage in fuel storages and in fuel transfers are to be minimized by design solutions.
Spent fuel cooling shall satisfy the single failure criterion. This requirement is given in 
Guide YVL B.1.
At the Loviisa NPP site, the latest enlargement of the storage facility was commissioned 
in 2001. The installation of high-density fuel racks was started in 2007, and it will continue in 
the future according to necessity. The total allowable amount of spent fuel, according to the 
renewed operating license issued in 2007, is 1100 tU and the storage capacity with additional 
high-density racks will be adequate until the end of the planned 50 years of operational life.
At the Olkiluoto NPP site, after cooling in pools within the reactor buildings, the spent fuel 
is transferred to an on-site facility, commissioned in 1987, with an initial capacity of about 1200 
tU. The enlargement of interim spent fuel storage was started in 2009 and finalized in 2015. 
The extension of the storage capacity included the construction of three new storage pools 
considering also the commissioning of OL3. The capacity of the interim spent fuel storage 
after this extension is 1800 tU. The extension has been included as part of the OL1 and OL2 
operating license and was authorized as a plant modification. The safety of the spent fuel 
storage sites (both at Loviisa and at Olkiluoto) was analysed as part of the EU stress tests in 
relation to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
The sub-criticality of the spent fuel in existing interim storage facility pools in Olkiluoto 
and Loviisa is ensured through the structural design of the racks and by choosing the boron 
containing rack material. In the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage, ion exchanged water is used in 
the pools, while the Loviisa spent fuel storage has boron containing cooling water in storage 
pools. 
The cooling of the spent fuel in the storage pools is implemented with cooling water 
systems. Both spent fuel storages have two redundant cooling water circuits. If the cooling 
circuits are disabled in accidental conditions, cooling water can be fed from other sources to 
maintain the water level in the storage pools. At Loviisa NPP small cooling towers, which can 
be used for decay heat removal in case of loss of sea water cooling, can also be used for heat 
removal from the interim spent fuel storage pools, if the heat sink used in normal condition 
conditions is lost (see also Articles 5 and 7).
Waste minimization
Minimizing the amount of nuclear waste arising in spent fuel storage is related to minimizing 
the corrosion of the fuel assemblies and storage equipment and limiting the leakage from 
damaged fuel bundles. The requirements concerning these issues are stated in Guide YVL D.3. 
The coolant of spent fuel pools shall be kept clear and clean to facilitate the fuel identification.
The operating Finnish NPPs have performed measures to minimize the radioactive waste 
produced in spent fuel storage. In the Olkiluoto NPP, leaking fuel assemblies are closed in 
hermetically sealed capsules to minimize the Cs activity in the fuel pool cooling water clean-up 
system.
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In Loviisa NPP, leaking fuel assemblies are stored in spent fuel pools without specified 
capsules. Pool water samples are taken regularly and no significant activity originating from 
leaking fuel rods has been identified. In Loviisa, the cobalt content of the shielding elements 
has been decreased to minimize the amount of activation products in the cooling water and in 
the decommissioning waste.
Interdependencies
The Finnish once-through spent fuel management strategy provides that the spent fuel is 
stored in interim storage facilities and is then planned to be disposed of in deep bedrock. 
The spent fuel of TVO and FPH is planned to be disposed in Olkiluoto, in vicinity of the TVO 
interim storage. The disposal plans, including spent fuel transfer and transport, encapsulation 
and disposal, have been adapted to all the fuel types in use in Olkiluoto reactor units 1 to 3 and 
in Loviisa units 1 and 2. 
Posiva, the implementing organization for the spent fuel disposal of TVO and FPH, is co-
owned as a joint company by these NPP utilities. Even though Posiva is the implementer of the 
final disposal, the waste management obligations remain with the NPP utilities. NPP utilities 
make sure that the interdepencies between the different steps in spent fuel management are 
considered in their waste management plans. Fennovoima Oy is responsible for the disposal of 
its own future spent fuel. Fennovoima started the EIA process for its own disposal site in June 
2016 as required as a condition of the DiP. The choice of a site for the disposal of spent fuel will 
become relevant later, approximately in the 2040’s.
Protection of individuals, the society and the environment
The operational radiation protection requirements for spent fuel storage are discussed in 
Article 24. The operating experience, as discussed in Article 9, indicate that spent fuel storage 
has led to practically no releases and occupational radiation exposures have been very low.
Biological, chemical and other hazards
The biological, chemical and other non-radiological hazards posed by the spent fuel storage 
are comparable with conventional industry hazards. Such hazards are regulated by legislation 
related to general occupational safety and to the management of hazardous substances.
Protection of future generations and avoidance of undue burdens on future generations
The interim storage of spent fuel is envisaged to last several decades. The current high level of 
safety can be maintained during that time by means of appropriate operational, maintenance 
and surveillance procedures. The nuclear power plant licensee is responsible for the storage 
safety, operations and costs. The assets collected in the VYR Fund secure the future costs of 
storage in case the licensee is no more able to take care of its responsibilities. Thus, the future 
generations are adequately protected, and any other undue burdens will not be imposed on 
them.
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Article 5 Existing facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to review the safety of any spent fuel management 
facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, 
if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility.
Safety reviews
The latest comprehensive safety assessments of the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto NPPs, including 
the spent fuel storages, have been carried out recently. For the Loviisa NPP it was performed in 
connection with the periodic safety review in 2014–2016 and for the Olkiluoto NPP in 2017–
2018. The periodic safety review for the Olkiluoto NPP was carried out in connection with the 
renewal of operating licences for the Olkiluoto NPP reactor units.
In 2015, STUK finalised the safety assessment of the enlargement of the spent fuel storage 
facility at Olkiluoto and approved TVO’s application to increase the capacity of the spent fuel 
storage facility (see Article 4).
Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, national safety 
assessments as well as EU level stress tests were initiated in Finland in 2011 and 2012. The 
safety of spent fuel storage facilities was assessed as part of NPP safety assessments. STUK 
has reviewed the results and made licensee specific decisions in July 2012. Based on the results, 
it was concluded that no such hazards or deficiencies were found that would have required 
immediate action in Finnish NPPs. However, areas where safety can be further enhanced 
were identified (e.g. decreasing the dependency on the plant’s normal electricity supply and 
distribution systems, as well as on sea water cooled systems for residual heat removal of 
the reactor, containment and spent fuel storage pools, protection against external flooding, 
seismic resistance of spent fuel pools and fire-fighting systems). There were plans on how to 
address these areas and most of the improvements have already been implemented by the end 
of 2019. As an example, Loviisa NPP has completed modifications to ensure long-term decay 
heat removal in case of the loss of seawater by implementing an alternative ultimate heat sink, 
two air-cooled cooling units. Additionally, the availability of extra feed water into the storage 
pools has been improved. TVO has improved the seismic resistance of the fire water systems, 
improved the storage pool water level and temperature systems, and provided additional feed 
water sources into the spent fuel pools.
The comprehensive safety assessments for applications for the renewal of licences include 
updating the following safety relevant documents (among others):
• Final safety analysis reports (FSARs)
• Quality assurance programmes for operation
• Technical specifications
• Programmes for periodic inspections
• Plans for nuclear waste management, including decommissioning and disposal
• Timetables for nuclear waste management and estimated costs
• Plans for physical security and emergency preparedness
• Administrative rules for the facilities
• Programmes for radiation monitoring in the environment of the facilities
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• Licensee assessments of compliance with the regulations, including assessment of the 
fulfilment of YVL Guides’ requirements
• Licensee assessments of how an adequate safety level has been maintained
The periodic safety review report must include the same above listed updated information, as 
appropriate.
The re-licensing safety reviews and statements of STUK given to the MEAE concluded, 
regarding radiation and nuclear safety, that the conditions at the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto 
NPPs comply with the national nuclear energy legislation and regulations. In addition to 
the review of the above-mentioned documents, STUK has also made independent safety 
assessments and has annually performed several regular and topical inspections of the 
facilities.
Need for safety enhancement
The continuous safety assessment and enhancement approach applied in Finland is based on 
the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 a) stating that the safety of the use of nuclear energy shall be 
as high as reasonably achievable. To further enhance safety, all actions justified by operational 
experience, safety research and the progress in science and technology shall be taken. 
Safety improvements have been annually implemented at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
NPPs including the facilities for spent nuclear fuel handling and interim storage since the 
commissioning of the reactor units. At the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage facility, recent safety 
improvements have been carried out in connection with the enlargement of the spent fuel 
storage facility. There exists no urgent need for additional improvements to upgrade the safety 
of these storage facilities. The recent safety improvements were implemented as a result of 
safety assessment due to the Fukushima-Daichi accident and the EU stress test mention earlier 
in this article under the title “Safety reviews”.
Article 6 Siting of proposed facilities 
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established and 
implemented for a proposed spent fuel management facility:
(a) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a facility during its 
operating lifetime;
(b) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the environment;
(c) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of the public;
(d) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to be 
affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility to 
enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall 
not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance with the general 
safety requirements of Article 4.
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Siting process and site-related factors
The spent fuel management facilities are nuclear facilities, either as an integrated part of a 
nuclear power plant or as separate facilities. All the present spent fuel management facilities 
in Finland are located on the NPP sites. According to the Nuclear Energy Act and the Nuclear 
Energy Decree the application for a Decision-in-Principle shall include (among other things):
• An outline of the ownership and occupation of the site
• A description of settlement and other activities and town planning arrangements at the site 
and in its vicinity
• An evaluation of the suitability of the site and the restrictions caused by the planned nuclear 
facility on the use of surrounding areas
• An assessment report in accordance with the Act on the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedure (252/2017), as well as a description of the design criteria the applicant will observe 
in order to avoid environmental damage and to restrict the burden to the environment. More 
detailed requirements on the Environmental Impact Assessment are provided in the Decree 
(277/2017) on the Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure.
In the design of a nuclear power plant, including spent fuel management facilities on site, site-
related external events shall be considered. The STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) provides 
as follows: “The impact of local conditions on safety and on the implementation of the security and 
emergency arrangements shall be considered when selecting the site of a nuclear facility. The site shall 
be such that the impediments and threats posed by the plant to its surroundings remain extremely small 
and heat removal from the plant to the environment can be reliably implemented.” In addition, Guide 
YVL A.2, “Site for nuclear facility”, generally describes all the requirements concerning the site 
and surroundings of a nuclear facility. It also provides requirements on safety factors affecting 
the site selection and covers regulatory control. Specific provisions against earthquakes are 
provided in Guide YVL B.7.
Deterministic analyses are made to assess the impact of various natural phenomena and 
other external events. A probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) is required as part of the safety 
review for construction and operating licences. The PRA also and provides information on the 
estimated frequency of releases of radioactive substances and radiation exposures brought 
about by internal and external events. The requirements of the PRA are given in Guide YVL A.7, 
“Probabilistic risk assessment and risk management of a nuclear power plant”. Restrictions for 
the type and amount of human activity in the vicinity of the nuclear facility site are described 
in Guide YVL A.2.
Assessment of new nuclear power plants and candidate sites
The DiP for Fennovoima NPP was originally ratified by the Parliament in 2010. In 2015, 
Fennovoima Oy changed its NPP plans and applied construction license for the AES-2006 
type power plant. Since then the license application has been supplemented with several 
data and documentation deliveries. These deliveries have also complemented the site related 
documentation of Pyhäjoki, Hanhikivi. They are being evaluated and reviewed in connection 
with the construction license procedure. Deliveries have been reviewed by STUK and other 
expert organizations in their respective fields. In addition to the Finnish regulations, IAEA 
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Safety Requirements and Safety Guides, and WENRA requirements were considered in the 
review.
Safety impact
The safety impacts of a spent fuel management facility are analysed either in the safety 
analysis reports presented as part of the construction or in the operating license applications 
of NPPs regarding spent fuel storage. The operating licences for nuclear facilities are granted 
for a limited period. For the license renewal and the Periodic Safety Review, a comprehensive 
re-assessment of safety, including the environmental safety of the nuclear facility and the 
effects of external events on the safety of the facility, shall be performed. STUK reviews the 
license applications, including all site-specific safety reports.
Availability of information
The availability of information related to the siting process for a major nuclear facility is based 
on Finnish legislation on the openness of information, notably the Act on the Openness of 
Government Activities (621/1999). Further requirements are based on the Act and Decree on 
the Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure and the Nuclear Energy Act. The first step of 
consultation with the general public is the EIA procedure. Public hearings are arranged both 
in the programme phase of the EIA and during the actual impact assessment. The responsible 
contact authority for that procedure is the MEAE. The EIA report and the statement of the 
MEAE must be attached to the application for the Decision-in Principle.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 13) states that, before the DiP is made, the applicant shall 
make an overall description of the facility, the environmental effects it is expected to have 
and of its safety available to the public. The MEAE shall provide a chance for residents and 
municipalities in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear facility, as well as local authorities, 
to present their opinions in writing before the DiP is made. Furthermore, the Ministry shall 
arrange a public hearing in the municipality where the planned site of the facility is located 
and during this hearing the public must have the opportunity to give their opinions either 
orally or in writing. The presented opinions shall be made known to the Government. The 
Act (Section 14) further provides that a prerequisite for the DiP is that the planned host 
municipality for the nuclear facility is in favour of siting the facility in that municipality.
Consulting of contracting parties
Finland is a party to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, signed in Espoo in 1991. The Finnish policy is (Act 252/2017) to provide full 
participation to all neighbouring countries which may be affected by the nuclear facilities in 
question.
During 2017–2019 no Environmental Impact Assessments have been done in Finland. In 
2018, MEAE made an individual case decision that the continuation of operating licenses of 
two Olkiluoto rector units did not require an EIA process and Sweden was informed on this. 
Fennovoima submitted the EIA report concerning Hanhikivi NPP to MEAE in February 2014 
and later same year MEAE gave a statement about it. The statement on the Fennovoima spent 
fuel disposal EIA program was given by MEAE in December 2016. In the assessment procedure 
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with respect to cross-border environmental impact, based on the Espoo Convention, the 
Ministry of the Environment notified the authorities of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, 
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia and Austria about the EIA Programme. Austria, 
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Russia and Poland participated in the 
international hearing on the EIA programme. Lithuania did not participate at this stage, but 
they requested to be involved in the EIA reporting and the construction licensing stages.
In June 2016 Fennovoima submitted an EIA programme concerning the disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel to the MEAE. The hearing process was conducted by the MEAE in autumn 2016 in 
Finland and abroad according to the Espoo Convention. The MEAE’s statement was submitted 
to Fennovoima in December 2016. According to programme, the EIA outcome report will be 
scheduled so that the selection of spent fuel disposal site will be possible during 2040s.
Article 7 Design and construction of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(a) the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility provide for suitable measures 
to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment, including those from 
discharges or uncontrolled releases;
(b) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for the 
decommissioning of a spent fuel management facility are taken into account;
(c) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility 
are supported by experience, testing or analysis.
Regulatory requirements
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 19) the prerequisite for granting a construction 
license is that the location of a nuclear facility is appropriate with respect to the safety of the 
planned operations and that environmental protection has been considered appropriately. 
The site related prerequisite for granting an operating license (Section 20) is that the 
environmental protection has been considered appropriately. The Nuclear Energy Decree 
(Section 32) requires that the construction license application shall include a description of 
the effects of the nuclear facility on the environment and a description of the design criteria 
that will be observed by the applicant in order to avoid environmental damage and to restrict 
the burden on the environment. In operating license application (Section 34) there should 
be a description of the measures to restrict the burden caused by the nuclear facility on the 
environment.
The guiding requirements for spent nuclear fuel storage design and construction are 
described in the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants. 
More detailed requirements for the design and construction of nuclear facilities are given in 
the Guides YVL A.2, YVL A.5, YVL B.1, YVL B.3 and YVL D.3. The general design of the nuclear 
facility and the technology used are first assessed by STUK for when reviewing the application 
for a DiP and performing a preliminary safety assessment of the facility. More detailed safety 
assessments are carried out by STUK when reviewing applications for construction licences 
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and for the operating license, as well as in connection with possible plant modifications. In the 
operating license renewals and in the periodic safety reviews the facility design is reassessed 
against safety requirements and advancements in science and technology.
The limitation of radiological impact is discussed in Section F in the context of Article 24.
Provisions for decommissioning
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 g) states that provisions for decommissioning shall be 
included in the design of a nuclear facility. In the context of the licensing requirements, 
the STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) states that the design of an NPP shall consider 
decommissioning to limit waste volumes and radiation exposure both to workers and to 
the environment. The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 32) requires that the application for a 
construction license must include a description of the applicant’s plans and available methods 
for arranging nuclear waste management, including the decommissioning of the nuclear 
facility and the disposal of nuclear waste, and a description of the timetable for nuclear waste 
management and its estimated costs. More detailed requirements are given in Guides YVL A.1 
and YVL D.4. The requirements regarding decommissioning plans are discussed in Section F.
Proven technology
The requirement to use high quality, carefully examined and well-tested technologies that are 
proven by experience are stated in the design requirements provided in the STUK Regulation 
(STUK Y/1/2018). Detailed requirements on the design of spent fuel handling systems are given 
in Guides YVL B.1, YVL D.3 and YVL E.11. Spent fuel storage at the Finnish NPPs is based on 
water pool technology, for which extensive experience exists worldwide.
Implementation during the review period
An assessment of the design of the facility and related technologies is made by STUK for the 
first time when assessing the application for a Decision-in Principle. Later on, the evaluation 
is continued, when the Construction License application is reviewed. Finally, a detailed 
evaluation of systems, structures and components is carried out through the design approval 
process during construction or facility modification phase. 
The design of the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage facility and its extension was reviewed 
by STUK when assessing the construction of the extension part of the storage facility. The 
review included a preliminary safety analysis report and other safety related documents. 
Protection against an airplane crash was included in the design of the extension and it was 
also been improved for the existing part of the facility. Additionally, the cooling water systems 
for the spent fuel pools were improved to enable to feed water from outside the facility. 
The monitoring of the storage pool water level and temperature were improved to consider 
earthquake resistance and loss of the facility power supply to address lessons learned from the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The enlargement of the spent fuel storage facility at Olkiluoto 
was completed when STUK finalised the safety assessment on commissioning the extension 
and approved TVO’s application to increase the capacity of the spent fuel storage facility in 
summer 2015. The final review included a Final Safety Analysis Report and the other safety 
related documents.
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Additionally, the Loviisa spent fuel storage facility has been improved since the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi accident. The main changes were aimed at reducing the dependency on the plant’s 
normal electricity supply and distribution system, as well as on the seawater cooled systems 
for residual heat removal from the reactor, containment and spent fuel pools. Two air-cooled 
cooling units were constructed and commissioned in 2014–2015 to ensure long-term decay 
heat removal in case of the loss of seawater. The design plans for the installation of a diverse 
water supply to the spent fuel pools were approved by STUK in 2015. The installation was 
implemented in 2019. Flood protection for NPPs was already improved in 2012 from +2.1 m to 
+2.45 m. After that flood protection design water level was increased to +2.95 m in 2018.
Article 8 Assessment of safety of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(a) before construction of a spent fuel management facility, a systematic safety assessment and an 
environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its operating 
lifetime shall be carried out;
(b) before the operation of a spent fuel management facility, updated and detailed versions of the 
safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemed necessary to 
complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (a).
Regulatory approach
The license applications for a new license or for the renewal of an existing license include 
the documents required by the Nuclear Energy Decree: Preliminary or Final Safety Analysis 
Reports; Probabilistic Risk Analysis Reports; Quality Assurance Programmes for Construction 
and Operation; Safety Classification Document, Operational Limits and Conditions Document 
(Technical Specifications); Programmes for Periodic Inspections; Plans for Physical Protection 
and Emergency Preparedness; Plans for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; 
Administrative Rules for the Facilities; Programmes for the radiological baseline survey or 
the results of the radiological baseline survey; Programmes for Radiation Monitoring in the 
Environment of the Facilities; and Decommissioning plans.
The design of the facility is described in PSAR and in FSAR. These reports are submitted 
to STUK for approval in connection respectively with the applications for construction 
and the operating licences. According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, the FSAR shall be kept 
continuously up to date.
The requirements for performing the initial safety assessment and environmental impact 
assessment for nuclear facilities are discussed in the context of Article 6. A description of the 
safety principles that will be observed needs to be included in the DiP application.
The STUK Regulation (Y/1/2018) requires that the nuclear power plant safety and the 
technical solutions of its safety systems, including systems for spent fuel interim storage, 
shall be assessed and substantiated analytically and, if necessary, experimentally. Analyses 
should be maintained and revised if necessary, considering operating experience, the results of 
experimental research, plant modifications and the advancement of computational methods.
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The safety assessments are reviewed by STUK with support of independent safety analyses 
and/or by external experts. The licences and related safety documents of the on-site spent fuel 
storages are attached to those of the respective NPPs and the renewal review processes take 
place simultaneously.
Implementation
As discussed under Article 7, an assessment of the design of the facility and related 
technologies is made by STUK for the first time when assessing the application for a Decision-
in Principle. Later, the evaluation is continued when the Construction License application is 
reviewed. Finally, the detailed evaluation of systems, structures and components is carried out 
through their design approval process. The design of the Loviisa plant units was reassessed by 
STUK in connection with the Periodic Safety Review of the plant in 2014–2016. The Periodic 
Safety Review for the Olkiluoto NPP was carried out in connection with the renewal of 
operating licences for the Olkiluoto NPP reactor units in 2017-2018. 
The preliminary safety analysis report and the other safety related documents for the 
extension of the Olkiluoto spent fuel interim storage facility were reviewed in 2010 before the 
construction work. The Final safety analysis report and the other safety related documents 
were reviewed in 2015 when STUK finalised the safety assessment on commissioning of the 
extension. The extension has been designed to withstand an aeroplane crash and the design of 
the existing part of storage has been updated.
Article 9 Operation of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(a) the license to operate a spent fuel management facility is based upon appropriate assessments as 
specified in Article 8 and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning programme demonstrating 
that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;
(b) operational limits and conditions derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments, 
as specified in Article 8, are defined and revised as necessary;
(c) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a spent fuel management facility 
are conducted in accordance with established procedures;
(d) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available throughout the 
operating lifetime of a spent fuel management facility;
(e) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the license to the 
regulatory body;
(f) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established and that the 
results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(g) decommissioning plans for a spent fuel management facility are prepared and updated, as 
necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed by 
the regulatory body.
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Initial authorisation
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 36), several documents, including the Final 
Safety Analysis Report shall be submitted to STUK when applying for an operating license. 
More detailed requirements are given in Guides YVL A.1 and B.1. The requirements for safety 
assessment are discussed in detail under Article 8.
Requirements for the commissioning programme for the NPPs and the associated spent 
fuel storage facilities are set out in Guide YVL A.5. According to the Guide, the purpose of the 
commissioning programme is to give evidence that the plant has been constructed and will 
function according to the design requirements. Through the programme potential deficiencies 
in design and construction can also be identified. The commissioning programme is described 
in the preliminary and final safety analysis reports, which are submitted to STUK for review 
and approval.
Operational limits and conditions
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 36), the applicant for an operating license 
shall provide STUK with the operational limits and conditions. These should set out the 
technical and administrative requirements for ensuring the plant’s operation in compliance 
with the design bases and safety analyses. The operational limits and conditions include the 
requirements for ensuring the operability of systems, structures and components important to 
safety; and the limitations that must be observed in the event of component failure.
The STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) requires that systems, structures and components 
important to the safety of a nuclear facility shall be available as detailed in the design basis 
requirements. Operability and the effects of the operating environment shall be monitored 
by means of inspections, tests, measurements and analyses. Operability shall be checked in 
advance by regular maintenance, and provisions shall be made for maintenance and repairs 
in the event of any deterioration in operability. Condition monitoring and maintenance shall 
be planned, supervised and implemented so that the integrity and operability of systems, 
structures and components are reliably preserved throughout their service life. More detailed 
requirements for condition monitoring and maintenance programmes are given in the guide 
YVL A.8.
The operational limits and conditions are subject to the approval of STUK prior to the 
commissioning of the facility. Strict observance of the operational limits and conditions is 
verified by STUK through a regular inspection programme. Operational limits and conditions 
are updated based on operational experience, tests, analyses and plant modifications.
Established procedures
According to Guide YVL A.3 on management systems for nuclear facilities, document 
management shall cover all procedures required in the operation of the facility. The document 
management procedures shall be described as a part of the licensee’s management system. 
These include, among other things, the specification, preparation, drawing up, review, 
approval, implementation, revision, dissemination, archiving and disposal of documents. The 
responsibilities and administrative procedures indicating how to take care of these actions 
shall be described in the licensee’s management system. The procedures for operation shall 
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be approved by the licensee itself, and procedures important for safety are required to be 
submitted to STUK for review. Detailed requirements are presented in the appropriate YVL 
Guides. STUK verifies that the approved procedures are in use and are followed in the operation 
of the facility by means of resident inspectors, inspections and reviews.
Engineering and technical support
The staffing, training and qualifications of the personnel are discussed in general in Section F, 
Article 22. STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) Section 25 requires that the organization shall 
have access to professional expertise and technical knowledge required for the safe operation 
of the plant, the maintenance of equipment important to safety and the management of 
accidents. The licensee of a nuclear facility has the primary responsibility for ensuring that 
the employees of the facility are qualified and authorised to their jobs and that the continuity 
of expertise is secured for the operational lifetime of the facility. Guide YVL A.4 specifies the 
expertise requirements for the positions which are important for safety. The requirements in 
Guide YVL A.4 also cover technical support. 
TVO and FPH have both longstanding expertise in nuclear operations. TVO and Posiva uses 
external expertise regularly when needed in various design and modification activities. FPH 
has under corporate structure own unit for technical support to the Loviisa NPP among other 
projects. There are also on-site experts at the Loviisa NPP for various engineering and technical 
support functions.
Fennovoima has presented its latest organisation development plans with competences 
to cover all engineering tasks during the lifecycle of the plant including nuclear waste 
management in the construction license application submitted to MEAE in June 2015. 
The competence of the engineering and technical support is supervised by the licensee. In 
addition, STUK carries out inspections by which the competence of the support staff is also 
evaluated.
Operating experiences, incident reports and evaluation
The STUK Regulation (STUK Y/1/2018) requires that feedback on operational experience is 
collected and safety research results are monitored, and both shall be assessed for the purpose 
of enhancing safety. Safety-significant operational events must be investigated for the purpose 
of identifying the root causes as well as defining and implementing the corrective measures. 
Improvements in technical safety, resulting from safety research, shall be considered to the 
extent justified based on the safety principles stated in the Nuclear Energy Act section 7 a.
According to Guide YVL D.3, a spent fuel condition surveillance programme, subject to 
STUK’s approval, must be drawn up to monitor the effects of long-term storage on spent fuel.
Guides YVL A.9 and A.10 provide the reporting requirements in detail on incidents, 
operational disturbances, and events which must be reported to STUK. They also define 
requirements for the contents of the reports and the administrative procedures for reporting, 
including time limits for submitting various reports.
STUK’s Annual Report on nuclear safety summarizes the operational events from the whole 
year and is available to the general public in Finnish and in English.
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Operational events in spent fuel interim storage facilities have been rare in recent years. 
Some minor events have been reported by the licensee to the regulatory body. These events 
have, for example, been events that took place in the construction site of the enlargement 
for interim spent fuel storage in Olkiluoto. Other types of events have been those related to 
complying with administrative instructions.
Decommissioning plans
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 g) describes the requirements for the preparation and 
updating of the decommissioning plans. Decommissioning issues are discussed in Section F, 
Article 26.
Article 10 Disposal of spent fuel
If, pursuant to its own legislative and regulatory framework, a Contracting Party has designated spent fuel 
for disposal, the disposal of such spent fuel shall be in accordance with the obligations of Article 3 relating 
to the disposal of radioactive waste.
According to the Finnish waste management policy, spent fuel is regarded as waste and shall 
be permanently disposed of in Finland. The encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel are 
discussed in the next Section H, in the context of the safety of radioactive waste management. 
Pre-disposal storage of spent fuel was handled in this Section G.
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Article 11. General safety requirements
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive waste 
management, individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological and 
other hazards.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:
(a) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during radioactive waste 
management are adequately addressed;
(b) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste is kept to the minimum practicable;
(c) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in radioactive waste management
(d) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying at the 
national level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of its 
national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards;
(e) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with 
radioactive waste management;
(f) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greater 
than those permitted for the current generation;
(g) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.
Scope and general regulations
In this Section, the management of LILW from the nuclear facilities and from the research 
reactor, including disposal, the management of non-nuclear radioactive waste and 
management for spent fuel disposal are discussed. The relevant general regulations are, the 
Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and Decree (161/1988), STUK Regulation (Y/4/2018) on the 
Safety of the Disposal of Nuclear Waste including the disposal of low and intermediate level 
operational and decommissioning waste and spent nuclear fuel. The STUK regulation Y/1/2018 
regulates the safe handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel in spent nuclear fuel storage 
facilities and nuclear waste handling in nuclear facilities attached to a nuclear power plant. 
More detailed technical requirements on the management and safety, including disposal, of 
LILW and spent fuel are given in the Guides YVL D.3, D.4 and D.5. Radioactive waste subject to 
the Radiation Act are regulated by STUK regulations S/2/2019 and S/5/2019.
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Criticality and removal of residual heat
Regulatory requirements
STUK Regulation (Y/4/2018) requires that during the handling and storage of spent nuclear 
fuel, the possibility of criticality shall be very low and that the disposal package containing 
spent nuclear fuel shall be designed so that no self-sustaining chain reaction of fissions can 
occur, even in the disposal conditions.
Guide YVL D.3 Handling and storage of nuclear fuel further specifies that subcriticality 
of spent nuclear fuel shall be ensured by means of structural design solutions. The transfer 
casks, storage racks and handling equipment as well as the disposal canisters shall be designed 
to ensure criticality safety (exclusion of a chain reaction sustained by neutrons) in planned 
operational conditions and in the event of an anticipated operational occurrence or postulated 
accident. These requirements are stated in Guide YVL D.3 which also refers to the Guide 
YVL B.4.
In addition, Guide YVL D.5 requires that the design of the spent fuel disposal canisters shall 
also accommodate potential criticality conditions where the leak-tightness of the container 
has been lost and the container has sustained mechanical or corrosion-induced deformations. 
Also, the long-term criticality safety analyses of the disposal canister shall consider the 
possibility of a self-sustaining chain reaction of fissions and analyse the consequences of such 
an event as far as practicable.
The residual heat generation of spent fuel must be considered in the design of the 
encapsulation and disposal facilities. The requirements for the cooling of spent fuel during the 
encapsulation are presented in Guide YVL D.3.
Criticality and removal of residual heat in encapsulation 
and disposal facility of spent nuclear fuel
Criticality safety
Criticality safety analyses have been performed by Posiva in the construction license 
application. Posiva has confirmed in analyses that the spent fuel will remain subcritical when 
handled, stored or disposed of in a disposal canister. Subcriticality of spent fuel is ensured 
by the structural design of the fuel drying station and the disposal canister. To ensure the 
subcriticality the design of encapsulation facility prevents water entering the structures 
containing spent fuel. The analyses proved that even if structures containing spent fuel were 
filled with water, subcriticality was ensured by taking the burnup credit into account.
Posiva has analysed the criticality safety of copper/iron canisters and the analyses were 
provided to STUK for review in the construction license application. To prove the subcriticality 
of the spent fuel disposed in canisters, burnup credit has been applied in the criticality safety 
analyses.
In the post-closure criticality safety analyses the criticality of the disposal canister must 
be ruled out with very high certainty over the long term. In this respect, however, the analyses 
contain extremely conservative assumptions regarding the long-term evolution of the disposal 
canister geometry, indicating that re-criticality of the disposed fuel is highly unlikely.
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Residual heat removal
Heat transfer analyses for spent fuel in encapsulation was performed by Posiva and the 
analyses were sent to STUK for review in the construction license application. The analyses 
showed that spent fuel and the surrounding rooms will remain at their design basis 
temperature even without active cooling using a ventilation system. The spent nuclear fuel 
transported to the encapsulation plant from the spent fuel interim storages will have been 
cooled in storage pools for a minimum of 20 years.
In the encapsulation plant, the cooling of spent fuel is provided by the ventilation system. 
If the ventilation system is not available, passive cooling can be run by natural circulation by 
opening the ventilation dampers. In a natural circulation mode, the filtering of the ventilated 
air from the encapsulation plant can be provided.
The Olkiluoto spent fuel disposal facility will have an underground buffer storage for 
encapsulated spent fuel. It is estimated that several tonnes of uranium (spent fuel) within 
copper-iron canisters may stay at a time within the buffer storage. The heat removal from the 
storage will be dimensioned conservatively.
The residual heat of the disposed spent fuel is also considered in the design of disposal 
canister and surrounding bentonite buffer in the disposal facility. The temperature of the 
canister-bentonite clay interface has been analysed and an appropriate safety margin has been 
used in the disposal facility dimensioning calculations. The maximum temperature of the 
disposal canister surface should be reached within 10 to 15 years after the disposal.
Thermal dimensioning including the detailed heat transfer phenomena in the near field of 
the deposition holes and optimisation of the disposal facility has been analysed. To ensure the 
functionality of engineered barriers, the minimum distances between deposition holes and 
deposition tunnels have been defined.
Waste minimization
Regulatory requirements
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 27 a), the waste produced as a result of the use 
of nuclear energy must be kept as low as reasonable by practical means both in terms of its 
activity and the amount of waste. The requirements for waste minimization are presented in 
YVL guide D.4. This guideline emphasizes that the generation of waste must be decreased, 
i.e. by proper planning of repair and maintenance work and by means of decontamination, 
clearance and volume reduction practices. The Guide YVL D.4 also refers to sound working 
methods for waste minimization, e.g. volume reduction of waste, avoiding the transfer of 
unnecessary objects and materials in the controlled areas and by adoption of working processes 
which either create only small amounts of waste or in which the created waste is easily 
manageable.
The release of waste from regulatory control (clearance) is regulated by Guide YVL D.4. 
Both conditional and unconditional clearances are effectively used for waste minimization 
by the NPPs. Clearance criteria, levels and procedures are discussed in Section B, Article 32, 
Paragraph 1.
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According to the Radiation Act 859/2018 (Section 78), the radioactive waste produced in 
the use of radiation or in non-nuclear radioactive instances shall be kept as low as reasonably 
possible by practical means. However, these practical means shall not compromise the 
principles of justification, optimization and individual radiation protection.
Waste minimization of LILW in NPP’s
The accumulation of LILW in the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto NPPs is depicted in Figure 13. 
The average accumulation of low and intermediate level waste at the Olkiluoto NPP (OL1 
and OL2) has been about 120 m³ and at the Loviisa NPP (LO1 and LO2) 24 m³ per year during 
2017–2019. The accumulation of waste has in some years even been reduced by effective 
waste minimization and volume reduction measures, such as the radiochemical treatment 
of liquid waste, campaigns for removal of very low-level waste from regulatory control, and 
compaction of maintenance waste. Large metallic waste components have been transported 
for treatment at the Studsvik facility in Sweden which reduces the volume of radioactive waste 
to be disposed significantly. Activation products or parts containing external contamination 
or components that have been separated from the metal are transported back to Finland for 
disposal. 
Loviisa NPP has continued the use of ion exchange methods for the purification of liquid 
waste (removal of Cs). The use of the method decreases the amount of liquid waste and the 
doses to the representative person in the vicinity of the NPPs as shown in Figure 12. Loviisa 
NPP has also developed the free release practises for the metal wastes during the reporting 
period and sent some big metal components to Sweden for melting in 2019.
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FIGURE 13. Accumalation of LILW in Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPP’s
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TVO has made a modification in both power plant units in the condensate polishing 
system to reduce the temperature and thus increase the lifetime of pre-coat resins. 
Consequently, the generation of spent ion exchange resins has decreased considerably. Surface 
contaminated metal scrap is decontaminated in a new facility by blasting with glass marbles. 
Decontaminated metals are released from regulatory control, if activity levels below those for 
clearance are reached. Part of the metal waste (removed large components e.g. heat exchangers 
and liquid coolers) has been transported for treatment in Sweden in 2018 and 2019. The 
removal of these large components from NPPs is also shown in Figure 13 as unusually high 
amounts of LILW waste accumulation in 2018 and 2019.
Waste minimization in the decommissioning of research reactor
The nuclear waste (in total 6 m³) produced during the operation of reaserch reactor is packed 
and currently stored in Otaniemi. VTT has estimated that the amount of decommissioning 
waste will be about 75 tons. The waste management procedures are currently under 
development for the decommissioning phase. Waste minimization will be taken into account 
by careful planning and implementing efficient waste sorting and packaging methods and also 
by decontamination and clearance.
Waste minimization of non-nuclear radioactive wastes
The laboratories using radioactive sources in medical and research applications usually store 
their short-lived radioactive waste on their premises until it has decayed below the limits set 
for discharges in STUK S/2/2019. Only small amounts of waste need to be conditioned for 
disposal.
Interdependencies
Regulatory requirements
Guide YVL D.4 on the treatment and storage of LILW from NPPs requires that waste is treated, 
e.g. segregated, categorised and conditioned, in an appropriate way regarding its further 
management. The Guide YVL D.4 also provides for the consideration of the requirements of 
waste packages related to their disposal. These requirements may concern, e.g., the structure of 
the waste packages, their physical and chemical compositions, their resistance to external and 
internal loads and the amount and structural and chemical stability of radioactive substances 
in the waste packages.
Interdependencies in encapsulation and the disposal of spent nuclear fuel
Interdependencies in the context of spent fuel management are discussed in Section G.
Interdependencies in nuclear waste management activities in NPP’s
Both operating nuclear power plants have their own LILW disposal facilities, thus the 
premises for considering interdependencies in the waste management chain are excellent. 
Interdependencies of the various steps in waste management are considered in the NPPs’ 
Operational Manuals. At the Loviisa NPP all the waste treatment, conditioning, handling, 
storing, transport and disposal operations are carried out at the NPP site by the personnel of 
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the Loviisa NPP. Only the spent nuclear fuel will be transported for disposal from the Loviisa 
NPP site to Posiva’s disposal facility at Olkiluoto. In case of the Olkiluoto NPP, all the waste 
management steps take place at Olkiluoto. The Decision in Principle concerning Fennovoima 
also includes an LILW disposal facility on the NPP site. Fennovoima has performed preliminary 
site characterizations for proposed locations of disposal facility at the NPP site and STUK has 
reviewed these results.
Interdependencies in nuclear waste management activities in the decommissioning of the 
research reactor
The spent fuel of research reactor will be removed from the reactor before the dismantling is 
started. The spent fuel will likely be sent back to the USA according to the existing returning 
agreement. The agreement is valid until 2029.
The waste produced during the decommissioning of the research reactor is planned to be 
packed at the reactor site in a way that it could be later stored and disposed in Loviisa LILW 
repository.
Interdependencies in non-nuclear radioactive waste management
Non-nuclear radioactive waste is packed into barrels to enable it to be stored in a similar way 
as the operational waste from the nuclear power plants are stored. The non-nuclear wastes 
are currently stored on the premises of Suomen Nukliditekniikka in Orimattila and in the 
Government’s storage facility inside the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility. There is also an 
agreement to dispose of these wastes in the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility and the disposal 
started in 2016.
Protection of individuals, the society and the environment
Regulatory requirements
Requirements for protection of workers are set in the Radiation Act 859/2018 and for 
protection of the population in the vicinity of nuclear waste facilities in Nuclear Energy Decree 
Section 22 d.
The Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) requires (section 22 d) that the post-closure safety of 
disposal of nuclear waste shall be designed and implemented in a manner where the radiation 
exposure caused by nuclear waste as a result of its expected evolution will not exceed the 
constraints set in the Nuclear Energy Decree. This requires that the annual effective dose to 
the most exposed members of the public remains below 0.1 mSv for a period of the first several 
thousand years. The average annual effective doses to other members of the public must 
remain insignificantly low.
Beyond that period, the average quantities of radioactive substances over long time periods, 
released from the disposed waste and migrating further into the environment, must remain 
below the nuclide specific constraints defined by STUK. These constraints are given in Guide 
YVL D.5 as limits for annual activity releases into the environment. They are defined so that, 
at their maximum, the radiation impacts arising from disposal are comparable to those 
arising from natural radioactive substances and on a large scale; the radiation impacts remain 
insignificantly low.
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STUK Regulation Y/4/2018 states that the radiation exposure caused by rare events 
impairing long-term safety shall be assessed whenever possible. The probability of events 
causing significant radiation exposure shall be very low, and the widespread impacts of the 
release of radioactive substances caused by them must also be low.
In addition, Guide YVL D.5 pays attention to the protection of living nature requiring that 
the disposal of nuclear waste shall not detrimentally affect any species of fauna or flora. This 
must be demonstrated in the safety assessment by considering typical radiation exposures 
of terrestrial and aquatic populations in the disposal site environment, assuming the present 
time kinds of living populations. These exposures must remain clearly below the levels which, 
on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge, would cause a decline in biodiversity or 
other significant detriment to any living population of fauna or flora.
Protection of individuals, the society and the environment in spent fuel management
Dose limits and constraints that are applied to operational encapsulation and disposal 
facilities were already introduced in Section F, Article 24.
The design of Posiva’s nuclear waste facilities takes account of limiting the radiation 
doses received by the personnel, population and the environment by all practical means. Fuel 
handling is designed so that the releases of radioactive substances in the facilities and their 
spread to the environment is limited as far as possible. The radiation exposure of the personnel 
is reduced by implementing the handling of spent fuel and the disposal canisters via remote 
control.
The radioactive releases and potential radiation doses to humans, plants and animals 
during the operation of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility have been analysed 
in PSAR. The PSAR was a part of the construction license application documentation. The 
radioactive releases and possible radiation doses have been analysed for normal operations, 
operational occurrences and for accident conditions.
The handling of fuel bundles that contain a leaking fuel rod has been considered in the 
design of the encapsulation plant. The handling of fuel bundles is performed in a hot cell, 
which is designed to limit the release of radioactive substances inside the encapsulation plant 
and further into the environment. The limitation of radiation is based on the structures and 
leak tightness of the hot cell. Additionally, the air conditioning of the hot cell is provided with 
filtering for radioactive substances.
The limiting operational occurrences that may occur include the mishandling of a fuel 
bundle followed by a possible radioactive release from broken fuel rods. These releases are 
assumed to occur in the hot cell or in controlled area of the encapsulation plant. Both are 
equipped with filtered air-conditioning.
The limiting accident conditions include the dropping of a fuel bundle in the hot cell or the 
dropping of a disposal canister in the canister lift shaft. In both conditions, the filtration of the 
hot cell air-conditioning or the filtration of the controlled area air conditioning would limit 
possible radioactive releases.
The analysed radiation dose for the operational occurrence is 2·10–5 mSv, which is the 
equivalent of a dose from normal ingestion for one year. This dose is far below the limit of 0,1 
millisievert specified in the regulations. For the worst-case accident condition, the radiation 
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dose was analysed to be 0,01 millisievert, which is below the limit of 1 millisievert specified in 
the regulations.
Protection of individuals, the society and the environment in LILW management
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree section 22 d the average annual dose to the most 
exposed individuals of the population arising from the normal use of the LILW facility shall be 
below 0,01 millisievert (cf. also Section F, Article 24).
The radioactive releases and possible radiation doses to humans, plants and animals 
during the operation of LILW repositories are analysed in the Final Safety Analysis Reports 
(FSAR). The FSAR is a part of the original operation license application documentation and 
the report has been kept up to date since. The radioactive releases and possible radiation doses 
are analysed for normal operation, operational occurrences and in accident conditions. The 
analysed operational occurrences included, e.g., failures during the lifting of waste packages, 
failures in the groundwater pumping system or ventilation and power supply failures. The 
analysed accidents included, e.g., fires, earthquakes, flooding, intentional damage and traffic 
accidents during transportation.
During normal operation, the doses of workers are clearly below the limits set in the 
regulations. The possibility of operational occurrences and accidents that might affect 
radiation safety were deemed to be very unlikely in LILW repositories after analyses. The doses 
to the most exposed individuals were analysed for operational occurrences and accidents and 
with a high degree of certainty the exposures would be below the annual dose limits set for 
individuals. Under accident conditions, the annual doses of the workers would also remain 
below the annual dose limits set in the regulations with the proper education and instructions 
for workers and protective clothing and equipment.
The total discharges from Finnish NPPs have been very low and the total annual calculated 
radiation doses of the most exposed individual in the vicinity of both NPPs was less than 
0.1% of the limit of 100 micro Sieverts that is established in the Nuclear Energy Decree. The 
discharges from waste management activities are very small compared to the total releases 
from NPPs and so are the annual doses to the most exposed individuals of the population.
Protection of individuals, the society and the environment in decommissioning of the 
research reactor
According to the operational limits and conditions of the research reactor FiR 1, the radioactive 
discharges into the air and water during operation will not be more than one tenth of the 
limits set for NPPs. In 2014 radioactive releases from the research reactor into the air were 
0.22 TBq (Ar-41). The research reactor was permanently shut down in June 2015. Since then 
there has not been any radioactive releases to the air. Yearly releases into the air have at 
maximum been 17% of the release limit (3.7 TBq Ar-41 per year) set by STUK for the operation 
of the research reactor.
During the dismantling of the reactor and concrete structures, small amounts of 
radioactive substances (e.g. Co-60) may be released into the reactor building. The spread of the 
radioactivity will be prevented by choosing methods that prevent dust and particle formation. 
Additionally, some radioactivity (e.g. gaseous xenon and krypton) may be released into the 
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reactor building during the handling of the damaged fuel assemblies. During dismantling, the 
reactor building will be kept under-pressurized, which efficiently prevents releases from the 
building. The ventilation system will be equipped with continuous radioactivity monitoring, 
and if needed, the air can be filtered before releasing it from the reactor building. All water 
produced during decommissioning will be collected into tanks and will not be released until it 
has been measured and found to be clean from radioactivity.
Protection of individuals, the society and the environment in non-nuclear radioactive 
waste management
According to Section 78 of the Radiation Act (859/2018), the amount of radioactive waste 
generated using of radiation and other radiation practices shall be kept as low as reasonably 
achievable without endangering the implementation of the general provisions ( justification, 
optimization, limitation).
The radiation doses received from non-nuclear radioactive waste are very low. The dose 
received from the air emission of radioactive substances shall be under 10 µSv per year for 
a representative person. The dose limits and activity limits for discharges are given in the 
Regulation S/2/2019. Disused radioactive sources are stored in the Government waste facility 
in connection to the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility and are disposed of in the same way as 
nuclear waste according to the operating license of the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility.
Biological, chemical and other hazards
Regulatory requirements
According the Act on the EIA procedure (252/2017), the environmental impacts must already 
be evaluated in the planning and decision-making phase of a project. Another important aim 
of the EIA procedure is to increase the information available about the project to citizens 
and provide the opportunity to participate in the project planning phase. During the EIA-
procedure, all types of environmental impacts (e.g. noise, dust, traffic, releases to air and water 
etc.) of the project are investigated and evaluated. In nuclear facility projects, other hazards 
than those posed by radiation are also considered during the EIA procedure.
Biological, chemical and other hazards in spent fuel management
During the construction and operation of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel small amounts of hazardous waste, such as waste oil, solvents and batteries 
will be generated. Hazardous waste is collected and sent to a hazardous waste treatment plant.
The encapsulation and disposal concept for spent nuclear fuel does not include any 
hazardous or harmful materials except nuclear waste. The outer shell of the disposal container 
is made from copper, but the release of copper from the disposal facility is limited by the slow 
corrosion rate of copper.
Biological, chemical and other hazards in LILW management in NPPs
Disposed LILW consists of the NPP’s trash waste, scrap metal, filter elements and liquids and 
sludge. These materials and their immobilisation matrices are not harmful to the environment 
as such, but may contain harmful residues, such as heavy metals.
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Some studies on radioactive nickel releases from the disposal facility have been carried out 
in Finland. The results show that the potential annual releases are small. In the same way, it 
can be argued that the release rate of chromium and poorly soluble lead and cadmium will also 
be small. The chemical effects of the Swedish LILW disposal facility (SFR) in Forsmark have 
been studied more thoroughly. SFR and the Finnish LILW facilities are similar regarding the 
structure and the type and the content of the disposed waste. The Swedish studies indicate 
that the increase of heavy metal concentrations in seawater would be negligible, mostly owing 
to the release barriers at the disposal facility.
When the waste is isolated properly, the discharges to the environment are small, when 
compared to other forms of industry or other sources of hazardous waste. As long as the 
engineered barriers isolate the radioactive waste, also other harmful substances are effectively 
isolated from the environment. Furthermore, the LILW repositories are located in areas which 
do not contain exploitable groundwater reserves for present day communities. This condition 
is expected to be valid in future as well.
Biological, chemical and other hazards in decommissioning of research reactor
The reactor building of FiR 1 reasearch reactor was constructed in 1950s when it was quite 
common to use asbestos, e.g. in fire shielding, pipe insulation, tiles and in mortar. In addition 
to asbestos, many other materials hazardous to health were used until the 1980s. In the 1990s 
the reactor building was renovated and materials containing asbestos, for example, were 
removed. There may still be some old plastic tiles and tile glue left in the building, which will 
be investigated for asbestos and other harmful materials before dismantling. If asbestos or 
other harmfully materials are found, they will be handled and disposed of according to current 
legislation before dismantling the reactor is started.
The research reactor still contains some chemicals used in the research. These are planned 
to be packed and disposed of duly before dismantling starts.
Biological, chemical and other hazards in non-nuclear radioactive waste management
Biological, chemical and other hazards may be related to some waste arising from medical and 
research applications. The requirements of the relevant non-radiation related regulations, 
including those related to general occupational health, are applied in these cases as 
appropriate.
Protection of future generations and avoidance of undue burdens on future generations
Regulatory requirements
Section 7 h of the Nuclear Energy Act states that nuclear waste shall be managed so that no 
radiation exposure is caused after disposal which would exceed the level considered acceptable 
at the time the disposal is implemented.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 h) requires that the disposal of nuclear waste in a 
manner intended as permanent is planned with due regard to safety and that ensuring long-
term safety does not depend on the surveillance of the disposal site. In Section 8 of STUK 
Regulation Y/4/2018 it is required further that planning of the construction, operation and 
closure of a disposal facility must account for the reduction of the activity of nuclear waste 
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through interim storage, the utilisation of high-quality technology and research data, and the 
need to develop an understanding of the performance of the barriers and long-term safety 
through investigations and monitoring.
Section 30 of STUK Regulation Y/4/2018 states that the long-term disposal safety shall be 
based on long-term safety functions achieved through mutually complementary barriers so 
that the degradation of one or more long-term safety functions or a foreseeable change in the 
bedrock or climate would not jeopardise the long-term safety.
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 9) requires that a licensee whose operations generate or 
have generated nuclear waste must be responsible for all nuclear waste management measures 
and their appropriate preparation, as well as for their costs (See Section B, Article 32: Costs 
and funding). The principle of securing the future disposal of nuclear wastes applies to every 
nuclear waste producer.
Spent nuclear fuel
Until the mid-1990s, Finnish power companies had different arrangements for the 
management of spent fuel. Export was the primary option for the both operating companies, 
and FPH also implemented export. To fulfil its license conditions and the content of the 
Government Decision in 1983, TVO also initiated in 1983 its R&D work for spent fuel disposal 
within Finnish territory. The amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act in 1994, prohibited the 
imports and exports of nuclear waste and, after a transition period, since 1996 the disposal 
within Finnish territory has been the only disposal option.
Radiation protection of the public is discussed earlier in “Protection of individuals, the 
society and the environment”. The same principles protect future generations from the 
unwanted consequences of nuclear waste disposal.
The costs of the disposal of spent fuel are secured with assets collected in the VYR Fund. 
The obligation for financial provision starts when a MEAE licenced nuclear facility begins to 
produce nuclear (operational and spent fuel) waste.
LILW and VLLW
The Finnish nuclear waste management policy is based on the ethical principle of avoiding 
transferring undue burdens to future generations. Disposal facilities for LILW are operational 
at the both existing NPP sites and are planned to also host decommissioning waste. At 
Olkiluoto preparations for licensing VLLW disposal in a near-surface facility were started by 
the end of 2018.
The costs of the disposal of LILW are secured by assets collected in the VYR Fund (See 
Section B, Article 32: Costs and funding).
Decommissioning of the research reactor
The research reactor will be dismantled as soon as VTT has the technical and organizational 
readiness for the work and the required license for decommissioning is granted by the 
Government. The decommissioning will be performed under the supervision of the personnel 
who have been operating the reactor and who have the best knowledge of the facility.
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The future waste management and disposal costs of the FiR 1 research reactor are secured 
by assets collected in the VYR Fund (See Section B, Article 32: Costs and funding).
Non-nuclear radioactive waste
Government owned non-nuclear radioactive waste are disposed in the Olkiluoto LILW disposal 
facility. Active institutional controls are not needed to ensure the safety of these disposal 
facilities during the post-closure period.
Article 12 Existing facilities and past practices
Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the appropriate steps to review:
(a) the safety of any radioactive waste management facility existing at the time the Convention 
enters into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable 
improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility;
(b)  the results of past practices in order to determine whether any intervention is needed for reasons 
of radiation protection bearing in mind that the reduction in detriment resulting from the reduction in 
dose should be sufficient to justify the harm and the costs, including the social costs, of the intervention.
Existing facilities
Regulatory requirements
According to the Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 a), the safety regarding the use of nuclear 
energy must be maintained at as high a level as practically possible. For the further 
development of safety, measures must be implemented that can be considered justified 
considering operating experience, safety research and advances in science and technology. 
In practice, this means that the existing facilities need to be improved based on the latest 
operational experience from Finland and abroad, and the latest technical developments should 
also be considered.
Existing facilities for spent fuel management
There are not yet any existing facilities aiming at final spent fuel disposal. The construction 
license for the spent fuel disposal facility was granted to Posiva at the end of November 2015 
and the construction of the facility started in December 2016.
Existing facilities for LILW management
The predisposal management facilities for low and intermediate level radioactive waste at 
the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto NPPs are covered by the respective operating licences for the 
reactors. The LILW disposal facilities have separate operating licences both in Olkiluoto 
and in Loviisa. The requirements for their safety review are described in Section G and the 
conclusions drawn are valid for LILW management as well.
Thorough assessments of the safety of the facilities were carried out by the licensees and 
reviewed by STUK in connection with the construction and operating license applications. 
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A periodic safety review of the LILW disposal facilities is made with 15-year intervals. The 
Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility started operation in 1992 and consequently its safety 
assessment was reviewed by STUK in 2007. The operating license of Olkiluoto LILW disposal 
facility covers operational waste from OL1, OL2 and OL3 and state owned non-nuclear 
radioactive waste.
The LLW disposal halls of the Loviisa LILW disposal facility started operation in 1998. The 
construction of the ILW disposal cavern was completed in 2007 and started operation in 2019. 
The periodic safety review of the LILW facility was conducted in 2013–2014.
In conclusion, the safety reviews regarding the waste management of LILW at NPPs 
required by Article 12 were carried out at the time of licensing. The safety analysis reports 
are continuously up to date. In addition, periodical safety reviews are made regularly. Safety 
improvements have been continuously implemented at the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto plants, 
including the facilities for waste management, since their commissioning.
Existing facilities for decommissioning the research reactor
The predisposal management facilities for low and intermediate level radioactive waste from 
operation are covered by the existing operating license of FiR 1 research reactor valid until the 
end of 2023.
Existing facilities for non-nuclear radioactive waste management
Non-nuclear radioactive waste, e.g. from research, industry and hospitals is stored at existing 
facilities in the Suomen Nukliditekniikka storage facility and in the Olkiluoto LILW disposal 
facility.
Outokumpu Stainless is a steel manufacturer in northern Finland. The company receives 
scrap metal as a raw material for its production. On average once a year the company 
accidentally melts an Am-241-source. The nuclide is almost impossible to detect with radiation 
ports due to its low gamma energy. The company has radiation monitors for its product and 
slag, as well and this is how Am-241 is detected. The low-level contaminated slag is sited at an 
industrial dumping ground for disposal approved by STUK. The company also stores other low-
level waste originating from smeltings at the industrial dumping ground before it is sited.
Terrafame Oy (formerly Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy) operates a nickel and zinc mine in 
Sotkamo. The ore in the mine contains small amounts of uranium which is extracted from the 
ore in the mine’s bioheap leaching process. Uranium is not currently recovered in the metal 
extraction process but is recirculated until finally mostly precipitated in waste rock piles and 
waste gypsum ponds. Terrafame applied for a license to extract uranium in 2017, and a license 
was granted in February 2020 by the Government. At the end of 2019 the amount of uranium 
in the gypsum ponds was estimated to be around 550 tonnes. The mine had wastewater 
leakages from a gypsum pond in 2012 and 2013, resulting in contamination of small nearby 
lakes with sulphate and heavy metals. The amount of released uranium outside the mining 
area was estimated to be relatively small and amounting to about 500–1000 kg. Environmental 
remediation of the lakes is being planned. As this waste does not originate from the nuclear 
fuel cycle and it contains only NORM, this convention does not apply to it.
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Article 13 Siting of proposed facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are established and 
implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management facility:
(a) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a facility during its 
operating lifetime as well as that of a disposal facility after closure;
(b) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the environment, 
taking into account possible evolution of the site conditions of disposal facilities after closure;
(c) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of the public;
(d) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to be 
affected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility to 
enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities shall 
not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance with the general 
safety requirements of Article 11.
Regulatory requirements
The description of siting procedures, provided under Article 6 for siting of spent fuel 
management facilities (including spent fuel storage facilities), is also applicable for facilities 
intended for the predisposal management of LILW at the NPPs and for the disposal of LILW or 
spent fuel, and is not repeated here.
Concerning the siting of a nuclear facility, STUK Regulation Y/4/2018 Section 12 includes 
the statement: The impact of local conditions on operational safety and the feasibility to implement the 
arrangements for security and emergency arrangements shall be considered when selecting the site of a 
nuclear facility. The site shall be such that the detriments and threats posed by the operation of the facility 
to its vicinity remain very low. Section 31 states that “The characteristics of the rock at the disposal site 
shall, as a whole, be favourable to the isolation of the radioactive substances from the living environment. 
Any area with a feature that is substantially adverse to long-term safety shall not be selected as the 
disposal site.”
Guide YVL D.5 specifies the generic site suitability criteria.
Siting of nuclear and non-nuclear radioactive waste management facilities
Disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel
Spent fuel disposal facility site investigations at the Olkiluoto site have been going on since 
the 1980s. These have included many types of investigations airborne, surface and bedrock, and 
finally they included in situ investigations in the bedrock at the disposal depth at the ONKALO 
URCF to confirm the suitability of the bedrock for high level waste disposal.
In the context of the DiP process in 1999–2001 for TVO’s and FPH’s spent nuclear fuel 
disposal, Olkiluoto was selected by Posiva and proposed as the site for a spent nuclear fuel 
disposal facility. Based on the DiP, the project received permission to proceed with the 
construction of the underground rock characterisation facility and the more detailed site-
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specific studies. Knowledge of the site has increased significantly since the DiP stage. At the 
end of 2012 Posiva submitted a construction license application for a spent fuel encapsulation 
and disposal facility. The license application documentation also addresses the site related 
analysis concerning, for example, the design of facilities and the suitability of the disposal 
facility host rock. The studies of the disposal site and the analyses of the evolution scenarios 
of the site reaching far into the future are adequate for the construction license, and they have 
not introduced any matters which would not be favourable for the post-closure safety of the 
selected disposal site. Based on the studies and analyses, the conclusion can be drawn that the 
bedrock’s characteristics are suitable for implementing the disposal as proposed.
Concerning the siting, design, construction and assessment of safety, the details of the 
regulatory approach to Posiva’s spent fuel disposal project in Olkiluoto are described in Annex 
L.2.
The condition of the DiP on the NPP for Fennovoima required that it shall have either a 
co-operation agreement with shareholders of Posiva for spent fuel disposal in the Olkiluoto 
disposal facility or alternatively an EIA programme for a separate disposal facility shall be 
submitted within six years from the date of the DiP ratification (2010) by Parliament. In the 
absence of the agreement with Posiva’s owners, Fennovoima submitted an EIA programme 
for the disposal facility to the MEAE in June 2016. The EIA programme contains both 
environmental studies and geological investigations to confirm the suitability of candidate 
sites for spent fuel disposal. The investigation phase will last about 20 years, based on current 
estimates. Fennovoima is aiming to select the site for final disposal in the 2040s at the earliest. 
In 2016, Fennovoima presented a co-operation agreement with Posiva Solutions Oy about the 
use of Posiva’s competence in developing a spent fuel disposal solution for Fennovoima.
LILW disposal facilities
In Finland, the siting decisions for the LILW repositories at the NPP sites were strongly 
encouraged with short NPP operating licences during the early days of operations. Site 
investigations on FPH and TVO plant sites were started late 1970’s and early 1980’s, respectively. 
The DiP for Fennovoima’s NPP in 2010 also includes an LILW disposal facility at the NPP site.
Waste management facilities for decommissioning waste from the research reactor
VTT has signed a contract at the end of March 2020 with FPH about dismantling FiR1 
research reactor. The contract includes an option to store and dispose the operational and 
decommissioning waste of FiR 1 research reactor in Loviisa NPP site. The storage or disposal of 
VTT's waste can be done at Loviisa site only after updating the licenses of the existing facilities 
at Loviisa NPP site according Nuclear Energy Act.
Waste management facilities for non-nuclear radioactive waste
At present, non-nuclear radioactive waste is stored in Orimattila at the Suomen 
Nukliditekniikka storage facility, and in Olkiluoto. Additionally, the disposal of State owned 
non-nuclear waste has continued in Olkiluoto. Therefore, siting is currently not an issue.
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Article 14 Design and construction of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(a) the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility provide for suitable 
measures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment, including 
those from discharges or uncontrolled releases;
(b) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for the 
decommissioning of a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility are taken into 
account;
(c) at the design stage, technical provisions for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared; the 
technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility are 
supported by experience, testing or analysis.
Regulatory requirements
The discussion under Article 7 (Section G) is relevant for the predisposal management facilities 
for LILW, which are covered by the operating licences of the NPPs and STUK Regulation 
Y/1/2018.
Safety requirements for the spent fuel encapsulation facility, which is planned to be 
situated in connection with the spent fuel disposal facility, are described in STUK Regulation 
Y/4/2016. Guides YVL A.5, YVL B.1 and YVL D.3 provide detailed safety requirements for the 
encapsulation facility design and construction.
The design requirements for LILW and spent fuel disposal facilities and the measures to 
limit radiological impacts from these facilities are discussed in Section G. An illustration for 
the disposal facility of spent fuel at Olkiluoto is shown in Figure 6. The design of Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto LILW disposal facilities are illustrated in Figures 7 and 8, respectively.
According to Section 8 of STUK Regulation Y/4/2018, disposal must be implemented 
in stages, with attention paid to aspects affecting long-term safety. The planning of the 
construction, operation and closure of a disposal facility shall account for the reduction of the 
activity of nuclear waste through interim storage, the utilisation of high-quality technology 
and research data, and the need to develop an understanding of the performance of the 
barriers and long-term safety through investigations and monitoring.
More detailed requirements on the design principles are given in Guide YVL D.5.
Design and construction of disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel
In connection with the construction license application, Posiva delivered a PSAR, which 
described the design bases of the disposal facility detailed enough. Based on the design 
documentation, it can be stated that the facility can be implemented to fulfil the safety 
requirements that were originally laid down in Government Decree 736/2008, which has been 
replaced by STUK Requirement Y/4/2018.
Posiva has submitted a description of the decommissioning of the encapsulation plant for 
the construction license and has taken decommissioning into account in the facility’s design 
requirements. In the construction license application documentation, Posiva has presented 
the principles of closure in a way that is detailed enough for the construction license and has 
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planned the closure to be implemented in a way that the bedrock maintains the characteristics 
important to post-closure safety as effectively as possible.
Conceptual plans for the closure of the disposal facilities have been included in their 
initial designs (e.g. the PSAR designs of the LILW repositories and the construction license 
application documentation of the spent fuel disposal facility in Olkiluoto). These closure plans 
will be reconsidered in the context of later licensing stages or periodic safety assessments.
Concerning siting, design, construction and assessment of safety, a more detailed 
description of the regulatory approach to Posiva’s spent fuel disposal project in Olkiluoto is 
presented in Annex L.2.
Article 15 Assessment of safety of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(a) before construction of a radioactive waste management facility, a systematic safety assessment 
and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its 
operating lifetime shall be carried out;
(b) in addition, before construction of a disposal facility, a systematic safety assessment and an 
environmental assessment for the period following closure shall be carried out and the results evaluated 
against the criteria established by the regulatory body;
(c) before the operation of a radioactive waste management facility, updated and detailed versions 
of the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemed necessary to 
complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (a).
Regulatory requirements
Regarding the disposal of spent fuel and LILW, compliance with long-term radiation protection 
objectives as well as the suitability of the disposal concept and site must, according to STUK 
Regulation (STUK Y/4/2018), be justified by means of compliance with the long-term radiation 
protection objectives. Equally the suitability of the disposal concept and site must be justified 
through a safety case that addresses both the expected evolutions and unlikely disruptive 
events possibly impairing part of the multi-barrier long-term safety features. The requirements 
and analysis related to the operational safety of the waste management facilities are presented 
in Article 11.
According to Guide YVL D.5 a safety analysis must include:
• a description of the disposal system and the definition of barriers and safety functions;
• the specification of performance targets for the safety functions;
• a definition of the scenarios (scenario analysis);
• a functional description of the disposal system and a description of the conditions 
prevailing at the disposal site by means of conceptual and mathematical modelling, and the 
determination of necessary model parameters;
• an analysis of the quantities of radioactive substances that could be released from the 
disposed waste, penetrate the barriers and enter the biosphere, and an analysis of the 
resulting radiation doses;
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• whenever possible, an estimation of the probabilities for activity releases and radiation doses 
arising from unlikely events impairing long-term safety;
• uncertainty and sensitivity analyses and complementary qualitative considerations; and
• a comparison of the outcome of the analyses against the safety requirements.
The licensee shall carry out a periodic safety review for the disposal of nuclear waste at least 
once every 15 years, unless otherwise stated in the conditions of the operating license. The 
periodic safety review must be conducted in compliance with the requirements of Guide 
YVL A.1, Regulatory control of the use of nuclear energy, where applicable.
Detailed requirements for the contents of the post-closure safety case are provided in 
Guide YVL D.5 Annex A. The post-closure safety case must include a description of the 
disposal system: quantities of radioactive substances; waste packages; buffer materials; 
backfill materials; structures for isolation and closure; excavated rooms; the geological, 
hydrogeological, hydrochemical, thermal and rock mechanical characteristics of the host rock; 
and the natural environment at the disposal site. The post-closure safety case shall define the 
safety concept, barriers and safety functions together with their performance targets.
The discussion under Article 8 on the safety assessment of spent fuel interim storage 
is valid for the predisposal management of LILW because both activities are covered by 
the operating licences of the reactor units at the present NPPs and by STUK’s Regulation 
(Y/1/2018).
The predisposal management of waste subject to the Radiation Act generally involves 
operations which may not cause any extensive hazards: handling of sealed sources, segregation 
and packaging of small amounts of LLW. Thus, no comprehensive safety or Environmental 
Impact Assessments are needed, but the safety of the required operations needs to be evaluated 
in the context of the licensing process.
Implementation
Safety assessments performed for disposal of spent nuclear fuel
A R&D programme for spent fuel disposal was started in 1978 with a foundation of Nuclear 
Waste Commission of Power Companies (YJT). The coordinated research was run by the 
commission until the end of 1995. Thereafter, disposal R&D work has been run by TVO’s 
and FPH’s joint company Posiva. The early R&D programme mainly aimed at planning 
and implementing a spent fuel disposal project but also included a programme for LILW 
management.
Concerning post-closure safety, Posiva updated the safety assessment work presented in the 
DiP for the construction license application for the Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility in 2012. A framework for the development of the post-closure safety case was first 
reported in 2005 and updated in 2008. Posiva developed the safety case portfolio to meet the 
regulatory requirements and to show the safety assessment methodology. Posiva submitted the 
construction license application at the end of 2012.
Together with the license application Posiva delivered the post-closure Safety Case (TURVA 
2012). STUK reviewed the post-closure documentation during 2013-2015. Based on STUK’s 
review of the safety case documentation, the post-closure safety assessment of the facility was 
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found to be adequte for the purposes of the construction license. The results demonstrated 
that, after the closure, the facility would be safe to people and other living nature in the 
surroundings as was required by the Government Decree (736/2008) on the safety of disposal 
of nuclear waste. Furthermore, Posiva has indicated the suitability of the disposal method 
and disposal site in a manner for the purposes of the construction license stage. The review 
showed, however, that there is a need to further improve the post-closure safety case by 
clarifying the safety arguments and the related methods and by reducing the uncertainties 
concerning the performance of barriers. Posiva has prepared a plan to produce a post-closure 
Safety Case (TURVA 2020) in support of the operating license application. The present post-
closure safety case plan is based on the following:
• Follow-up of further developments of STUK’s regulations on the safe use of nuclear energy 
and safety of nuclear waste management and disposal
• Feedback from STUK on the post-closure safety case presented in 2012
• Lessons learned from the post-closure safety case work
• Recommendations and guidelines on the methodology for the development of post-closure 
safety by international bodies.
STUK has implemented a regulatory inspection programme for the oversight of the 
construction of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility, feasibility of the disposal concept 
and post-closure safety case development. These activities are described in more detail in 
Annex L.2.
Safety assessments performed for LILW repositories
The operating license of the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility was renewed based on TVO’s 
application in 2012 by the decision of the Goverment. The new license conditions enabled the 
disposal of operational waste from OL1, OL2 and OL3 units and State-owned radioactive waste 
in to Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility. In connection to this licensing process STUK prepared a 
safety assessment of the TVO’s application.
The Government granted FPH a permission to use the LILW disposal facility in 1998. FPH 
submitted the first periodic safety review of the LILW disposal facility to STUK for approval 
in 2013. The update of the safety review must be submitted to STUK for approval after every 15 
years.
STUK’s safety review and decision in 2014 stated that the safety level of the Loviisa low- and 
intermediate-level operational waste disposal facility is good in terms of operational safety and 
long-term safety, and that the licensee has implemented the procedures needed to continue 
safe operation. STUK approved the periodic safety review of the Loviisa low- and intermediate 
level operational waste disposal facility carried out by FPH.
In 2018, FPH delivered to STUK Loviisa NPP decommissioning plan update. In accordance 
with this plan FPH provided to STUK the updated post-closure safety case in 2019. In the safety 
case both the constructed parts of the repository and planned parts for the decommissioning 
waste disposal are addressed. The safety case also considered the updated regulation and 
guidance.
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STUK reviewed the safety case and reached conclusions on the adequacy of FPH’s 
submission. The focus of STUK’s review has been to ensure that the safety case for the 
repository follows the structure and intent of the regulatory requirements and is sufficiently 
developed and convincing to address the post-closure safety of the repository.
Based on its review STUK concluded that FPH has provided, overall, a clear and credible 
safety case to demonstrate that the existing repository for the operational waste fulfils and the 
planned repository for the decommissioning waste can be implemented to fulfil the regulatory 
requirements considering the post-closure safety. FPH makes clear presentation of the safety 
concept and the technical data and the analyses are, in general, state-of-the-art.
However, there remains a need to develop safety argumentation and methodologies further, 
and there is also a need to reduce some uncertainties regarding performance of the barriers. 
FPH will continue to develop the safety case, with an update to be presented in connection of 
the construction and operating licences for the enlargement of the repository for the disposal 
of the decommissioning waste, and in the connection of the periodic safety reviews.
Safety assessment performed for decommissioning of research reactor
The safety of the research reactor FiR 1 was reviewed focusing specifically on the safety of the 
decommissioning during 2017–2019. STUK’s safety assessment concerning decommissioning 
was published in spring 2019.
Article 16 Operation of facilities
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
(a) the license to operate a radioactive waste management facility is based upon appropriate 
assessments as specified in Article 15 and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning programme 
demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;
(b) operational limits and conditions, derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments 
as specified in Article 15 are defined and revised as necessary;
(c) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a radioactive waste management 
facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures. For a disposal facility, the results 
thus obtained shall be used to verify and to review the validity of assumptions made and to update the 
assessments as specified in Article 15 for the period after closure;
(d) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available throughout the 
operating lifetime of a radioactive waste management facility;
(e) procedures for characterization and segregation of radioactive waste are applied; and incidents 
which are significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the license to the regulatory 
body;
(f) programmes to collect and analyse relevant operating experience are established and that the 
results are acted upon, where appropriate;
(g) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility 
are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that 
facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body;
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(h) plans for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using 
information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility and are reviewed by the regulatory 
body.
The legislative and regulatory requirements discussed under Article 9 are also valid for the 
predisposal management of LILW from the NPPs for the operational period of an LILW 
disposal facility, spent fuel encapsulation plant and spent fuel disposal facility. Therefore, only 
some specific features related to the disposal of LILW or spent fuel, as well as those related to 
radioactive waste from small operators, are presented here.
Initial authorization
The Nuclear Energy Decree (Section 36) requires that several documents, including the Final 
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), are submitted to STUK when applying for an operating license 
for a nuclear facility. More detailed requirements are given in Guide YVL A.1, including STUK’s 
review and inspection of the commissioning of a nuclear facility. The requirements for the 
safety assessment are discussed in detail above under Article 15.
In the context of the commissioning of a nuclear waste facility, the licensee must ensure 
that the systems, structures and components, as well as the entire facility function as planned. 
The licensee must ensure that an appropriate organization, adequately skilled workforce and 
applicable instructions exist for the future safe operation of the facility.
Operational limits and conditions
The requirements concerning operational limits and conditions are discussed in Article 9 
and they are also valid for LILW facilities, including disposal, management of non-nuclear 
radioactive waste and for spent fuel encapsulation plant and disposal facilities.
Established procedures
According to the STUK Regulation on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear Waste (STUK Y/4/2018) 
appropriate instructions must exist for the operation, maintenance, regular in-service 
inspections and periodic tests, as well as for transient and accident conditions. The reliable 
functioning of systems and components must be ensured by adequate maintenance and by 
regular in-service inspections and periodic tests. Detailed requirements are given in YVL A.3. 
This topic is also discussed in Section G.
Updated assessment for post-closure period
For the LILW disposal facilities, both in Loviisa and Olkiluoto, the operating license conditions 
require a periodic update of the safety assessment. The STUK Regulation (STUK Y/4/2018), 
concerning nuclear waste disposal, requires that a safety case must be presented when applying 
for a construction license and operating license for the disposal facility and when making 
substantial plant modifications. The safety case must be updated at regular intervals unless 
otherwise required in the license conditions. The need for updating the safety case must be 
assessed before making modifications that concern the disposal system. Furthermore, the 
safety case must be updated prior to the closure of the disposal facility.
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Engineering and technical support
The STUK Regulation (Y/4/2018) requires that the licensee will employ adequate and competent 
personnel for ensuring the safety of the nuclear waste facility. The licensee must have access 
to the professional expertise and technical knowledge required for the safe construction and 
operation of the facility, the maintenance of equipment important to safety, the management 
of accidents and the long-term safety of disposal. The LILW repositories operate under the 
NPP organizations but the same regulations are applied. More detailed guidance for adequate 
engineering and technical support is presented in Guide YVL A.4 applies.
Posiva has expertise on planning for the safe disposal operation of SNF. Posiva’s own 
expertise is supported by the technical expertise of Posiva’s owners, TVO and FPH, and also by 
external experts. TVO and FPH have expertise on operating the LILW disposal facilities and 
their own expertise is supported by external experts.
Characterization and segregation of waste, incident reports
The guidance and requirements for LILW characterization and segregation is provided in 
Guide YVL D.4. STUK reviews plant procedures, the FSAR, and performs inspections on 
waste management at the NPPs and the disposal facilities to ensure compliance with all 
requirements.
Guide YVL D.3 provides requirements concerning the characterization of spent fuel to 
be disposed of and the characterization of the spent fuel disposal canisters. The properties 
that have a bearing on operational or long-term safety of disposal must be defined and 
characterized.
Incident reporting requirements are given in Guide YVL A.10.
Decommissioning plans
The Nuclear Energy Act (Section 7 g) states that the design of a nuclear facility must provide 
for the facility’s decommissioning. The related decommissioning plan should already be 
presented in the construction license phase and the updated version of it in the operation 
license phase. During operation, the licensee is obligated to update decommissioning plans for 
regulatory review every six years (Section 7 g in Nuclear Energy Act). Guide YVL D.4 requires 
that provisions for the decommissioning of the nuclear facilities should be made already 
during the design phase.
The plans for the decommissioning of the facilities for LILW and spent fuel management, 
other than repositories, are part of the decommissioning plans of the NPPs.
The decommissioning plan of the spent nuclear fuel encapsulation plant was presented in 
the construction license application of spent fuel repository in 2012. The encapsulation plant 
will be decommissioned according to immediate dismantling strategy. The decommissioning 
plan for the encapsulation plant contains a preparation phase for decommissioning. The 
length of the preparation phase is about one year. The actual dismantling of the encapsulation 
plant and disposal of decommissioning waste is estimated to take about two years. The 
decommissioning plan for encapsulation plant will be updated for the operating license 
application of spent fuel reposiroty and regularly during operation.
Decommissioning is discussed in more detail under Article 26.
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Closure plans
According to STUK Y/4/2018 the design of the disposal facility must consider the safety of the 
closure of the facility after its operation has ended. The disposal facility must be designed, 
constructed and operated in a manner that allows it to be closed without jeopardizing long-
term safety. In addition, the siting, excavation, construction and closure of underground rooms 
must be implemented so that the characteristics of the rock deemed important in terms of 
long-term safety are retained, as far as possible.
The closure plans of the LILW repositories are presented in the Final Safety Assessment 
Reports of the facilities.
The closure plan for the spent nuclear fuel disposal facility was presented in the 
construction license application and in its technical appendices in 2012. The main closure 
principles, preliminary design requirements, implementation plan and materials to be used 
were presented. The main aim is that the closure of the disposal facility is planned and 
implemented so that the favourable bedrock conditions for disposal are maintained. After 
closure of the disposal facility the conditions in the bedrock should be as close to the natural 
bedrock conditions as possible. Posiva will continue the detailed closure planning over the 
forthcoming years.
Article 17 Institutional measures after closure
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that after closure of a disposal facility:
(a) records of the location, design and inventory of that facility required by the regulatory body are 
preserved;
(b) active or passive institutional controls such as monitoring or access restrictions are carried out, if 
required; and
(c) if, during any period of active institutional control, an unplanned release of radioactive materials 
into the environment is detected, intervention measures are implemented, if necessary.
Regulatory requirements
According to STUK’s Regulation on the Safety of the Disposal of Nuclear Waste (Y/4/2018), 
records must be kept of the disposed waste, which includes waste package specific information 
about the waste type, radioactive substances, location in the waste emplacement rooms and 
other necessary data. STUK maintains a database, where the nuclear waste data reported 
annually by the operators of the NPPs are stored. Guide YVL A.9 provides general requirements 
for reporting to STUK and includes provisions for waste management reporting. More 
detailed requirements for waste management records are given in Regulatory Guides YVL D.4 
and YVL D.5. During the operational period, the records referred to above must be annually 
complemented and submitted to STUK. STUK will organise the long-term archiving of the 
information about the disposal facility and the disposed waste (STUK Y/4/2018, Section 29).
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Institutional control
Two types of institutional control can be implemented: restrictions on land use (passive 
control) and technical surveillance of closed facility surroundings (active control).
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, Section 63, STUK’s regulatory oversight rights 
include issuing land use restrictions after the closure of the disposal facility when deemed 
necessary. STUK’s Regulation (Y/4/2018) on nuclear waste disposal further stipulates that an 
adequate protection zone should be reserved around the disposal facility as a provision for the 
prohibitions of measures referred to in Section 63 of the Nuclear Energy Act.
According to Guide YVL D.5,  it can be assumed that human activities affecting the 
disposal facility, or the nearby host rock are precluded for 200 years at the most by means of 
land use restrictions and other passive controls. YVL D.5 also requires that before closure the 
facility operator shall submit for approval a closure plan to STUK including a plan for possible 
institutional control measures and a proposal for a protection zone. It should also be noted 
that the Finnish repositories for LILW are located at a depth of 60–100 m in the bedrock and 
the spent fuel disposal facility is planned to be located at least 400 m below the surface.
Potential intervention measures
After approval of the final closure of a disposal facility, the State bears the responsibility for 
the waste facility and of all intervention measures that may be needed (the Nuclear Energy Act, 
Section 34). Such measures are unlikely, because the disposal concepts are based on passive 
safety; multiple engineered barriers ensuring effective long-term containment of the disposed 
waste.
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Article 27 Transboundary movement
Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary movement shall take the appropriate steps to ensure 
that such movement is undertaken in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Convention and 
relevant binding international instruments.
In so doing:
(a) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that 
transboundary movement is authorized and takes place only with the prior notification and consent of the 
State of destination;
(b) transboundary movement through States of transit shall be subject to those international 
obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transport utilized;
(c) a Contracting Party which is a State of destination shall consent to a transboundary movement 
only if it has the administrative and technical capacity, as well as the regulatory structure, needed to 
manage the spent fuel or the radioactive waste in a manner consistent with this Convention;
(d) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall authorize a accordance with the consent of the 
State of destination that the requirements of subparagraph (c) are met prior to transboundary movement;
(e) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps to permit re-entry 
into its territory, if a transboundary movement is not or cannot be completed in conformity with this 
Article, unless an alternative safe arrangement can be made.
A Contracting Party shall not license the shipment of its spent fuel or radioactive waste to a 
destination south of latitude 60 degrees south for storage or disposal.
Nothing in this Convention prejudices or affects:
(a) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, of maritime, river and air navigation rights and 
freedoms, as provided for in international law;
(b) rights of a Contracting Party to which radioactive waste is exported for processing to return, or 
provide for the return of, the radioactive waste and other products after treatment to the State of origin;
(c) the right of a Contracting Party to export its spent fuel for reprocessing;
(d) rights of a Contracting Party to which spent fuel is exported for reprocessing to return, or provide 
for the return of, radioactive waste and other products resulting from reprocessing operations to the State 
of origin.
Regulatory requirements
Regulations on transport of dangerous goods are laid down in Act on the Transport of 
Dangerous Goods (719/1994). In addition, several Decrees define more detailed requirements 
on the transport of dangerous goods. As far as radioactive material is of concern, additional 
requirements are given also in the Radiation Act (859/2018), as well as in the Nuclear Energy 
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Act (990/1987) and Decree (161/1988). Further guidance is given in Regulatory Guides YVL D.2 
and ST 5.7 by STUK.
Concerning the transboundary movement of radioactive material, the Regulation 93/1493/
Euratom on shipments of radioactive substances between Member States must be applied. The 
requirements are also in accordance with the European Council Directive 2006/117/EURATOM 
on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel. 
State border control concerning nuclear and non-nuclear radioactive materials
With respect to illicit trafficking, regulatory and detection measures were taken in the mid 
of 1990s to address and prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and non-nuclear radioactive 
materials across Finland’s borders. The measures included installing fixed monitors for 
vehicles and railway traffic at all major crossing points along the Finnish–Russian border and 
at Helsinki harbour, and portable monitors at all crossing points. All measuring systems at 
the Finnish border crossing points were upgraded during 2008–2015 (the RADAR project), 
including upgrading all systems with neutron detection capability, allowing better detection 
of special nuclear materials. From 2016 onwards the Customs is the main operator of the 
radiation control measuring systems at the border crossing points. STUK owns the measuring 
equipment and is responsible for its maintenance. In addition, STUK arranges the trainings 
for the Customs personnel responsible for radiation protection on an annual basis. In 2019, the 
systematic radiation monitoring at the State borders led to 298 documented investigations. 
Of these cases, 38 were investigated in more detail with STUK assistance. None of these were 
associated to illicit trafficking. 
Shipments of spent fuel and radioactive waste in 2017–2019
The shipments of spent fuel and radioactive waste abroad were denied by the Nuclear Energy 
Act approved by Finnish parliament in 1994 and the amendment regarding this change came 
into force in 1996 as part of the national nuclear waste management policy. Since then only 
shipments for reaseach purposes or waste processing (e.g. melting of metals) are allowed by 
Finnish legislation (Nuclear energy act Section 6 a).
Transboundary movements take place very seldom in Finland. During 2017–2019 spent fuel 
rods were shipped out of Finland to Sweden for research (2 shipments) and some large metal 
components were shipped also to Sweden for scrapping (3 shipments). Radioactive waste will 
be shipped back to Finland after the treatment. In addition, radioactive source inside steel 
scrap pale was returned from Finland back to Estonia. The authorization of these shipments 
was done according Directive 2006/117/Euratom.
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Article 28 Disused sealed sources
Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework of its national law, take the appropriate steps to ensure 
that the possession, remanufacturing or disposal of disused sealed sources takes place in a safe manner.
A Contracting Party shall allow for re-entry into its territory of disused sealed sources if, in the 
framework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned to a manufacturer qualified to receive 
and possess the disused sealed sources.
Regulatory requirements
Regulatory control of radioactive sources is based on the Radiation Act and regulations issued 
pursuant thereto, into which the provisions of the European Union radiation protection 
directive (Council Directive /2013/57/ Euratom) have been implemented. Other EU regulations 
are applicable as well, e.g. the Council Regulation 1494/93/Euratom on shipments of 
radioactive substances between Member States.
According to the Radiation Act (Section 48) prior authorization is required for all activities 
involving radioactive sources, e.g. for the use, manufacture, trade in, holding and disposal 
of such sources. A safety license is granted by STUK upon written application. The general 
conditions for granting a license are laid down in the Radiation Act and the licensing 
procedure is prescribed in more detail in the Government Decree on Ionizing Radiation 
Annex 5. All premises where radioactive sources are employed are inspected by STUK regularly, 
every 2–8 years, depending on the type and extent of the practice. For sealed sources, the 
inspection frequency has normally been once every 3, 5 or 8 years depending on the activity 
and number of sources. The main objective of an inspection is to validate that the radioactive 
sources are used and stored safely, and other conditions set in the safety license are preserved. 
The inspector must identify each sealed source. However, the premises where several tens 
or more sources are employed (such as a large industrial facility) the licensee must provide 
written evidence of its own quality control on all the sources and then the inspector will 
randomly select about 10–20% of the sources for identification. Any discrepancies with the 
licensing information concerning the placing of the sources, new sources and sources taken 
out of use are recorded for amending the license accordingly. STUK is currently reviewing its 
inspection practices, and inspection frequencies will be considered more risk-informed in the 
future and other monitoring means will also be used.
The Radiation Decree (Section 130) provides that STUK has to be notified immediately, if a 
radiation source has disappeared, been stolen, lost or otherwise ceased to be in the licensee’s 
possession. Licensing information is stored in a database maintained by STUK, also including 
source-specific information on each sealed source in the licensee’s possession. Source-specific 
information is updated continuously according to the licensees’ notifications and observations 
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made during the inspections. Some low-activity radioactive sources, such as calibration 
sources employed in laboratories, as well as sources in the storages of dealers (e.g. importers 
of radioactive sources) are not individually registered in STUK’s database. However, records 
of transfers of sources maintained by dealers are reported to STUK annually and they are also 
subject to inspection by STUK at any time.
Finland has pledged to the apply the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of 
Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive 
Sources as well as Guidance on the Management of the Disused Radioactive Sources. The Code 
and the Guidance have been implemented into national requirements. Major parts of the 
Guidance on Disused Sources have been implemented into national requirements. However, 
some details are pending an update to the Radiation Act. Finland also actively participates on 
IAEA activities regarding this subject. However, as a member of the European Union and bound 
by its law, Finland only applies the Code with import or export from or to outside the EU. 
Source transfers within the EU are only regulated according to Council Regulation 1493/93/
Euratom. Each import or export (as opposed to intra-EU transfer) of a high-activity sealed 
source requires a separate authorization by STUK. Procedures of the Guidance are followed for 
IAEA category 1 and 2 sealed sources.
Handling of disused sealed sources
Radiation Act (Section 83) states that it is not appropriate to store unnecessarily sealed sources 
no longer in use. In practice, however, it is sometimes difficult to define whether a stored 
source might have some use in the future. The annual fee for holding a license depends on the 
number of sources in the licensee’s possession and, therefore, there is some financial incentive 
to transfer disused sources back to the provider (and therefrom to the manufacturer) or to a 
facility authorised for the handling, long-term-storage and disposal of disused sources. The 
number of devices containing unused sealed sources stored in the premises of various licensees 
is currently (2.3.2020) 404, i.e. about 6% of the total number of such devices in use (the total 
number is about 6680).
TVO has leased a storage cavern to the State in the LILW disposal facility at Olkiluoto 
for the interim storage of non-nuclear radioactive waste. The safety of the operations at 
the Olkiluoto storage is independently regulated by STUK’s Department of Nuclear Waste 
Regulation and Safeguards. The most of this waste, including sealed sources, will be disposed 
of in the disposal facility. The disposal started at the end of 2016 based on revised operation 
conditions in 2012. A few high activity sealed sources will need a different disposal route, which 
is not yet determined. Finding solution to this issue is part of national cooperation described 
further in Annex L.4.
Disused sources have been collected by a private entrepreneur (Suomen Nukliditekniikka), 
by whom they are repacked, as necessary, and then transferred to state´s storage at 
Olkiluoto. Handling of radioactive disused sources from other companies requires also prior 
authorization. Suomen Nukliditekniikka is currently the only company authorised for this and 
has been the main operator in collecting and repacking disused sealed sources.
When new sources are authorized for use, STUK requires the applicant to present a plan on 
measures to be taken when it becomes a disused source. Essentially there are two main options; 
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either to have an agreement with the provider on returning the source or to transfer the source 
to the central storage facility at the cost of the licensee.
During recent years Finnish companies have exported annually some 500–1000 (2019: 518 
items; 2019: 1235 items) sealed sources to foreign providers. Sealed sources that have not been 
manufactured in Finland cannot be imported to Finland as radioactive waste. Currently there 
is no on-going manufacturing of sources in Finland.
Orphan sources
According to the Radiation Act (Section 79), the licensee is required to take all measures 
needed to render radioactive waste arising from its operations harmless. If the origin of the 
waste is unknown, as in the case of orphan sources, the State has the obligation to render the 
radioactive waste harmless (Section 80). In such cases, responsible party – if identified later 
– must compensate the State for the costs incurred in such an action. With respect to orphan 
sources and border controls, see Section I.
All important users of scrap metal have fixed radiation monitors installed at the entrances 
to their facilities. Two largest scrap metal companies and one metal steel factory have been 
authorised to handle orphan sources according Radiation Act (Section 86). The procedures for 
orphan source handling have been presented to STUK before authorization. STUK co-operates 
with the Finnish Customs office and the metal industry in questions such as measurement 
arrangements and personnel training. STUK also provides expert help in cases where 
exceptional radiation is detected.
On an average, about 2–3 sealed radioactive sources have been found annually in scrap 
metal. Orphan sources, whose owners cannot be identified, are delivered to the State interim 
storage at Olkiluoto.
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The 6th Review Meeting in 2018 identified challenges and recorded some planned measures to 
improve the safety of radioactive waste management in Finland. The status of the overarching 
issues and challenges identified in the 6th review meeting is summarized in the beginning 
of this Section. The major developments in the nuclear and non-nuclear radioactive waste 
management in Finland since the 6th Review Meeting are the following:
• Spent nuclear fuel disposal project progressed in construction of the disposal facility and the 
encapsulation plant
• Licensing for decommissioning of Finland’s first nuclear reactor commenced
• Progress in the low and intermediate waste management
• Strategy to enhance regulatory oversight
• The legislative and regulatory system was enhanced
• Improvement of the national plan for radioactive waste management
• The management of non-nuclear radioactive waste has progressed.
Aspects of nuclear and non-nuclear radioactive waste management have been developing well 
in Finland, but there are still challenges which Finland faces in the forthcoming years. These 
future challenges will be summarized in this Section as well. Finally, the 6th review meeting 
summarized good practices among the convention countries. In the end of this section, these 
are shortly reflected against the current status of Finnish radioactive waste management.
Overarching Issues identified by the 6th Review Meeting
The 6th review meeting identified issues which were common across the country groups and 
were deemed to be important to be addressed by the national reports for 7th review meeting. 
These overarching issues are listed in below and following a short consideration of each issue 
against the Finnish context.
1) Implementation of national strategies for spent fuel and radioactive waste management
The general objectives and timeline for the Finnish spent fuel management was essentially 
outlined with the Government Decision of 1983. The early-day disposal plans and arrangements 
are dealt in more detail in Section B, Article 32 and Section H, Article 11. The 1983 decision 
defined that the siting and evaluation work by licensees for the geological disposal option 
shall aim to the site selection by the end of year 2000. This Decision of 1983 also defined that 
construction license application for the spent fuel disposal facility should be applied by the 
end of year 2010 (this was delayed in 2003 with two years) and disposal operations should start 
around 2020 (current plan is the year 2024).
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The construction license for the spent fuel disposal facility was granted at the end of 
2015 (for more details see Section H, Articles 12 and 13). After the license, the extension of 
the underground research facility begun in 2016 towards the licensed underground rooms. 
Operating license application is expected to be delivered to the ministry at the end of 2021. 
Disposal is not possible until the granted operating license.
The operating NPP (Loviisa and Olkiluoto) have operating disposal facilities for LILW for 
power plant waste (see Secton H). Furthermore, extensions of these facilities are planned for 
decommissioning phase of power plants.
For the major part of the non-nuclear radioctive wastes there are defined responsibilities 
and waste-streams for conditioning, storage and disposal. However, certain highly active 
sealed sources do not have yet complete route for disposal as indicated in Section J (see also 
Annex L.4).
The infrequent discovery of orphan sources remains an issue. On an average, about 2–3 
sealed radioactive sources have been found annually in scrap metal. Orphan sources, whose 
owners cannot be identified, are delivered to the State interim storage at Olkiluoto. To 
strengthen the responsibility of larger operators, Radiation Act was amended to include a 
safety license for operators that frequently come across orphan sources. To date, three such 
licences have been issued.
Overall, Finland considers that it is implementing, or it has realistic plans how to solve its 
waste management and disposal.
2) Safety implications of long-term management of spent fuel
Finland implements its overall policies described in Section B and national disposal strategies 
(described above) aiming for spent fuel disposal in geological repositoritory. The disposal plans 
and related licensing activities of long-term management of spent nuclear fuel from currently 
operating NPP’s are at a mature stage in Finland (see Section G).
According to the plans, spent fuel is stored minimum 20–30 years at Olkiluoto and at 
Loviisa in interim storages before disposal. The Olkiluoto spent fuel interim storage facility 
has undergone many improvements during its extension, which commenced operations in 
summer 2015. Furthermore, the safety of both Olkiluoto and Loviisa spent fuel storage facilities 
has been improved since the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The capacity of both interim storage 
facilities has been evaluated to be adequate until the nuclear power plant operational lifetime, 
in case spent fuel disposal progresses as planned. Finland does not see any significant safety 
implications related to long-term management of spent fuel.
3) Linking long-term management and disposal of disused sealed radioactive sources
For the major part of the non-nuclear radioctive wastes there are defined responsibilities and 
waste-streams for conditioning, storage and disposal. As indicated in Section J and in the 
challenges below, there is a lacking disposal route for a minor set of highly active disused 
sealed sources. The predisposal management (treatment and conditioning) of these sources 
has been arragned, but licensed disposal is currently not available. This issue is also futher 
considered in Annex L.4.
114 STUK-B 259 / OCTOBER 2020
SECTION K GENERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SAFETY
4) Remediation of legacy sites and facilities
Currently, there are no unsolved legacies in Finland that would require remediation. During 
years 1958–1961 a uranium pilot mine operated in Paukkajanvaara, Eastern Finland. The pilot 
mine produced some 30 tU until the activity was found uneconomical. The pilot resulted some 
radioactive tailings and the legacy remained unsolved over three decades. As a result of STUK’s 
initiative, the remadiation of the mine area finally started in 1993. The mine tailings were 
covered with a 2-metre thick soil cover and the mine pit was closed. STUK accepted the results 
of remediation in 2001.
There has been couple even smaller initiatives of uranium prospects. Imatran Voima 
(predecessor of FPH) studied Askola rapakivigranite (southern Finland) in late 1950s and 
Geological Survey of Finland continued later these studies (during late 1970s). In mid 1960s 
in Paltamo, NE Finland was discovered uranium from apatite contining drill cores. These 
prospects, as well, included some on-site extraction experiments. However, the tailings caused 
have been judged to be insignificant.
The status of the challenges from the 6th Review Meeting
The challenges to be addressed are listed in the following and status of them are shortly 
described.
1) Improvement of national waste management system to cover all possible waste streams 
(non-nuclear clean-up waste, FiR 1, HASS)
Because of the contamination event in the premises of Suomen Nukliditekniikka in 2016, a 
clean-up of Cs-137 contaminant had to be arranged. This clean-up created a moderate amount 
(20 m³) of non-nuclear radioactive waste. The items that were able to be decontaminated have 
been treated accordingly and disposed appropriately. The remaining waste (10 m³) has been 
treated and is currently stored in an interim storage. It’s estimated that about half of this waste 
(5 m³) will need underground disposal and the rest of the waste can be classified as VLLW. The 
whole incident revealed a deficiency in the Finnish national waste management system for 
handling this type of non-nuclear radioactive waste. However, also deficiencies in the company 
safety culture and activities have been identified as well as a deviation in regulatory control.
Recent operating license updates (2018 and 2019) for Olkiluoto NPP units enable now the 
treatment and conditioning of non-nuclear LILW wastes, and the 2012 license update for 
Olkiluoto LILW repository enables disposal of these wastes. Therefore, deficiency for handling 
non-nuclear LILW waste in Finland has been addressed.
The High Activity Sealed Sources (HASS) that are not suitable for disposal in existing LILW 
repositories are remaining in the interim storage for non-nuclear wastes at Olkiluoto. Disposal 
route for these type of HASS sources will be addressed as a part of the Finnish national waste 
management plan but currently there is no operating facility that could dispose of these 
sources. MEAE steers a national coordination group that is engaged to find solutions to these 
problems (see further details below and Annex L.4). On a general level, the disposal of highly 
active non-nuclear radioactive waste is a national challenge for Finland and will remain so 
until practical options for disposal become available.
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The decommissioning of the research reactor (FiR 1) is the first nuclear decommissioning 
project in Finland. It is still in the licensing phase. According to the current estimate the 
Government will consider the license application in autumn 2020. The primary option 
for spent fuel management is to repatriate it to the USA according to the existing return 
programme, which is valid until 2029. In March 2020, VTT signed a contract with FPH on 
dismantling FiR1 research reactor and waste management, as well as possible storage and 
disposal of decommissioning wastes to Loviisa NPP site. The storage and disposal would 
require changes to the existing operating license of Loviisa repository and Loviisa NPP. The 
secondary option for the FiR 1 spent fuel is the future disposal in the Olkiluoto spent fuel 
disposal facility. This would also require new agreements and licenses as indicated in Section B, 
Article 32.
As a summary Finland has addressed the challenge raised in the 6th review meeting. 
National system has been enhanced and plans for further enhancement exist. However, 
implementation of disposal routes for waste identified above will require some time.
2) Developing competences, regulatory framework, and regulatory oversight for 
decommissioning of nuclear facilities
Decommissioning license step was added into the Nuclear Energy Act and Nuclear Energy 
Decree from the beginning of 2018. This clarified the terms for the decommissioning of 
the nuclear facilities. Also, the Guide YVL D.4, which sets more detailed requirements for 
the decommissioning phase, was slightly updated in 2019. Anyhow, STUK and MEAE have 
already recognized the need to develop the requirements related to decommissioning for the 
future decommissiong projects. The decommissioning of the research reactor will be very 
important learning process for the regulatory body as the experiences gained will be used in 
updating the regulations and guides and later in planning the regulatory oversight for the 
decommissioning of NPPs. In addition, STUK is following the international development on 
the decommissioning and implementing in the forthcoming years the good practises into its 
regulations, guides and regulatory oversight actions.
STUK has established a regulatory oversight project which aims to ensure competent 
resources during the whole decommissioning phase of the research reactor. The project is 
supported by a range of STUK experts with varying areas of required competence. As a result 
of recently reached agreement between VTT and FPH, the practical regulatory oversight of the 
decommissioning is becoming topical and is to be planned, applying graded approach.
Developing competences, regulatory framework, and regulatory oversight for 
decommissioning of nuclear facilities will remain as continuing challenge even if Finland has 
clear plans how to manage the situation.
3) Regulatory communication to improve the general public´s understanding of disposal 
safety
STUK aims to communicate proactively, openly, promptly and clearly (see also Section E, 
Article 20). STUK is well-known to the public and the media. The communication strategy 
is based on the most trustworthy information available and responds to the expectations 
of the public. STUK communicates on its own web site and on social media platforms. 
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Communication with the public and other interested parties remains highly important for 
STUK. The objective is to share understandable and reliable information promptly as it arises. 
This will remain as continuing challenge in the future in the changing communications 
environment. General public interviews done during the years indicate that on its behalf STUK 
has succeeded in the past (cf. Section A, Figure 2). However, the proactive communication will 
be especially important during the coming years as licensing the spent fuel disposal facility 
operation becomes topical.
4) Independent research and maintenance of competent oversight
Currently the nuclear field in Finland is very active. Maintaining nationally both competent 
regulatory resources and qualified regulatory oversight, while older generations are reaching 
retirement age, forms a continuous challenge to the regulatory body. Also, the independent 
safety research within the regulatory body has been under pressure during the second decade 
of the new millennium.
Buiding-up competence of new resources and employees in the field of radioactive waste 
management is a shared concern of many interested parties (government, regulators, licensees, 
research institutes, universities). As an answer to this, a joint effort of introductory training 
has been taken. Courses on nuclear safety (YK course) and nuclear waste management (YJH 
course) have been arranged on annual basis since 2003 and 2010, respectively. For the season 
2017–2018 these two courses were for the first time merged as a new nuclear and waste 
management safety (YJK) course. In all, YJK covers six separate training sessions and extends 
to 23 working days. Great interest for the courses confirms the need (over 1000 participants 
since 2003) and justifies the annual or every other year arrangements. Interest has also been 
shown to a tailor-made, common course for directors and board members of the nuclear power 
industry.
Publicly funded nuclear waste research has been going on since 1989 in Finland. Currently, 
the national research programme (KYT research programme) is in central role in the 
development of new competent human resources and higher educational degrees in the field 
of radioactive waste management. The 2012–2015 initiative (YTERA- Doctoral programme for 
Nuclear Engineering and Radiochemistry) ceased because of the financial difficulties.
The research institute VTT is the only hot cell service provider in Finland in the field of 
nuclear laboratory research. In 2016, VTT nuclear energy and nuclear safety researchers moved 
to a new CNS building that received STUK’s safety license in 2017. VTT Nuclear Safety research 
employs 150 researchers and has six hot cells. VTT CNS offers its services nationally and 
intermationally to licensees but is also available for regulatory support.
The governmental budget cuts resulted in significant decrease of STUK’s own radiation 
safety research during the recent years. Budget cuts did not impact STUK’s oversight 
activities (charged from the licensees) or nuclear and waste safety research (funded via the 
waste management fund). To re-establish radiation safety research in Finland STUK actively 
pushed establishment of a national radiation safety research consortium in co-operation with 
universities in Finland. STUK has also been able to fund more its own radiation safety research 
with the incomes from expert services. Ensuring continued and stable funding of the radiation 
safety reseach in Finland remains a challenge (see Section E, Article 20).
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The major developments in Finland since the 6th Review Meeting
Since the 6th review meeting certain major developments have been achieved in Finland. The 
successful activities during years 2017-2019 that earn separate references are listed in the 
following.
1) Spent nuclear fuel disposal project progressed in construction of the disposal facility 
and the encapsulation plant
Posiva submitted the construction license application and its supporting safety documentation 
to the authorities at the end of 2012. STUK’s safety review and assessment of the application 
was submitted to the MEAE in February 2015. The construction license was granted by the 
Government to Posiva in November 2015. The construction of the disposal facility started in 
December 2016. The disposal project and granted license covers spent fuel from five reactors: 
LO1 and LO2, and OL1, OL2 and OL3. The construction of the disposal facility has proceeded as 
planned. The construction of the encapsulation plant began in June 2019 (Planned Measures 
to Improve Safety: Construction and oversight of the spent fuel disposal facility). Detailed 
description of the Posiva disposal facility project and the oversight are given in Annexes L2 
and L3.
Posiva is also preparing to the commissioning phase and the operation license phase 
with planning the schedules and procedures. The prereview process of operation license 
documentation is agreed with the regulator and it is implemented within next years.
2) Licensing for decommissioning of Finland’s first nuclear reactor commenced
VTT applied from the Government for a license for decommissioning of the FiR 1 research 
reactor in June 2017. STUK gave its statement and safety assessment of the license 
application to the MEAE in spring 2019. The main conclusion was, that the license for 
the decommissioning can be granted, but the detailed planning for the decommissioning 
phase and for the nuclear waste management shall be developed further before the actual 
dismantling can start. The waste management plans have been developed further as VTT 
signed a contract with FPH in March 2020, which agrees on the handling, storage and disposal 
of decommissioning waste in Loviisa NPP site. Future activities still need changes to the 
exisisting operating license of Loviisa disposal facility and Loviisa NPP. The dismantling 
will be regulated by STUK concerning radiation and nuclear safety aspects. The preliminary 
planning of the regulatory oversight activities for dismantling is on-going at STUK.
As the dismantling activities of the research reactor have not started during the reporting 
period, the identified measures to improve safety concerning decommissioning are still 
underway and remains future tasks. (Planned Measures to Improve Safety: Licensing of 
research reactor decommissioning and start of dismantling activities.)
3) Progress in the low and intermediate waste management
FPH delivered to STUK the updated post-closure safety case in 2019. In the safety case both the 
constructed parts of the repository and planned parts for the decommissioning waste disposal 
are addressed. The safety case also considered the updated regulation and guidance.
118 STUK-B 259 / OCTOBER 2020
SECTION K GENERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SAFETY
STUK reviewed the safety case and reached conclusions on the adequacy of FPH’s 
submission. The focus of STUK’s review has been to ensure that the safety case for the 
repository follows the structure and intent of the regulatory requirements and is sufficiently 
developed and convincing to address the post-closure safety of the repository. The Loviisa 
LILW repository post-closure safety case is dealt more in Section H (Article 15).
FPH will continue to develop the safety case, with an update to be presented in connection 
of the construction and operating licences for the enlargement of the repository for the 
disposal of the decommissioning waste, and in the connection of the periodic safety reviews.
In 2019 STUK also approved the commissioning of the solidified waste hall in the FPH’s low 
and intermediate waste repository. In the end of 2019, FPH promptly started the disposal in the 
hall (cf. Figure 7).
At the end of 2018, TVO started its plannings for a VLLW near-surface disposal facility to be 
located at the Olkiluoto island. The licensing preparations of the facility are active and during 
the 2020 the EIA studies to be annexed with the application were going on.
4) Strategy to enhance regulatory oversight
STUK published a new strategy in 2018 covering the period of 2018–2022. The strategy is 
comprised of nine targets categorizied in three groups and supported by four core values 
as presented in Figure 14. The implementation of the strategy is underway. As part of the 
implementation STUK has started to evaluate its approach to spent fuel disposal oversight. 
STUK implemented project using service design where Posiva was involved as a customer 
for the regulator. Service design project outlined aspects related to roles of experts, clarity 
of organisations formal standpoint and interaction between STUK and Posiva that require 
further improvement actions.
FIGURE 14. STUK strategy: vision, targets and values.
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5) The legislative and regulatory system was enhanced
The Nuclear Energy Act was revised due to the Basic Safety Standards directive and because of 
the amended Nuclear Safety Directive in 2018. The revision of the Nuclear Energy Act included 
also amendments related to changes in the Pressure Equipment Act and licensing of nuclear 
facilities. The new Nuclear Energy Act and Decree introduced a decommissioning license step. 
The decommissioning license is granted by the Government. The Nuclear Energy Act is being 
updated in 2020 to renew legislation related to nuclear security arrangements.
In 2015, a revision to the Nuclear Energy Act enabled STUK to issue legally binding 
regulations. STUK has updated three of its regulations from 2016:
• Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
(Y/1/2018)
• Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on the Security in the Use of Nuclear 
Energy (Y/2/2018)
• Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear 
Waste (Y/4/2018).
Other regulations are currently being updated. In addition to the updated regulations, STUK 
issued one new Guide YVL D.7 Release barriers of spent nuclear fuel disposal facility in 2018.
A new Radiation Act proposal was submitted to Parliament on 28 March 2018. Parliament 
adopted the new Radiation Act on 29 September 2018. The act entered into force on 15 
December 2018.
The new Radiation Act (859/2018) and secondary legislation issued under it implement 
the European Union’s new Basic Safety Standards Directive concerning radiation protection 
(2013/59/Euratom). The implementation of the Directive required Finland to make many 
structural and terminological changes to its radiation legislation. Therefore, an overall reform 
of radiation legislation was justified in connection with the implementation of the Directive.
Government Decree on the Ionizing Radiation (1034/2018) issued on 22 November 2018 
by the virtue of the new Radiation Act (859/2018) replaced the previous Radiation Decree 
(1512/1991).
The new Radiation Act authorizes STUK to issue legally binding regulations. One regulation 
was issued by the virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act and the Radiation Act:
• Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Regulation on the Exemption and Clearance Levels 
(STUK SY/1/2018)
As a result of overall reform of the radiation legislation, the status of ST Guides has been 
changed as recommendations.
Furthermore, it is regocnized that the current nuclear legislation has been amended several 
times. Therefore, MEAE has begun to evaluate the need of a comprehensive reform of the 
nuclear legislation.
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6) Improvement of the national plan for radioactive waste management
Finland has a well-functioning system and technical solutions for the management of nuclear 
waste arising from NPPs and for the major part of non-nuclear radioactive waste. However, 
as a consequence of the sealed source incident in 2016 and its related clean-up work, as well 
the planning strorage and disposal of the research reactor decommissioning waste, and the 
continuing challenge of disposal of a few HASS sources, it has been identified that our national 
radioactive waste management plan and licensing system needs to be evaluated and improved 
to address all possible waste streams.
To improve the national plan, MEAE appointed in 2017 a National Cooperation Group 
on nuclear waste management (YETI) to examine the objectives, development measures 
and possible solutions for safe and cost-effective management of nuclear waste and 
other radioactive waste. Based on its deliberations, the group issued 15 recommendations 
and 7 suggestions to achieve these objectives. Currently the group follows up how its 
recommendations are being addressed. The group also addressed recommendations made by 
the Finnish Safety Investigation Authority about the sealed source incident in autumn 2016. 
The YETI group is described in more detail in Annex L.4.
In April 2018, MEAE appointed a working group tasked with assessing and proposing 
amendments to the legal standards that regulate the investment activities of the VYR Fund 
and its product selection. The working group concluded that regulation and administration of 
the investment of assets under the Fund’s management can be amended in a way that provides 
opportunities for better long-term fund performance while at the same time ensuring that 
there are enough assets available to cover the costs of nuclear waste management. Ministry is 
currently preparing the amendments based on working group’s opinion.
7) The management of non-nuclear radioactive waste has progressed
TVO has leased a cavern in the LILW disposal facility at Olkiluoto to the State for the interim 
storage of non-nuclear radioactive waste. The revised (in 2012) license conditions of the 
Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility enabled the disposal of non-nuclear waste, including sealed 
sources at the Olkiluoto LILW disposal facility. This activity started at the end of 2016 and has 
continued since then. Sealed sources containing nuclides causing the highest doses (C-14, Ra-
226 and Am-241) are packed separately and are still stored in the interim storage.
In 2018 Government renewed the operating license of OL1 and OL2 units. The new operating 
license allows TVO to transfer nuclear wastes freely between the different NPP units (OL1, OL2 
and OL3) and nuclear waste management facilities. It also enables TVO to receive radioactive 
waste from the other radiation users to its waste management facilities for handling, 
packaging and storage. This enables companies to agree on co-operation in radioactive waste 
management based on commercial contracts. Due to earlier operating license conditions this 
was not possible and was thought to be a major challenge for the co-operation in this field. 
The aim is also in the future to enable the flexible use of existing nuclear waste management 
facilities for the handling, packaging and storage of the radioactive wastes from the small 
users of radiation.
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Challenges for future work in spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management
Finland has identified three main challenges for the future work, and these are summarized 
below.
1) Implementation of STUK’s stategy
Implementation of STUK’s strategic objective related to enhancing risk-informed and 
performance-based regulation and oversight, and highlighting licensee’s responsibility for 
safety, including
• Changes needed to the nuclear energy regulations and regulatory guides, e.g. to be more be 
goal setting and enabling and emphasising the licensees’ responsibility for safety.
• Developing the oversight activities to be more risk-informed and performance-based and 
emphasing licensees’ responsibility, e.g. by crediting licensees’ own oversight activities and 
good safety performance.
• Development of oversight practices and tools to take into account the possibilities offered by 
digitalisation and ensuring that the personnel has the necessary related skills.
• Ensuring resources on the implementation of the strategic objectives as well as on the 
oversight of many ongoing activities in different life-cycle phases of nuclear facilities.
• Especially a continuing regulatory challenge is to evaluate and to adapt oversight of Posiva’s 
activities as new information and experience is gathered during the spent fuel disposal 
progress.
2) Developing competences and the regulatory framework for decommissioning
As the decommissioing of research reactor FiR 1 is Finland’s first decommissioning project, 
Finland has limited experience in this area. The decommissioning project of the research 
reactor is an important learning process for STUK as the experiences gained will be used in 
updating regulations and YVL guides, and later also for planning the regulatory oversight 
for decommissioning NPPs. The first experiences are already gained during the review of the 
license application. STUK has identified needs to develop further the detailed guidance on 
the content of the required licensing documentation. There is also a need to consider, which 
documents shall be kept updated during the decommissioning phase, when the conditions 
change very often as the dismantling proceeds. The internal reporting of the experiences from 
the licensing phase is underway at STUK. The planning of the regulatory oversight for the 
actual dismantling phase is underway. As there is currently only one small decommissioning 
project on going in Finland, the maintaining and developing competences for the 
decommissioning remains a challenge in Finland both for the regulator and for the licensees.
3) Continuous challenges
Continuous challenges remain to maintain progress in spent nuclear fuel disposal and to 
implement improvements for national radioactive waste system identified in YETI group. In 
these challenges Finland has existing plans and implementation is ongoing. Therefore, no new 
actions are needed, but challenge still exists.
122 STUK-B 259 / OCTOBER 2020
SECTION K GENERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SAFETY
Areas of good Good Practices identified by the 6th Review Meeting
The 6th Review meeting identified six good practices during the Country Group Sessions held 
in May 2018. Those six good practices are listed in the following and are shortly refrected with 
short national responses.
1) Significant progress in the establishment of a final disposal facility for spent fuel: a construction 
license has been granted and construction has commenced. All stakeholders have been involved in the 
process of site selection. The decision has been taken with the consent of the local municipality.
From the Finnish viewpoint, its clear that our national efforts of many years are the reason 
for this good practice. As indicated in the beginning of this Section, Finland is approaching the 
operational stage of spent fuel disposal.
2) Completion of a holistic, graded approach to waste management of all waste types, culminating 
with the recent development of a dedicated VLLW disposal facility as a complement to the overall 
implementation of the programme.
Graded approach itself has been implemented in several locations of the national 
legislation as indicated in the Section E, Article 19 resposes. Finland has minor ambiguities 
in terms of some waste disposal routes (see e.g. Section H; Section F, Article 26). The recent 
updates of legislation identify VLLW disposal. Accordingly, both TVO and Fennovoima are 
planning near-surface disposal (Section B, Article 32). Currently VLLW is disposed together 
with LLW (Section D).
3) A robust approach to implementing waste management hierarchy has delivered significant benefits 
for the national programme, particularly regarding the management of LLW which has resulted in major 
reductions in the volumes of LLW requiring disposal at the LLW repository, thereby extending the lifetime 
for the facility by a hundred years.
As noted above, there has been some inefficiency in the Finnish VLLW management. Waste 
that has not been exempted for oversight goes at minimum to LLW disposal. Safety is not 
compromised but the legislation updates now enable the benefits for licensees.
4) A centralized storage facility for treatment and long-term storage of disused sealed radioactive 
sources.
For sealed sources that cannot be returned to manufacturer (Section B, Article 32), Finland 
has a centre for treating, conditioning and temporal storage (Section J) for the sources, and 
a separate centre for longer term storage (Section H, Article 11). Suomen Nukliditekniikka in 
Orimattila takes care of the former, while the latter is in the possession of STUK and located 
within the LILW repository owned by TVO at Olkiluoto.
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5) Openness and transparency – public involvement in a national regulatory oversight process through 
reporting on an annual basis independently from any licensing process.
STUK compiles annual reports on its oversight activities. STUK also serves residents of 
facility sites by arranging meetings where dialogue about topics concerning local people 
is possible. During preparatory phase of a new regulation, interested parties are invited to 
comment and propose improvements to draft regulation.
Decisions of the regulatory body with all the background information used for the decision 
are public (availale on request) as soon as they are declared. On separate identified grounds 
(safety arrangements, commercial interests, etc.) parts of the decisions can be kept back 
from the publicity. On important or publically interesting decisions, as well as, all topical 
radiation safety related issues STUK publishes press releases on regular basis. The titles of 
active oversight cases are available from STUK website and website is also used for broader 
communication with the public (cf. Section E, Article 20)
6) Establishment of a consultative forum at each licensed site composed of regulator, regulatory expert 
organization, residents, experts recommended by the local residents and governments.
Licensing of the site contains public involvement processes this has been described while 
considering Section B, Article 32. Specifically, at the stage of considering a site suitability the 
ministry (MEAE) is responsible of arraning public hearings of interested parties (Section G, 
Article 6). On the public service basis, STUK is obliged to answer any questions assigned for its 
attention. STUK has not established permanent groups in licensed sites. Some of the licensees 
have a consultation group composing of local residents and licensee representatives.
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L.1 National regulations and regulatory guides
Legislation
• Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987)
• Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988)
• Decree on State Nuclear Waste Management Fund (161/2004)
• Act on Third-Party Liability (484/1972)
• Decree on Implementation of Third-Party Liability (486/1972)
• Radiation Act (859/2018)
• Decree on Ionizing Radiation (1034/2018)
• Act on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (1069/1983)
• Decree on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (618/1997)
• Decree on Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety (1015/2016)
• Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (252/2017)
• Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (277/2017)
• Act on Openness of Government Activities (621/1999)
• Decree on Financial Provision for the Costs of Nuclear Waste Management (991/2017)
STUK Regulations
• STUK Regulation on the Safety of a Nuclear Power Plant (STUK Y/1/2018)
• STUK Regulation on the Emergency Arrangements of a Nuclear Power Plant (STUK Y/2/2018)
• STUK Regulation on the Security in the Use of Nuclear Energy (STUK Y/3/2016)
• STUK Regulation on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear Waste (STUK Y/4/2018)
• STUK Regulation on the Safety of Mining and Milling Operations Aimed at Producing 
Uranium or Thorium (STUK Y/5/2016)
• STUK Regulation on the Exemption and Clearance Levels (STUK SY/1/2018 – English 
translation pending)
• STUK Regulation on plans for radiation safety deviations and actions during and after 
radiation safety deviations (STUK S/1/2018 – English translation pending)
• STUK Regulation on security of radiation sources subject to authorization (STUK S/3/2018 – 
English translation pending)
• STUK Regulation on radiation measurements (STUK S/6/2018 – English translation 
pending)
• STUK Regulation on radioactive waste and releases in the use of unsealed sources (STUK 
S/2/2019 – English translation pending)
• STUK Regulation on practices involving exposure to natural radiation (STUK S/3/2019 – 
English translation pending)
• STUK Regulation on radiation safety of radiation sources during use and decommissioning 
of radiation sources and facilities (STUK S/5/2019 – English translation pending)
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• STUK Regulation on practices subject to authorization (STUK S/6/2019 – English translation 
pending)
The Regulations are available at: https://www.stuklex.fi/en/maarays
Regulatory Guides on nuclear safety (YVL Guides)
(only Guides relevant to this report are included)
Group A: Safety management of a nuclear facility
• Guide YVL A.1 Regulatory control of safety in the use of nuclear energy, 17 March 2020
• Guide YVL A.2 Site for a nuclear facility, 15 February 2019
• Guide YVL A.3 Leadership and management for safety, 15 March 2019
• Guide YVL A.4 Organisation and personnel of a nuclear facility, 15 December 2019
• Guide YVL A.5 Construction and commissioning of a nuclear facility, 15 March 2019
• Guide YVL A.8 Ageing management of a nuclear facility, 15 February 2019
• Guide YVL A.9 Regular reporting on the operation of a nuclear facility, 15 February 2019
• Guide YVL A.10 Operating experience feedback of a nuclear facility, 15 February 2019
• Guide YVL A.11 Security of a nuclear facility, 15 November 2013
• Guide YVL A.12 Information security management of a nuclear facility, 22 November 2013
Group B: Plant and System Design
• Guide YVL B.1 Safety design of a nuclear power plant, 15 June 2019
• Guide YVL B.2 Classification of systems, structures and components of a nuclear facility, 
15 June 2019
• Guide YVL B.3 Deterministic safety analyses for a nuclear power plant, 2 September 2019
• Guide YVL B.4 Nuclear fuel and reactor, 15 March 2019
• Guide YVL B.7 Provisions for internal and external hazards at a nuclear facility, 15 December 
2019
• Guide YVL B.8 Fire protection at a nuclear facility, 15 December 2019
Group C: Radiation safety of a nuclear facility and environment
• Guide YVL C.1 Structural radiation safety at a nuclear facility, 15 March 2019
• Guide YVL C.2 Radiation protection and exposure monitoring of nuclear facility workers, 
1 November 2019
• Guide YVL C.3 Limitation and monitoring of radioactive releases from a nuclear facility, 
15 March 2019
• Guide YVL C.4 Assessment of radiation doses to the public in the vicinity of a nuclear 
facility, 15 March 2019
• Guide YVL C.5 Emergency arrangements of a nuclear power plant, 20 January 2020
• Guide YVL C.6 Radiation monitoring at a nuclear facility, 15 March 2019
• Guide YVL C.7 Radiological monitoring of the environment of a nuclear facility, 19.12.2016
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Group D: Nuclear materials and waste
• Guide YVL D.1 Regulatory control of nuclear safeguards, 24 May 2019
• Guide YVL D.2 Transport of nuclear material and nuclear waste, 15 May 2019
• Guide YVL D.3 Handling and storage of nuclear fuel, 17 March 2020
• Guide YVL D.4 Predisposal management of low and intermediate level waste and 
decommissioning of a nuclear facility, 15 December 2019
• Guide YVL D.5 Disposal of nuclear waste, 13 February 2018
• Guide YVL D.7 Release barriers of spent nuclear fuel disposal facility, 13 February 2018
ST Guides for non-nuclear radioactive waste
As a result of overall reform of the radiation legislation, the status of ST Guides has been changed as 
recommendations.
• Guide ST 1.1 Safety in radiation practices, 23 May 2013
• Guide ST 1.4 Radiation user’s organization, 2 November 2011
• Guide ST 1.5 Exemption of radiation use from safety licensing, 12 September 2013
• Guide ST 1.8. Qualifications and radiation protection training of persons working in 
a radiation user’s organization, 25 January 2016
• Guide ST 5.1 Radiation safety of sealed sources and equipment containing them, 
13 September 2016
• Guide ST 5.7 Shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel, 6 June 2011
• Guide ST 6.2 Radioactive waste and discharges from unsealed sources, 9 January 2017
• Guide ST 12.2 Radioactivity of building materials and ash, 17 December 2010
Summary of national programme
National programme on the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste in 
Finland – summarising documentation in accordance with Article 12 of the European 
Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom: https://www.stuk.fi/documents/12547/554501/
National+Programme+072015docx+14072015+English+translation+21082015.pdf
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L.2 Regulatory control of the Olkiluoto 
spent fuel disposal project
From a regulatory viewpoint, the Olkiluoto spent fuel disposal project can be divided into the 
following main phases (approximate years):
1. Research phase from the late 1970s to the DiP licensing phase, 1978–2001
2. Design, research and development phase including construction of an underground rock charac-
terization facility (from DiP to Construction license (CL)), 2001–2014
3. Construction and commissioning phase (from CL to operating license (OL)), 2015–2023
4. Operating phase (2024–2120, if no new NPPs)
5. Decommissioning and closure phase (2120–2125, assuming no new NPPs).
The first step in the licensing process was reached by mid-year 1999, when Posiva submitted 
the application for a DiP for an SNF disposal facility at Olkiluoto for the spent fuel from the 
four operating reactors. The DiP was granted by the Finnish Government in late 2000 and was 
accepted by the host municipality (veto right holder), Eurajoki, and ratified by the Finnish 
Parliament in early 2001. Later, the DiP was expanded with a separate DiPs to also cover the 
spent fuel from reactor units OL3
The initial DiP also made possible Posiva to start the construction of an underground rock 
characterization facility (ONKALO URCF) at the Olkiluoto site to the depth of the planned 
underground disposal facility. The DiP also requested the continuation of the research, 
development and design work to further elaborate the safety justifications in the disposal 
project for the purposes of the construction licensing stage.
Posiva has followed the time schedule set out in the Government decision in 1983 and 
accordingly submitted a construction license application and its supporting documentation to 
the authorities at the end of 2012. The Government granted Posiva the construction license at 
the end of 2015. This was the start of the construction phase.
Regulatory approach to the construction of ONKALO
Nuclear waste regulations require that the rock at the disposal site shall be characterized 
at the disposal depth. This requirement is further elaborated in the present STUK safety 
regulation (Guide YVL D.5), which states that the characterization may involve construction 
of a research or characterization facility on the site. The target of ONKALO URCF has been to 
ensure the suitability of the Olkiluoto site for a disposal facility and has been proposed from 
the beginning of the construction project also to be access route to the actual disposal facility 
in the future. Following the ratification of the Govermental DiP, STUK decided in 2001, based 
on its safety authority, that the ONKALO access route together with its auxiliary and other 
underground rooms shall be oversighted as if the URCF would be part of a licenced facility. 
Consequently, STUK implemented regulatory control to the ONKALO URCF construction 
project as a juvenile part of the whole repository project. However, a construction license was 
needed before starting the construction of the disposal rooms and other underground rooms 
outside the scope of the URCF.
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Regulatory approach for Posiva’s Research, Development and Technical Design (RD&D) 
activities
Every three years Posiva compiles a waste management program (YJH) for nuclear waste on 
behalf of TVO and FPH, who are liable for the nuclear waste generated at their nuclear power 
plants. TVO and FPH submit the program to the MEAE for regulatory review. STUK reviews the 
program and provides its own statement of its plans to the MEAE. The most recent program 
was submitted to the MEAE in September 2018 and it covers the period 2019-2021. STUK is 
responsible for regulating the safety related implementation of the RD&D work. During the 
period in concern, after Posiva had submitted the construction license application, STUK’s 
regulatory control of Posiva’s RD&D activities has focussed on demonstrating the feasibility 
and performance of the disposal concept.
The focus of STUK’s regulatory control has changed from the overall safety case 
development to the demonstration of the disposal system processes and the emplacements 
of the disposal canisters. The experiences from the review and assessment of Posiva’s safety 
case supporting the construction license application will also steer the future focus of the 
RD&D supervision. In addition to issues which Posiva has raised in the safety case, STUK’s 
review has identified some other areas, where further RD&D work is needed to reduce existing 
uncertainties.
Regulatory review and assessment of the construction license application for Olkiluoto 
spent nuclear fuel encapsulation plant and disposal facility
In 2003, Posiva applied additional two years time for submitting the construction license 
application (initially scheduled by the end of 2010). When granting the license application 
postponement to 2012, the MEAE required in return a description of the status of the CLA 
by the end of 2009 to make sure the progress of the work. The reasoning was to conduct a 
regulatory review of the status and maturity of the development of the construction license 
application. STUK reviewed the draft safety case and the process was used as an exercise for 
the actual license application review.
STUK established an internal project for the license application review. The assessment of 
the fulfilment of the safety requirements and of the implementing organization’s preparedness 
for construction were supported by STUK’s inspection programme for the pre-construction 
phase. The inspection programme continued later as a construction inspection programme 
(CIP) for construction control of the disposal facility.
Posiva submitted the construction license application and its supporting documentation 
to the authorities at the end of 2012. STUK performed a review and assessed the fulfilment 
of all the applicable radiation and nuclear safety requirements. STUK prepared a statement 
and a safety evaluation report and submitted them to the Government in February 2015. In its 
assessment, STUK highlighted issues that needed further attention. The Government granted 
the construction license in November 2015.
Regulatory control for the construction of the disposal facility
After the construction license phase, STUK has continued comprehensive regulatory control 
over the subsequent detailed design, construction, manufacturing and pre-operational testing, 
129STUK-B 259 / OCTOBER 2020
SECTION L ANNEXES
which will then be followed by the review and assessment of the forthcoming operating license 
application.
STUK controls the implementation of the facility project in detail. The purpose of the 
control is to ensure that the conditions of the construction license and the approved plans 
required in Section 35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree are complied with and that the nuclear 
facility is also in other respects constructed in accordance with regulations issued on the 
basis of the Nuclear Energy Act. The following chapters provide an overall view of the 
implementation of the regulatory control in Posiva’s case.
Verification of the readiness to start the construction
According to Section 108 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, various phases in the construction of 
a nuclear facility cannot be commenced until STUK has ascertained for each phase that all 
safety-related factors and safety regulations have been given enough consideration.
STUK performed inspections related to Posiva’s readiness during October and November 
2016 and stated in its decision given at the end of November 2016 that Posiva had achieved 
readiness for the construction project. Posiva started the construction of the first part of 
disposal facility which was outside the scope of the URFC part of ONKALO project on 1st of 
December 2016.
The next main phase of the project was starting the construction of the encapsulation 
plant and as stated in the Section 108 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, STUK ascertained Posiva’s 
readiness also for this phase of construction. The inspection was performed in May 2019. As a 
result of the inspection STUK stated that Posiva had fulfilled the requirements concerning this 
phase of the facility construction project, and that Posiva is organizationally prepared to begin 
the construction of th encapsulation plant.
Oversight of the construction of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility
The Guide YVL A.5, Construction and Commissioning of a Nuclear Facility gives detailed 
guidance for the licensee and describes STUK’s procedures for regulatory oversight. It includes 
oversight of the design, manufacturing, construction, installation, commissioning and 
reporting during the construction.
Overall, the regulatory oversight of the encapsulation plant will follow the same 
procedures as for the other nuclear facilities, considering a graded approach which focuses 
the oversight based on safety relevance. These procedures will be applied for the oversight of 
the construction of the encapsulation plant, because this is similar to the other nuclear waste 
processing facilities.
The Guide YVL A.5 cannot be directly applied for the regulatory oversight of the 
construction of the underground disposal facility. Excavating and drilling safety classified 
underground rooms with post-closure safety functions are specific to this facility and 
regulatory oversight procedures need to be adjusted for this purpose. The Guide YVL D.7 
Engineered and natural barriers in a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility, describes the oversight 
of the underground disposal facility. This guide was published 2018.
In the disposal facility oversight concept, STUK has gathered the experience from the 
oversight of the underground rock characterization facility (ONKALO URCF). The disposal 
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facility design documentation will be reviewed and approved by STUK according to the 
document type and safety classification of the rooms to be excavated.
After approval of the design documentation, STUK performs an inspection concerning 
the readiness to commence the excavations of safety classified underground rooms. During 
the construction, STUK performs inspections of the rock surface based on mapping 
documentation before the surfaces are covered by shotcrete and also similar inspections for 
the technical documentation of the excavated rooms.
During the construction, the commissioning inspection will be the final regulatory 
oversight procedure for the excavated rooms. It will conclude all the previous findings from 
earlier reviews, inspections, handling of non-conformances during the construction as well as 
quality control documentation.
Posiva is carrying out a comprehensive monitoring program which was started before the 
construction of the URCF started, to monitor the effects of construction activities on the site 
properties, such as maintaining the favourable properties of the site hydrology, hydrogeology 
and rock mechanics during both construction and operation of the disposal facility. A baseline 
study for the area was also made before the construction URCF started for the planned area.  
STUK is closely following the results of the monitoring programme during the construction.
Oversight of feasibility of the disposal concept
Based on the construction license review, Posiva has not yet fully demonstrated the 
feasibility of the emplacement of disposal components according to the latest design and 
some of the requirements for STUK’s decision on the PSAR concern this issue. These include 
demonstrating among other things:
• Posiva’s capability to excavate underground disposal rooms that fulfil the specifications
• the manufacture of engineered barrier components
• the installation of engineered barrier components.
The engineered barrier system (EBS) includes copper canister, bentonite buffer, backfilling 
of the tunnels and isolation and closure structures. STUK’s oversight covers the design, 
manufacturing and installation of the EBS components. During the construction period, 
the EBS oversight focuses mainly on Posiva’s R&D projects that aim to demonstrate the 
manufacture of EBS components fulfilling the requirement specifications set for them in the 
design documentation.
Oversight of post-closure safety case development during construction
The post-closure safety case has a clear interface with the construction of the disposal facility 
and the feasibility of the disposal concept. Changes in the post-closure safety case may 
influence the construction of the disposal facility and the feasibility of the disposal concept 
and vice versa.
To monitor the development work performed for the post-closure safety case requirements, 
STUK and Posiva have agreed to have regular discussions on the development work. The first 
step was to reach common understanding on the targets for the development work for each 
requirement set during the construction license application review. Secondly, Posiva developed 
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project plans to address the requirements and delivered the plans to STUK for review. To have 
a clear overall view of Posiva’s development work, STUK required Posiva to include all the 
project plans in the existing disposal concept development plan or in some other similar plans. 
The discussion will continue in the future as needed and at least when Posiva achieves the 
milestones set in the development projects.
Regulatory approach for nuclear safeguards
As ONKALO was foreseen to become a part of the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, 
STUK started implementation of the safeguards for ONKALO in 2003. Subsequently, Posiva 
was obliged to implement safeguards from the beginning of ONKALO excavation up to the 
closure of the disposal facility. In accordance with STUK’s regulations, Posiva prepared and 
documented the necessary safeguard procedures and measures in a quality manual called 
“Nuclear Materials Handbook” which was approved by STUK in 2005. Since then Posiva has 
regularly updated the handbook and submitted the new versions to STUK for approval.
In 2013 Posiva submitted the preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) of the 
geological disposal facility and the encapsulation plant to the European Commission (EC) 
as requested from new nuclear facility operators. The Commission has the assigned Material 
Balance Area (MBA) codes, W0LF, for the geological disposal facility and, W0LE, for the 
encapsulation plant. The two material balance areas constitute a site according to the 
Additional Protocol. The Posiva site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area around the buildings 
supporting the construction of the facilities. Based on the declarations, the IAEA and the EC 
perform regular inspections of the Posiva site and facilities.
STUK’s safeguarding activities consist of inspecting and assessing Posiva’s implementation 
of safeguards, reviewing Posiva’s reports, and verification through on-site inspections that the 
disposal facility is in full compliance with Posiva’s as-built documentation, also presented in 
the BTCs. STUK also verifies that the information in Posiva’s declaration on the site is correct 
before the declaration is submitted to IAEA and the EC.
STUK approved the “plan for arranging the safeguards control necessary to prevent the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons” which was included in Posiva’s construction license application. In the 
approval of the plan STUK highlighted to Posiva the need to plan and construct the facilities in 
a way that enables efficient implementation of safeguards by STUK, the European Commission 
and the IAEA. The safeguards long-term challenge is a good example of ongoing coordination 
with the IAEA and the EC in developing the concepts for new types of facilities, and to carry 
out the required safeguard activities for a period of hundred years. The task of accommodating 
the safeguards measures to be implemented at the encapsulation plant and geological disposal 
facility in the design of the facility is ongoing. Spent nuclear fuel, which has been emplaced 
in the disposal facility, cannot be re-verified later. A non-destructive assay instrument for 
verifying spent nuclear fuel at the single pin level is under development and currently the 
instrument is tested rigorously in nuclear power plants. The plan is to verify all spent fuel 
before packing into the spent fuel disposal canisters.
STUK’s safeguard activities and findings are published annually in the safeguards report 
“Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international co-operation and 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”.
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L.3 Posiva’s programme for spent fuel disposal
Introduction
In Finland, each producer of nuclear power generated electricity is fully responsible for its own 
nuclear waste management and its costs. Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) and Fortum Power 
and Heat Oy (FPH) have been managing their own nuclear waste since their nuclear power 
plants began operating in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Regarded as high-level waste, the 
spent fuel is currently kept in interim water pool storage facilities at the plant sites. Later, it 
will be disposed of in the Olkiluoto bedrock. In 1995, TVO and FPH established a joint company, 
Posiva, to implement and manage the disposal of spent nuclear fuel produced in their nuclear 
power plants in Finland and to perform the associated research and development work. The 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel is scheduled to begin in the early 2020s.
Summary of spent fuel geological disposal history
The first study of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel appeared in a series of reports published 
by the Nuclear Waste Commission of Finnish Power Companies (YJT) in 1982. The study 
examined the safety and technical feasibility of the disposal in Finnish conditions under the 
multi-barrier principle. The existing information on the Finnish bedrock was compiled in 
respect to the long-term safety of disposal and the suitability of the rock for underground 
construction. In 1983 TVO launched an R&D programme to develop the disposal solution 
for spent nuclear fuel. The programme contained geological screening of the possible final 
disposal sites in 1983–1985. Preliminary site characterization started in 1987 at five sites. The 
site characterization programme included deep drilling, geological mapping, hydrogeological, 
hydrogeochemical and rock mechanical studies. After summarizing the results of the 
preliminary site investigations, a detailed site characterization programme was conducted 
at four sites, Eurajoki, Loviisa, Äänekoski and Kivetty in 1992–1999. At the same time, the 
disposal concept was developed further in parallel to the site characterization. In 1999 Posiva 
applied for a DiP for a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki. The Finnish 
Government made a favourable DiP in December 2000 and the Parliament ratified the decision 
in May 2001.
After the DiP was ratified in 2001, Posiva continued detailed site confirmation studies 
at the Olkiluoto site and the development of the disposal concept. The excavation of the 
ONKALO URCF was started in 2004. As URFC is constructed at the repository site and will be 
used as an access route to the disposal facility, the construction of ONKALO has been subject 
to the requirements applicable to nuclear facilities in general, and, in particular, to those 
addressing the construction of nuclear waste facilities. An extensive programme of site-
specific characterization, testing and experiments was launched for ONKALO during URCF 
construction phase. The excavation of URCF was completed in 2016. The experience gained 
from the URCF part of ONKALO project will be used in the construction of the disposal facility.
General layout of ONKALO and the KBS-3V concept of disposal is presented in the 
Figure L3-1. 
Construction license granted and construction started
According to the Government’s DiP the spent fuel from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs will be 
disposed of in a KBS-3™ type geological repository on the Olkiluoto island in the municipality 
of Eurajoki. At the end of 2012 Posiva submitted a construction license application for an 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility to the Government.
The Finnish Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) gave a positive safety statement supported 
with a safety evaluation concerning the construction license application on February 2015. 
In addition, STUK made a separate decision about the key safety documents, which were 
submitted to STUK for review together with the license application. In these decisions STUK 
set requirements for Posiva that must be met during construction or in the operating license 
application documentation. These requirements concern further work in safety demonstration 
for reducing some of the uncertainties related to the project. The Finnish Government granted 
the construction license to Posiva on November 12, 2015 for the disposal of 6500 tU from NPP 
units OL1–OL3 and LO1 and LO2. Posiva has continued research and detailed technical design 
of the nuclear waste facilities to fulfil the requirements set by STUK as a result of its safety 
evaluation.
The construction of the disposal facility transportation and connecting tunnels was started 
in December 2016 after STUK had confirmed Posiva’s readiness to start the construction of 
the underground disposal facility. The scope of the first excavation phase also includes the 
first central tunnel into the disposal area. The construction of the disposal facility will be 
conducted in phases to limit disturbances caused by open spaces and to enable continuous 
improvement of the disposal technology during operation.
Posiva is planning to apply for the operating license by the end of 2021 and start operation 
of the encapsulation and disposal facilities in the first half of 2024. The time schedule depends 
FIGURE L3-1. General layout of the constructed ONKALO facility, Posiva’s 
disposal project and KBS‑3V concept of disposal.
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hydrogeochemical and rock mechanical studies. After summarizing the results of the 
preliminary site investigations, a detailed site characterization programme was conducted 
at four sites, Eurajoki, Loviisa, Äänekoski and Kivetty in 1992–1999. At the same time, the 
disposal concept was developed further in parallel to the site characterization. In 1999 Posiva 
applied for a DiP for a spent nuclear fuel disposal facility at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki. The Finnish 
Government made a favourable DiP in December 2000 and the Parliament ratified the decision 
in May 2001.
After the DiP was ratified in 2001, Posiva continued detailed site confirmation studies 
at the Olkiluoto site and the development of the disposal concept. The excavation of the 
ONKALO URCF was started in 2004. As URFC is constructed at the repository site and will be 
used as an access route to the disposal facility, the construction of ONKALO has been subject 
to the requirements applicable to nuclear facilities in general, and, in particular, to those 
addressing the construction of nuclear waste facilities. An extensive programme of site-
specific characterization, testing and experiments was launched for ONKALO during URCF 
construction phase. The excavation of URCF was completed in 2016. The experience gained 
from the URCF part of ONKALO project will be used in the construction of the disposal facility.
General layout of ONKALO and the KBS-3V concept of disposal is presented in the 
Figure L3-1. 
Construction license granted and construction started
According to the Government’s DiP the spent fuel from the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs will be 
disposed of in a KBS-3™ type geological repository on the Olkiluoto island in the municipality 
of Eurajoki. At the end of 2012 Posiva submitted a construction license application for an 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility to the Government.
The Finnish Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) gave a positive safety statement supported 
with a safety evaluation concerning the construction license application on February 2015. 
In addition, STUK made a separate decision about the key safety documents, which were 
submitted to STUK for review together with the license application. In these decisions STUK 
set requirements for Posiva that must be met during construction or in the operating license 
application documentation. These requirements concern further work in safety demonstration 
for reducing some of the uncertainties related to the project. The Finnish Government granted 
the construction license to Posiva on November 12, 2015 for the disposal of 6500 tU from NPP 
units OL1–OL3 and LO1 and LO2. Posiva has continued research and detailed technical design 
of the nuclear waste facilities to fulfil the requirements set by STUK as a result of its safety 
evaluation.
The construction of the disposal facility transportation and connecting tunnels was started 
in December 2016 after STUK had confirmed Posiva’s readiness to start the construction of 
the underground disposal facility. The scope of the first excavation phase also includes the 
first central tunnel into the disposal area. The construction of the disposal facility will be 
conducted in phases to limit disturbances caused by open spaces and to enable continuous 
improvement of the disposal technology during operation.
Posiva is planning to apply for the operating license by the end of 2021 and start operation 
of the encapsulation and disposal facilities in the first half of 2024. The time schedule depends 
FIGURE L3-1. General layout of the constructed ONKALO facility, Posiva’s 
disposal project and KBS‑3V concept of disposal.
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on the duration of the operating license application review. The project plan and the schedule 
are presented in Figure L3-2. 
Programme to address the open requirements
Posiva has established several development projects to address the requirements raised by 
STUK during the evaluation of the post-closure safety case for the construction license. These 
projects have been included into Posiva’s programme schedule (Figure L3-2) and their progress 
is tracked to assess the readiness of the disposal concept and the safety case before moving on 
to the next phase of the programme. Posiva and STUK engage in frequent dialogue to evaluate 
Posiva’s plans related to addressing the remaining STUK requirements.
The development projects on site confirmation and rock characterization deal with the 
compliance of various site models and respective site research data. They also deal with the 
reliability of the discrete fracture network modelling method, and address the interconnection 
between the safety functions, performance targets and design requirements of the host rock, 
and the reliability of Posiva’s rock suitability classification (RSC) method. The aim of the work 
is to increase the reliability of the future safety case (TURVA-2020) by producing an integrated 
site model and by verifying its compliance with the data gathered from the site during the 
site investigations and during the construction of the ONKALO URCF facility according to 
Posiva’s monitoring programme as reported in Posiva’s 2012-01 report. Further information 
will be produced in several different projects under the site programme that include all site 
description projects for the evaluation of the long-term evolution of the site properties and in 
some specific projects. The specific projects include studies into issues such as the salinity of 
the groundwater (Merireikä project), the penetration depth and evolution of the composition 
of glacial melt waters (Saimaa project), sulphide flux on canister surfaces (Sulfidi project), 
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and the evolution of mechanical properties of the host rock (POSE and Kalliomekaniikan 
paikankuvaus projects).
The integrated site model and the monitoring programme are in connection to the rock 
suitability classification (RSC), which is a method developed by Posiva during the construction 
of the ONKALO URCF facility for locating suitable rock volumes for various rooms and 
which will be used for the same purpose in the construction of the disposal facility. The 
reliability of the RSC method will be addressed, and the method will be evaluated and further 
developed during the detailed design and construction of the tunnels for the commissioning 
test. Detailed scale modelling of the site for the exact location of the rooms will be further 
developed in this connection.
Alternatives to the current model are being studied and modelling work is being carried 
out to evaluate the consequences of earthquakes and secondary movements on the disposal 
facilities (Seismologia project).
The post-closure evolution of the disposal system is affected by the evolution of the 
climate both from the short- and long-term perspective. Posiva has extended the studies 
to include extreme lines of evolution, such as extremely thick glaciation and an extended 
temperate climate by modelling the evolution of CO
2
 contents for a period of 1 million years 
(Ilmastokehitys project). The results have been integrated into the safety case.
The projects regarding the disposal canisters concentrate on the industrialization of 
canister manufacturing methods, as well as evaluating and reducing the uncertainties of the 
long-term performance of the canisters. Manufacturing processes for canister components are 
being developed to produce components that fulfil their requirements and can be produced 
in a cost-effective way. Grain size has been one focus of the development work for copper 
components and the effects of the casting process on mechanical properties are another focus 
area for the cast-iron inserts.
The long-term integrity of the canisters requires copper to resist corrosion. Various forms 
of corrosion have been studied for a few decades and according to current knowledge it has 
been stated that there are no forms of corrosion that can threaten the required lifetime of 
the canisters. To reduce the uncertainties related to assumptions made in the assessments, 
some further corrosion tests have been performed. To support the statement and the tests, 
modelling has been carried out (copper sulphide modelling) in co-operation with the Swedish 
waste management organisation SKB.
Studies on the creep properties of the copper have been extended to include larger 
temperature and stress fields (lid weld) and to include the effects of sulphur and phosphorus 
(base material).
The clay components of the disposal concept include a buffer surrounding the canisters in 
the deposition holes and the backfill material of the deposition tunnels. The buffer consists 
of blocks and pellets and the backfill of granules, according to the current reference design. 
When bentonite clay comes into contact with water, it swells and limits the transport of 
water and other substances that might be harmful to the canister; the buffer also protects 
the canister mechanically in case of small rock shear movements. The development work 
addresses some remaining open issues for evaluating the evolution of the clay components, 
such as homogenization, mechanical and chemical erosion, alteration of the clay minerals, 
136 STUK-B 259 / OCTOBER 2020
SECTION L ANNEXES – L.3 POSIVA’S PROGRAMME FOR SPENT FUEL DISPOSAL
interaction between the clay and cement used in the underground construction. To study 
these processes, several projects have been established and are ongoing. Changing of the 
reference backfilling method to granular bentonite has been taken into consideration in 
these projects and it has caused some delays in concluding them. The wetting behaviour of 
buffer and backfill components has been tested on various scales (1:6, 1:2) and modelled to 
support current knowledge (DoSub, DOST, FISST projects). The interaction of the various 
clay components is also being studied (HDD project) and the wetting behaviour and mass 
loss during the saturation of the components has been further studied and modelled (mechE 
project) to reduce the uncertainties related to early evolution until the full saturation of the 
disposal system. Posiva is also participating in a Euratom Horizon 2020 project BEACON where 
homogenization of bentonite is further studied.
In the long term, mass loss of the buffer and backfill components could also occur due 
to chemical erosion of the clay. The rate of chemical erosion depends on the ground water 
composition, fractures conducting the ground water to the deposition tunnels and holes as 
well as on properties of the clay. To reduce the uncertainties related to the mass loss of buffer 
and backfill due to chemical erosion, data on fractures has been gathered, further tests on clay 
performance are being done and modelling is being carried out.
Performance of the bentonite buffer in the long-term is also affected by its mineralogical 
composition. Further knowledge to support the assumptions made about the buffer 
performance is being gathered via long-term laboratory tests (MAB project) performed in 
elevated temperatures and in selected ground water compositions. In EURATOM, in EURAD 
project a work package called HITEC has been started to study properties of bentonite in 
elevated temperatures; Posiva is participating in the project.
The long-term interaction of the clay components with the cement used in the construction 
of the disposal facility has been studied with help of laboratory experiments, computer 
simulations and discrete fracture network modelling (CBI and DFN projects). The aim of 
the work has been to set safe limits for the use of cement, under which the effect on the 
performance of the clay components can be disregarded.
Two large Euratom Horizon 2020 projects, MODERN2020 (monitoring strategies of disposal 
facility), and, MIND (microbial activity in disposal, where Posiva has been participating, have 
been completed. Currently, Posiva is participating in Horizon 2020 project BEACON (bentonite 
homogenisation) and in EURAD project HITEC (bentonite in higher temperatures) as 
mentioned above and is following the EURAD projects FUTuRE (Fundamental understanding 
of radionuclide retention) and SFC (Spent Fuel Characterization and Evolution Until Disposal). 
Posiva cooperating on the IGD-TP (Implementing Geological Disposal Technology Platform) 
platform in the KINA (Natural analogues) project.
The programme to address the open requirements has been performed mainly according 
to plans with some minor adjustments due to changes in the reference designs for 
industrialization and optimization purposes. Number of single tasks in various projects 
to close the open requirements have been raised from the original 155 to 179 tasks. In the 
beginning of 2020 two third of the tasks have been finished and the work to finish the 
remaining ones is ongoing. The results of the finished tasks have been directed to the ongoing 
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safety case work; they have reduced its uncertainties and hence imporved its realiability. The 
aim is to finish all of the task and close the requirements by the end of 2021.
The integrated site model has been developed and the first full draft of Olkiluoto site 
description report has been finished and the review of the report is ongoing. The report 
includes results from all site description projects for the evaluation of the long-term evolution 
of the site properties. Reliability of the RSC method has been evaluated and further developed. 
Evolution of the climate including extreme lines of evolution both from the short- and long-
term (up yto 1 M years) perspective has been modelled and the results have been directed to the 
safety case.
Manufacturing methods of canister components have been further studied and developed, 
copper corrosion and creep studies have been concluded to the main parts. Various scales of 
bentonite tests have been performed and long-term properties of bentonite has been further 
studied. Some tests and modelling work is still ongoing.
Safety case methodology and transparency of describing and selecting scenarios has been 
further developed and the safety case work is proceeding.
Full scale in-situ system test (FISST)
Full scale in-situ system test, FISST is a part of Posiva’s strategy for the gradual 
implementation of tests and demonstrations (Posiva WR 2009-24 report). Posiva has moved 
from laboratory scale and full-scale installation tests of individual components to a phase of 
testing the installation of the entire final disposal system in ONKALO. The FISST consists of 
a disposal concept test in accordance with Posiva’s reference plan (KBS-3V) using materials 
largely in line with the reference plans. In the demonstration area of ONKALO, demonstration 
tunnel #2 and two its test deposition holes, which have been excavated and bored in the 
demonstration area in ONKALO has been used for the test.
Objectives of the test have been set as:
• demonstrating the installation and logistics of the various components with Posiva’s 
prototype machinery
• provide a platform to test and develop the functionality of Posiva's organisation
• demonstrating the evolution of the KBS-3 system in the early phase.
The FISST project and test has been designed in 2016–2017, extensive preparations for the test, 
including rock excavations, manufacture of components and installation of instrumentation have 
been made in 2017–2018. Readiness to start the installations of the FISST was achieved in 2018.
The test involved installation of two heated copper canisters, two set of deposition hole 
buffer, and approximately 50 m of deposition tunnel backfill as well as a deposition tunnel 
end plug. In deviation from the reference plans, a buffer made up of block segments instead of 
ringshaped and cheese shaped blocks and was installed in the second test deposition hole.
In FISST prototype installation equipment has been used and the achievement of the initial 
state after the installations has been studied (Figure L3-3). To study the early evolution of 
the system, in addition to the manufacturing and installation of components, the FISST also 
involves instrumentation and monitoring of the performance of EBS components as well as 
monitoring the environment in the FISST tunnel and in demonstration area.
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Reporting of the FISST is ongoing and the test monitoring is continued for as long as it 
produces appropriate data. 
Evaluation of Posiva's preparedness for nuclear construction
According to Section 108 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, the various phases in the construction 
of a nuclear facility cannot be commenced until STUK has ascertained for each phase that all 
safety-related factors and safety regulations have been given sufficient consideration on the 
basis of the documents mentioned in Section 35 of Nuclear Energy Decree and other detailed 
plans and documents.
In order to ensure Posiva’s preparedness to continue to the nuclear construction phase, 
Posiva established and implemented a verification programme. The programme included 
verifications of several levels of documentation, requirements and activities. In addition to 
the documentation and review of requirements, Posiva conducted one independent review 
and carried out one self-evaluation related to organizational preparedness, safety culture and 
management of nuclear facilities.
Posiva’s verification was conducted during April–September 2016 and the evaluation report 
was sent to STUK. STUK conducted three inspections during October–November 2016 to 
verify Posiva’s readiness to commence the nuclear construction. No significant open issues 
were observed which would restrain underground nuclear construction activities, and on 25th 
November Posiva’s preparedness for nuclear construction was confirmed by STUK. The MEAE 
was informed of the commencement of the nuclear construction on the 9th of December 2016.
Entering into the construction phase
In the beginning of the year 2019 Posiva made a comprehensive evaluation of its readiness, 
and thereafter also a decision, to enter to the next construction phase. Posiva compiled 
an extensive documentation for its owners as a basis for making the decision on the large 
investment including the following: the construction of the encapsulation plant, the second 
FIGURE L3-3. EBS components installed with prototype machines in FISST.
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contract of the final disposal facility and its systems, detailed design and purchase of final 
disposal machinery and starting the final disposal in the first deposition tunnel.
Posiva made a scientific–technical and organizational evaluation of readiness and 
feasibility taking into consideration the following perspectives:
• Disposal concept
• Production processes and logistics
• Operational nuclear safety
• Production process and provisions for disturbances in the fuel handling cell
• Production personnel and organization
• Status of actions for optimization and industrialization
• Economical provisions for final disposal
• Encapsulation plant programme
• Disposal facility programme
• Disposal machinery programme
• Strategy for licencing and qualifications
• Organizational readiness
• Organizational management during construction.
Posiva's whole organization was heavily involved in the documentation and the evaluation 
work. The documentation was reviewed by committees working for Posiva's Board of Directors 
and by an internal inspector before it was submitted to Posiva's Board of Directors. Based on 
the documentation and statements made on it, Posiva's Board of Directors made in June 2019 
the investment decision and the decision to enter into the construction phase. The foundation 
stone for Posiva's encapsulation plant (Figure L3-4) was laid in a festive ceremony in the 
presence of the Prime Minister of Finland Mr. Antti Rinne on the 23rd of September 2019 in 
Olkiluoto. 
FIGURE L3-4. Illustration of the encapsulation plant.
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Final disposal facility and encapsulation plant construction status and progress
Construction of the encapsulation plant started in June 2019. The underground excavation 
work package LTU1 (Final disposal facility, tunnel excavation contract no. 1) that started the 
nuclear construction phase in December 2016, was finished with excavations in December 2019. 
The total amount of LTU1 excavation is around 117 000 m³. The underground excavation work 
package LTU2 (Final disposal facility, tunnel excavation contract no. 2) is planned to be started 
in Q2/2020.
The construction status in February 2020 is as follows:
• The LTU1 work package excavations have been finished with the total amount of excavation 
at around 117 000 m³
• Canister shaft is fully excavated Raise boring of the shaft was finished in March 2019.
• The air outlet shaft has been in operation since 2017
• Canister reception station excavation at –437 m was finished in 2018
• Vehicle connectionshave been fully excavated by 2019
• Excavation of the first part of the central tunnel 5 and 6 has been started
• Pilot hole drillings of the first five deposition tunnels have been started
• Construction and installation of heating, ventilation, air-conditioning (HVAC) and 
electricity works in the technical rooms have been started
• Construction of the encapsulation plant is ongoing and progressing according to the 
planned schedule.
Preparations to start the LTU2 work package are ongoing and it is aimed to be started in 2020. 
The first part of the central tunnels 5 and 6 are aimed to be excavated and reinforced by 2022. 
Excavation of the tunnel for the integrated system test is included in the LTU2 and is aimed to 
be finished in 2020.
Personnel shaft reinforcement work entered into challenges in 2018 and the work was 
interrupted. A new solution was found, and the work was re-started in the end of 2019 with 
the aim to finish the reinforcement work in 2020. The manufacture of the steel structures is 
ongoing, and the aim is to install them by the end of 2020. The personnel hoist is planned to 
be installed by mid 2023.
The canister shaft reinforcement work is planned to be commenced and finished in 2020. 
The canister lift manufacture is planned to be ready in 2021, installation by the end of 2022 and 
commissioning of the canister lift is planned to be done by the end of 2023.
The construction work for the supporting structures of the technical area at –437 m has 
been finished in 2019. Canister reception station construction and system installation works 
are planned to be started in 2020 and finished in 2022.
Installation of the HVAC systems and construction works of in the vehicle connections and 
central tunnels is planned to be finished in 2022.
Encapsulation plant construction work is progressing according to the planned schedule 
(Figure L3-5). Aim is to finish the construction works by mid 2022. Manufacture of the systems 
of the encapsulation plant has been started. Installation of systems is aimed to start in 2021 
and commission of the encapsulation facility systems is planned to be started in 2022 and 
finished in 2023. 
FIGURE L3-5. Construction site of the encapsulation plant.
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Final disposal facility and encapsulation plant construction status and progress
Construction of the encapsulation plant started in June 2019. The underground excavation 
work package LTU1 (Final disposal facility, tunnel excavation contract no. 1) that started the 
nuclear construction phase in December 2016, was finished with excavations in December 2019. 
The total amount of LTU1 excavation is around 117 000 m³. The underground excavation work 
package LTU2 (Final disposal facility, tunnel excavation contract no. 2) is planned to be started 
in Q2/2020.
The construction status in February 2020 is as follows:
• The LTU1 work package excavations have been finished with the total amount of excavation 
at around 117 000 m³
• Canister shaft is fully excavated Raise boring of the shaft was finished in March 2019.
• The air outlet shaft has been in operation since 2017
• Canister reception station excavation at –437 m was finished in 2018
• Vehicle connectionshave been fully excavated by 2019
• Excavation of the first part of the central tunnel 5 and 6 has been started
• Pilot hole drillings of the first five deposition tunnels have been started
• Construction and installation of heating, ventilation, air-conditioning (HVAC) and 
electricity works in the technical rooms have been started
• Construction of the encapsulation plant is ongoing and progressing according to the 
planned schedule.
Preparations to start the LTU2 work package are ongoing and it is aimed to be started in 2020. 
The first part of the central tunnels 5 and 6 are aimed to be excavated and reinforced by 2022. 
Excavation of the tunnel for the integrated system test is included in the LTU2 and is aimed to 
be finished in 2020.
Personnel shaft reinforcement work entered into challenges in 2018 and the work was 
interrupted. A new solution was found, and the work was re-started in the end of 2019 with 
the aim to finish the reinforcement work in 2020. The manufacture of the steel structures is 
ongoing, and the aim is to install them by the end of 2020. The personnel hoist is planned to 
be installed by mid 2023.
The canister shaft reinforcement work is planned to be commenced and finished in 2020. 
The canister lift manufacture is planned to be ready in 2021, installation by the end of 2022 and 
commissioning of the canister lift is planned to be done by the end of 2023.
The construction work for the supporting structures of the technical area at –437 m has 
been finished in 2019. Canister reception station construction and system installation works 
are planned to be started in 2020 and finished in 2022.
Installation of the HVAC systems and construction works of in the vehicle connections and 
central tunnels is planned to be finished in 2022.
Encapsulation plant construction work is progressing according to the planned schedule 
(Figure L3-5). Aim is to finish the construction works by mid 2022. Manufacture of the systems 
of the encapsulation plant has been started. Installation of systems is aimed to start in 2021 
and commission of the encapsulation facility systems is planned to be started in 2022 and 
finished in 2023. 
FIGURE L3-5. Construction site of the encapsulation plant.
Programme milestones 2020–2024 to reach the operational phase
Posiva’s programme is divided into several phases. The main schedule of the programme 
contains all the relevant activities and time critical links between separate works. The main 
milestones reached already are:
• Design and cost optimization phase (2018)
• Readiness for full scale in-situ system test – FISST (2018)
• Completion of the full scale in-situ system test installations – FISST (2019)
• Start of the construction phase (2019)
• Start of construction of encapsulation plant (2019).
The main forthcoming milestones are:
• Qualification of canister components (2020)
• Qualification of buffer and backfill designs, and manufacturing and installation methods 
(2021)
• Submission of operating license application (2021)
• Excavation of final disposal tunnels 1–5 finished (2021)
• Encapsulation plant ready for commissioning tests (2023)
• Supplementing of operating license application with as-built documentation on the facilities 
(2023)
• Commissioning tests (2023–2024)
• Operation license and start of nuclear operation (2024).
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Design and cost optimization phase
The basic concept and general technical design of the disposal facility were approved, when a 
positive safety statement concerning the construction license was granted by STUK and the 
construction license was granted by the Government. According to the construction license 
decision from the Government, technical modifications and improvements to the design and 
concepts can be authorized by STUK, if they are within the terms of the construction license.
In 2017 Posiva started a programme sub-phase to optimize the design and costs of disposal. 
The main objective is to become more cost effective in the implementation without reducing 
the level of safety and to establish an industrialized concept for the disposal operation. In 
practice, this means detailed investigations into making the disposal processes simpler and 
more robust, developing the technical design so that standard industrial processes, systems, 
equipment and structures can be utilized, and bringing overlapping design criteria into line. 
The concept and cost optimization phase was focusing on design completion, operation 
concept modelling, and supply chains for the backfill and canister components.
Based on studies and evaluations, decisions on the following changes were made during the 
design and cost optimization phase according to Posiva's change management process:
• central tunnel backfilling was changed from bentonite blocks to in-situ backfilling with a 
mixture of crushed rock and bentonite
• a criterion in rock suitability classification
• deposition tunnel and deposition hole distance optimization
• buffer manufacture of segmented blocks
• canister purchase chain optimization
• deposition tunnel in-situ backfilling with granules
• bentonite supply chain optimization
• deposition tunnel profile optimization.
Studies on heat conductivity of the rock are ongoing and aimed to be finished by the end of 
2021. The study aims at producing further knowledge on the heat conductivity of the host rock 
for optimizing the layout of the final disposal facility, the distance of deposition tunnels and 
the deposition holes.
Posiva has also been studying different alternatives to scheduling the emplacement 
priority disposal order of the owners’ spent fuel and to optimize the concept for simultaneous 
activities for both the disposal of spent fuel and the excavation work at the disposal facility 
(Figure L3-6). Every significant design or conceptual change has been reviewed and approved 
according to the graded approach by its significance to nuclear or long-term safety. 
Preparation for operations
The operational activities are organised into a “preparation for operations” programme 
(TUVA), which incorporates the following activities organised as separate projects:
• Development of excavation and excavation related methods,
• Further development of prototype machinery for engineering barrier system installation 
such that they can be used effectively in operations,
FIGURE L3-6. Granule backfilling test.
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Design and cost optimization phase
The basic concept and general technical design of the disposal facility were approved, when a 
positive safety statement concerning the construction license was granted by STUK and the 
construction license was granted by the Government. According to the construction license 
decision from the Government, technical modifications and improvements to the design and 
concepts can be authorized by STUK, if they are within the terms of the construction license.
In 2017 Posiva started a programme sub-phase to optimize the design and costs of disposal. 
The main objective is to become more cost effective in the implementation without reducing 
the level of safety and to establish an industrialized concept for the disposal operation. In 
practice, this means detailed investigations into making the disposal processes simpler and 
more robust, developing the technical design so that standard industrial processes, systems, 
equipment and structures can be utilized, and bringing overlapping design criteria into line. 
The concept and cost optimization phase was focusing on design completion, operation 
concept modelling, and supply chains for the backfill and canister components.
Based on studies and evaluations, decisions on the following changes were made during the 
design and cost optimization phase according to Posiva's change management process:
• central tunnel backfilling was changed from bentonite blocks to in-situ backfilling with a 
mixture of crushed rock and bentonite
• a criterion in rock suitability classification
• deposition tunnel and deposition hole distance optimization
• buffer manufacture of segmented blocks
• canister purchase chain optimization
• deposition tunnel in-situ backfilling with granules
• bentonite supply chain optimization
• deposition tunnel profile optimization.
Studies on heat conductivity of the rock are ongoing and aimed to be finished by the end of 
2021. The study aims at producing further knowledge on the heat conductivity of the host rock 
for optimizing the layout of the final disposal facility, the distance of deposition tunnels and 
the deposition holes.
Posiva has also been studying different alternatives to scheduling the emplacement 
priority disposal order of the owners’ spent fuel and to optimize the concept for simultaneous 
activities for both the disposal of spent fuel and the excavation work at the disposal facility 
(Figure L3-6). Every significant design or conceptual change has been reviewed and approved 
according to the graded approach by its significance to nuclear or long-term safety. 
Preparation for operations
The operational activities are organised into a “preparation for operations” programme 
(TUVA), which incorporates the following activities organised as separate projects:
• Development of excavation and excavation related methods,
• Further development of prototype machinery for engineering barrier system installation 
such that they can be used effectively in operations,
FIGURE L3-6. Granule backfilling test.
• Planning and optimisation of operations,
• Planning and optimisation of maintenance, and
• Commissioning of facilities.
Each activity produces outcomes that prepare the operational organisation for effective 
operations. Currently to date the outcomes produced include feasibility studies for excavation 
and excavation related methods, further development and detailed design of the installation 
machinery for the engineered barrier system, plans and guidance for the operation processes 
and optimized production plan.
During the years preceding the Overall Commissioning Test without spent fuel (OCTw/o) 
the operational and maintenance procedures and systems, will be developed to achieve 
targeted operational schedules efficiently. Moreover, activities to achieve organisational 
readiness for operations are in progress. It is scheduled that the final readiness will be 
demonstrated in the OCTw/o in 2023–2024.
A new programme "Production equipment of disposal facility" has been established in 2019 
for further development, design, manufacture and commissioning of the machinery for the 
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installation of the engineered barrier system (EBS) and for excavating the deposition holes 
in the deposition tunnels. The programme includes also a project to develop an integrated 
automation for the machines. The following machines are included in the programme:
• Canister transfer and installation machine
• Buffer installation machine
• Backfill installation machine
• Deposition hole boring machine
• Deposition hole bottom levelling machine.
Design of the EBS-installation machinery has been updated in 2019 taking into consideration 
experiences gathered in the FISST test. Design freeze of the canister transfer and installation 
machine has been made and backfill installation machine has been tested in 2019.
Manufacture of the machines is planned to start in 2021 and they are aimed to be ready and 
tested to be ready for the commissioning test in 2023.
Post-closure safety case
The post-closure safety case will be a portfolio of several reports described later in this 
document section. Long-term safety requirements and disposal design requirements have been 
improved in line with the safety concept for clarifying the connections between long-term 
safety and design solutions. Posiva has been studying the materials of the components for the 
engineered barrier system to address factors affecting their long-term properties as described 
before. Posiva will also clarify the selection process for the relevant scenarios to be used in the 
safety case.
For the purpose of the operating license application, a safety case showing that the 
repository will satisfy the requirements for long-term safety is being produced. The main 
components of the safety case consist of a description of the design basis and initial state, 
an assessment of the performance of the disposal system in different future scenarios and an 
analysis of the likelihood and consequences of any potential releases of radioactive substances 
from the repository. The assessment starts from the initial state of the repository and then 
goes on to study the possible lines of evolution that the disposal system could be subject to 
in the future. The assessment of the lines of evolution is based on the best available scientific 
knowledge and data gathered both from Olkiluoto and from different laboratory experiments 
and technical tests conducted over 30 years. The safety case consists of a portfolio of reports as 
shown in Figure L3 -4. 
The main changes since the safety case for the construction license application 
(TURVA-2012) reflect the integration of the LILW-repository for encapsulation process waste; 
a more transparent link between the long-term evolution, scenario formulation, and analysis 
of radiological consequences; as well as enhancements in the production, management and 
communication of the safety case contents.
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The status of the main safety case reports is following:
• Design Basis (DB) – The connections between the safety functions and performance 
targets have been checked. The first final draft of the report was submitted to STUK for a 
preliminary review in 2018, has been reviewed and updated by Posiva in 2019 according to 
STUK's comments.
• Initial State (IS) – Initial state of the EBS and the spent fuel and the description of the initial 
state of the biosphere, the host rock and the final diposal facility are presented in the IS 
report. The report also describes their deviations for the safety case. Design freeze for the 
IS was made in 2018, however some changes in the reference designs made after that have 
been considered in the report. Hydrogeochemical and hydrogeological modelling results are 
being included in the report. The first final draft of the report will be submitted to STUK for 
a preliminary review in Q3/2020.
• Low and Intermediate Level Waste Repository Assessment (LILW-RA) – the first final draft of 
the report has been internally reviewed and updating of the report for submitting to STUK 
for a preliminary review is ongoing, the report will be submitted to STUK for a preliminary 
review in Q2/2020.
• Performance Assessment and Formulation of Scenarios (PAFOS) – Method to define 
scenarios has been finished including an improved recognition of main uncertainties in 
future evolution, especially canister evolution. Writing of the report is ongoing, the first final 
draft of the report is planned to be submitted to STUK for a preliminary review in mid 2020
• Future Human Actions (FHA) are described based on a systematic formulation of scenarios. 
The report has been writeen and will be cross-checked with the AOR in 2021.
• Analysis of Releases (AOR) – release scenarios of radionuclides have been further developed 
by grouping the scenarios according to canister failure mechanisms, all calculation cases 
have been drafted, an approach for simulation of radionuclide release and transport has been 
futher developed with an improved handling of uncertainties. Input information for the 
analyses has been chosen, evaluated, reviewed and stored in the Safety Assesment Database. 
Writing of the report is ongoing, the first final draft of the report is planned to be submitted 
to STUK for a preliminary review in the beginning of 2021.
• Models and Data (MD) : Work with modelling flow charts and their interconnections is 
ongoing. A source term report has been compiled and is being reviewed. The first final draft 
of the report is planned to be submitted to STUK for a preliminary review in the beginning 
of 2021.
• Complimentary Considerations (CC) – The report presents supplementary, qualitative 
information to the safety case. The first final draft of the report was submitted to STUK for a 
preliminary review in the beginning of 2020.
• Synthesis - writing of the report is ongoing, the first final draft of the report is planned to be 
reviewed in mid 2021; the report will not be submitted to STUK for a preliminary review.
All above reports are planned to be submitted to STUK in the end of 2021.
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Project for operating license application
The Finnish Government granted the construction license to Posiva on November 2015. Since 
then Posiva has started a project which aims to achieve a granted operating license so that the 
operation of the disposal facility would be able to start around the first half of year 2024. The 
project aims to submit the operating license application (Nuclear Energy Decree, section 20) 
by the end of 2021. The current plan is to apply for a 45-year operating license with a periodic 
safety review every 15 years. The plan is also to supplement the application with the results of 
an “overall commissioning test without spent fuel” (OCTw/o) and with an as-built analysis in 
the summer of 2023. STUK will conduct a safety review of the operating license application to 
be used as the basis for the Government’s decision on the license application. The operating 
license can be granted by the Government, if Posiva fulfils the requirements set out in the 
Nuclear Energy Act.
The operating license project includes collecting the information that Chapter 5 of the 
Finnish Nuclear Energy Decree under “Licensing” requires to be submitted with the operating 
license application to the Government and to STUK for its safety review. Additionally, the 
Regulatory Guides on nuclear safety (YVL) define information requirements that must be 
included in the documentation submitted to STUK. Specifically, Guide YVL A.1 “Regulatory 
oversight of safety in the use of nuclear energy” defines many of these, but also other 
regulatory guides include complementary requirements. Producing and or assembling all the 
required documentation is included in the licensing project. The licensing project acts as an 
interface with the MEAE and STUK.
During the construction phase, before the submittal of the operating license application, 
the licensing of the engineering solutions and building of the facilities will be reviewed and 
approved step by step by STUK. The safety assessments of the built facilities, operations, 
accident analyses, as well as post-closure safety analysis of the spent nuclear fuel disposal will 
be submitted along with the operating license application for STUK’s safety review.
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Organizational activities
Posiva has established and maintained the necessary management processes for the disposal 
project and modified its organization to meet current and future needs. The disposal project 
has been divided into several development and design programmes, which are further divided 
into several projects. A steering group has been established and working to support and control 
each programme and projects under them. The role of Posiva's programmes has been enforced 
in the matrix format organization. Furthermore, a dedicated project steering and follow-up 
group for project progress and resourcing control has been set up.
Safety culture of the organization has been studied and actions based on the study have 
been defined and performed. The actions are followed by Posiva's steering group.
In the design phase of Posiva's programme, nuclear and radiation safety is ensured in the 
design of facilities, systems, structures and equipment for safe operation of the encapsulation 
plant and the final disposal facility. Posiva complies with an established configuration 
management procedure which includes an assessment of effects on nuclear and radiation 
safety for each proposed change.
Reviews and reports describing the status of the disposal project are provided on a 
monthly basis to the steering group, where programme and line organization managers form 
a consensus on the status of the activities and forward their draft resolutions for decision 
making and approval. The status and follow-up of the main objectives, in addition to open 
requirements and actions required to close them are permanent topics on the steering group’s 
agenda.
Specific groups and processes to monitor design modifications (design authority function) 
and provide safety oversight, configuration management, assessments of long-term safety, 
nuclear safety and safety culture have all been established and are in active use. STUK 
has carried out its annual programme of nuclear construction inspections (CIP). STUK’s 
programme covers all major and safety significant processes related to nuclear facility 
construction. During the evaluation of Posiva’s preparedness for nuclear construction and 
during the on-going construction time no significant observations have been raised. A report 
on the status of construction activities is submitted to STUK monthly.
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L.4 National cooperation group on nuclear 
waste management (YETI)
In June 2017, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment appointed a National 
Cooperation Group on Nuclear Waste Management (YETI) to examine the objectives, 
development measures and possible solutions for safe and cost-effective management of 
nuclear waste and other radioactive waste for the period extending from the present well into 
the future. The cooperation group had members from the MEAE, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, STUK, FPH, 
TVO, Fennovoima, VTT, Posiva, LUT, and the University of Helsinki. The group worked for 1.5 
years.
The cooperation group found that the requirements contained in the Nuclear Energy Act 
and the Radiation Act concerning the management of nuclear waste and other radioactive 
waste should be more harmonised and be independent of the manner in which the wastes 
are generated. It is also important that all radioactive waste existing and to be generated in 
Finland will be managed appropriately, regardless of its origin, producer or the method in 
which it was produced. Finland must have procedures covering the processing, storage and 
disposal of all nuclear wastes and other radioactive wastes generated in the country. It would 
be appropriate to have the capability to carry out the processing and disposal of wastes mainly 
relying on the existing infrastructure.
The licensing of nuclear facilities has mainly worked well in Finland. However, there is 
a need to develop the licensing procedures for nuclear facilities, as making even a minor 
amendment to license terms are slow and expensive. This hampers the licensee’s efforts to 
develop their activities and, in the worst case, prevents cooperation with other licensees in 
waste management issues. It has also been necessary to complement the operating licences 
with licences for operations granted by STUK, which may have made it more difficult 
to manage or control the whole. The nuclear facility licensees could include managing 
small operators’ wastes in their actions if this does not affect electricity production or the 
sociological acceptability of the operation.
Cooperation should also be developed on the interface of the Nuclear Energy Act, Radiation 
Act and Waste Act in the future. Waste released from supervision under the Nuclear Energy 
Act and the Radiation Act has been found harmless with respect to its radiation properties, 
which places it under supervision pursuant to the Waste Act. However, prejudices continue to 
be associated with such wastes which hamper and, in the worst case, prevent their appropriate 
processing. The authorities should work together to dispel prejudices by disseminating the 
required information adequately and at the right time.
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The working group also proposes to the Safety Investigation Authority that the safety 
recommendation issued to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment and the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health could be closed. The recommendation said that the ministries 
should jointly establish procedures for granting licences for and managing radioactive waste 
in order to ensure that all radioactive waste generated in Finland can be handled, stored and 
disposed of safely in our country in the event that returning it to the manufacturing country 
via the importers proves inappropriate or impossible. The recommendation was discussed 
in the cooperation group and taken into account when MEAE prepared the new operating 
license to OL1 and OL2 units enabling also management of other radioactive wastes at 
Olkiluoto. Futhermore, the recommendation was taken into account in cooperation group´s 
recommendations for the future licencing.
The working group issued 15 recommendations and 7 suggestions aiming to achieve above 
mentioned objectives (http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-327-441-9). The recommendations 
were measures either addressed to the authorities or they were of major national importance 
and strongly supported by the working group. The suggestions were measures addressed 
either directly to licensees or they supported national activities. One of the working group 
recommendations concerned establishing a monitoring group to oversee the handling of the 
recommendations and suggestions. The monitoring group started its work in autumn 2019 and 
the group will meet one to three times a year. The recommentations and suggestions can be 
found in more detail in cooperation group’s final report.
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L.5 Spent fuel and radioactive waste 
inventory at the end of 2019
IAEA - SRIS
REVIEW AND SUBMISSION
Member State FINLAND
Reporting Period 2019 Submission Status DRAFT
REPORT DESCRIPTION / COMMENTS
data freeze 31.12.2019
Waste Classes
Classification Scheme
Class VLLW % LLW % ILW % HLW % Note
VLLW 100 0 0 0
LLW 0 100 0 0
ILW 0 0 100 0
HLW 0 0 0 100
Sites and Facilities
Loviisa NPP
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Solid waste storage
(RCA)
805 m3 0 1977 2065
Radioactive Waste Storage Unshielded building
Solid waste storage
(on site)
900 m3 0 1977 2065
Radioactive Waste Storage Above ground silo
Liquid waste storage
(TW)
2400 m3 0 1977 2065
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Solid waste storage
(silos, RCA)
74 m3 0 1977 2033
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
Maintenance waste
hall 1
1270 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Granite)
100 1997 2068
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
Maintenance waste
hall 2
1270 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Granite)
100 2005 2068
Radioactive Waste Storage Other
Maintenance waste
hall 3
2000 m3 0 2012 2068
Geological silos or
caverns
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
Solidified waste hall 1 24500 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Granite)
120 2019 2068
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Loviisa 1 reactor
building
60 tHM 0 1977 2030
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Loviisa 2 reactor
building
60 tHM 0 1980 2033
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet away from
Reactor, Storage Pool
Spent fuel storage 1 60 tHM 0 1980 2050
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet away from
Reactor, Storage Pool
Spent fuel storage 2 827 tHM 0 1983 2060
Otaniemi FiR 1
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
FiR 1 reactor pool 0 tHM 0 1962 2023
Radioactive Waste Storage Unshielded building FiR 1 site 10 m3 0 1962 2023
Spent Fuel Storage
Dry at Reactor,
Storage room
FiR 1 reactor building 0 tHM 0 1962 2023
DSRS Storage FiR 1 DSRS 2 m3 0 1962 2023
Olkiluoto NPP
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building
260 tHM 0 1978 2038
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building
266 tHM 0 1980 2038
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet away from
Reactor, Storage Pool
Spent fuel storage
(KPA)
1666 tHM 0 1989 2080
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Solid waste
storage(KAJ)
14000 m3 0 1985 2038
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Solid waste
storage(MAJ)
11000 m3 0 1985 2038
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Liquid waste
storage(OL1 and
OL2)
380 m3 0 1978 2038
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ)
8060 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Granite)
90 1992 2080
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ)
5642 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Granite)
90 1992 2080
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
410 m3 0 1978 2038
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Liquid waste storage
OL3 (KPE,KPK)
122 m3 0 2020 2060
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Solid waste storage
OL3 (KPA)
156 m3 0 2020 2060
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Olkiluoto 3 reactor
building
485 tHM 0 2020 2060
Interim Storage of State Owned Waste
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
DSRS Storage
Interim Storage of
State Owned Waste
60 m3 0 1999 2038
Hanhikivi NPP
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Near surface -
earthen trenches
VLLW 0 m3
Unknown (Site not
Selected)
0 2035 2140 Planned facility
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
LLW/ILW 0 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Other)
0 2037 2139 Planned facility
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Reactor 0 tHM 0 2029 2089 Planned facility
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet away from
Reactor, Storage Pool
ISFS 0 tHM 0 2034 2135 Planned facility
Spent Fuel Disposal
Deep geological
repository
Final disposal 0 tHM
Unknown (Site not
Selected)
0 2124 2135 Planned facility
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Waste Storage
building
0 m3 0 2029 2089 Planned facility
Final Repository for spent fuel
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Spent Fuel Disposal
Deep geological
repository
Final Repository for
spent fuel
0 tHM
Crystalline Rock
(Gneiss)
420 2025 2120
Final disposal facility
for spent fuel is
under construction.
The operation will
start in 2020's.
Radioactive Waste Inventory
Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class Location Facility Total activity Main Radionuclides
Waste Origin Distribution
(RO, FFE, RP, NA, DF, DC,
RE, ND - Total 100%)
Volume Disposed(m3) Note
LLW Loviisa NPP Maintenance waste hall 1 128.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 1276.00
LLW Loviisa NPP Maintenance waste hall 2 182.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 775.00
ILW Loviisa NPP Solidified waste hall 1 25.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 12.00
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ)
28.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 4490.00
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ)
69.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 2105.00
Storage of Conditioned Waste
Waste Class Location Facility
Current Volume
Stored(m3)
Total activity Main Radionuclides
Waste Origin
Distribution (RO, FFE,
RP, NA, DF, DC, RE,
ND - Total 100%)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
VLLW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage (on
site)
135.00 212.00 MBq Ni-63, Co-60, Ag-110m 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Other Clearance
LLW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(RCA)
171.00 42.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Maintenance waste hall
3
318.00 947.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(RCA)
138.00 944.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste
storage(KAJ)
1462.00 16.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
VLLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste
storage(MAJ)
69.00 0.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Near Surface
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
81.00 0.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
58.00 0.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class Location Facility Total activity
Main
Radionuclides
Waste Origin
Distribution (RO,
FFE, RP, NA, DF,
DC, RE, ND - Total
100%)
Current Stored
Quantity
Estimated
Disposal
Volume(m3)
Physical Form
Current Planned
Management
Route
Note
ILW Loviisa NPP
Liquid waste
storage (TW)
13.00 TBq
Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-
137
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
1318.00 m3 5400.00 Liquid Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(silos, RCA)
0.00 TBq
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
49.00 m3 203.00 Liquid Geological
ILW Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 site 0.16 TBq
Eu-152, Eu-154,
Co-60, H-3, C-14,
Cl-36
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
4.00 m3 0.00 Solid Geological
Thermal column
graphite, activity
inventory is based
on calculations in
year 2016. Main
nuclides are chosen
based on activity
importancy in final
disposal
LLW Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 site 13.00 MBq
Cs-137, Co-60, Eu-
152, Eu-154
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
2.00 m3 0.00 Solid Geological
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Liquid waste
storage(OL1 and
OL2)
0.00 TBq
Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-
137
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
60.00 m3 0.00 Liquid Geological
Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources
Location Facility Total activity Number of Sources Main Radionuclides
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 DSRS 0.00 MBq 2.00 Sb-124, Po-210 Geological
Neutron source, PoBe, ID R30,
inside of triga element Neutron
source, SbBe, ID R33, in reactor
core position F23
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
11.70 TBq 12100.00
Am-241, Cs-137, Pu-238, Kr-85,
H-3
Geological
The number of sealed sources
is rough estimate. The exact
number of sealed sources in
the storage is not known as
they have been packed in the
past. At that time only total
activity of radionuclides and
dose rate at package surface
was saved in the database. The
bookkeeping is developed and
currently also the number of
sealed sources is stored into
database.
Spent Fuel Inventory
Storage of Power Reactor Spent Fuel
Reactor Type Origin Location Facility Country Current Inventory(tHM)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Loviisa 1 reactor building 31.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Loviisa 2 reactor building 31.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Spent fuel storage 1 29.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Spent fuel storage 2 591.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building
97.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building
118.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP Spent fuel storage (KPA) 1364.00 Direct Disposal
Disposal of Power Reactor Spent Fuel
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Storage of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Origin Facility Location Facility Country Current Inventory(kgHM)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
LEU Own SF in MS Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 reactor pool 15.70
Subject to supplier return
agreement
LEU Own SF in MS Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 reactor building 5.60
Subject to supplier return
agreement
Disposal of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Total Inventory
Total Radioactive Inventory
Waste Class Total Amount (Stored / Disposed) (m3) Decommissioning Amount (m3) Total Activity Note
VLLW 204.00 0.00 TBq
LLW 8234.00 0.00 28.40 TBq
ILW 4085.00 0.00 71.00 TBq
HLW 0.00 0.00 TBq
Total Spent Fuel Inventory
Spent Fuel Total Amount (Stored / Disposed)(m3) Total Activity Note
Spent Fuel 2261.00 TBq
Outlook Facilities
Planned Capacity for Facilities
Facility Materials Managed Current Capacity Capacity in 2030 Capacity in 2050 Other year Capacity Note
Solid waste storage (RCA)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
805.00 m3 805.00 m3 805.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (on
site) [1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
900.00 m3 1700.00 m3 1700.00 m3 2022 1700.00 m3
Liquid waste storage (TW)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (silos,
RCA) [1977 - 2033]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
74.00 m3 74.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 1
[1997 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 2
[2005 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 3
[2012 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 m3
Solidified waste hall 1
[2019 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
24500.00 m3 8650.00 m3 8650.00 m3 m3
Loviisa 1 reactor building
[1977 - 2030]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Loviisa 2 reactor building
[1980 - 2033]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 1 [1980
- 2050]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 2 [1983
- 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 827.00 tHM tHM tHM tHM
FiR 1 reactor pool [1962 -
2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 site [1962 - 2023]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
10.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Radioactive waste will be
transported to Loviisa NPP
site for storage and
disposal.
FiR 1 reactor building
[1962 - 2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 DSRS [1962 - 2023] DSRS / Storage 2.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building [1978 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 260.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building [1980 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 266.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage (KPA)
[1989 - 2080]
Spent Fuel / Storage 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(KAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(MAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage(OL1
and OL2) [1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
380.00 m3 380.00 m3 380.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 m3
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
[1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
410.00 m3 410.00 m3 410.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage OL3
(KPE,KPK) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
122.00 m3 122.00 m3 122.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage OL3
(KPA) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
156.00 m3 156.00 m3 156.00 m3 m3
Olkiluoto 3 reactor
building [2020 - 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM tHM
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste [1999 -
2038]
DSRS / Storage 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 m3
VLLW [2035 - 2140]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 500.00 m3 2130 14000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
LLW/ILW [2037 - 2139]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 5100.00 m3 2090 21000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Reactor [2029 - 2089] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 250.00 tHM 250.00 tHM tHM
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
ISFS [2034 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 750.00 tHM 2060 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Final disposal [2124 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 2124 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Waste Storage building
[2029 - 2089]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
0.00 m3 500.00 m3 500.00 m3 m3
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
Final Repository for spent
fuel [2025 - 2120]
Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2120 6500.00 tHM
Final disposal facility for
spent fuel is under
construction. The
operation will start in
2020's.
Outlook Radioactive Waste
Planned Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Disposed
Volume(m3)
Total volume
disposed by 2030
2030(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2030(m3)
Total volume
disposed by
2050(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume
disposed (m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed
(m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00 2300.00 6900.00
LLW 6541.00 8761.00 35.00 10661.00 15373.00 2100 41500.00
Decommissioning
waste in 2030 is from
research reactor.
Decommissioning
waste in 2050 is from
LO1 and LO2 units.
Year 2100 contain
decommissioning
wastes from OL1,
OL2 and OL3.
According current
time schedule OL1
and OL2 will be
decommissioned and
wastes disposed by
2070 and OL3 by
2100. This estimate
contains all for now
waste types (VLLV,
LLW, ILW and HLW)
as more detailed
information is not yet
available.
ILW 2117.00 8278.00 9.00 9078.00 2266.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Conditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume of
stored waste(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 204.00
LLW 1691.00
ILW 537.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste (m3)
Other year
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00
LLW 0.00
ILW 5603.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Disuses Sealed Radioactive Sources
Site
Currently Stored Nr. of
Sources
Total stored in 2030 Total stored in 2050 Other year Total stored Note
Loviisa NPP 0
Otaniemi FiR 1 2.00
Sources are transported to
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste during
decommissioning of FiR 1 at
latest in 2023 or to Storage in
Loviisa NPP.
Olkiluoto NPP 0
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
12100.00 13000.00 155000.00
These are only very rough
estimates. The radiation
legislation from 2018 requires
that sealed sources should be
sent back to the manufacturer
in country of origin. This
estimate do not take it into
account.
Hanhikivi NPP 0
Final Repository for spent fuel 0
Outlook Spent Fuel
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Own SF in MS 2261.00 3154.00 4169.00
The whole inventory of spent
fuel is still reported as stored.
The final disposal of spent fuel
is planned to start in 2020's.
This has not yet been taken
into account in this reporting
as the disposal rate is not
known exactly.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(kgHM)
Mass(kgHM) Note
Own SF in MS 21.30
The spent fuel of Research
reactor is planned to be
shipped back to USA. The
timing of the shipment is not
known. The current returning
agreement is valid until 2029.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
Solidified waste hall 1 24500 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Granite)
120 2019 2068
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Loviisa 1 reactor
building
60 tHM 0 1977 2030
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Loviisa 2 reactor
building
60 tHM 0 1980 2033
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet away from
Reactor, Storage Pool
Spent fuel storage 1 60 tHM 0 1980 2050
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet away from
Reactor, Storage Pool
Spent fuel storage 2 827 tHM 0 1983 2060
Otaniemi FiR 1
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
FiR 1 reactor pool 0 tHM 0 1962 2023
Radioactive Waste Storage Unshielded building FiR 1 site 10 m3 0 1962 2023
Spent Fuel Storage
Dry at Reactor,
Storage room
FiR 1 reactor building 0 tHM 0 1962 2023
DSRS Storage FiR 1 DSRS 2 m3 0 1962 2023
Olkiluoto NPP
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building
260 tHM 0 1978 2038
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building
266 tHM 0 1980 2038
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet away from
Reactor, Storage Pool
Spent fuel storage
(KPA)
1666 tHM 0 1989 2080
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Solid waste
storage(KAJ)
14000 m3 0 1985 2038
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Solid waste
storage(MAJ)
11000 m3 0 1985 2038
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Liquid waste
storage(OL1 and
OL2)
380 m3 0 1978 2038
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ)
8060 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Granite)
90 1992 2080
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ)
5642 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Granite)
90 1992 2080
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
410 m3 0 1978 2038
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Liquid waste storage
OL3 (KPE,KPK)
122 m3 0 2020 2060
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Solid waste storage
OL3 (KPA)
156 m3 0 2020 2060
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Olkiluoto 3 reactor
building
485 tHM 0 2020 2060
Interim Storage of State Owned Waste
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
DSRS Storage
Interim Storage of
State Owned Waste
60 m3 0 1999 2038
Hanhikivi NPP
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Near surface -
earthen trenches
VLLW 0 m3
Unknown (Site not
Selected)
0 2035 2140 Planned facility
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
LLW/ILW 0 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Other)
0 2037 2139 Planned facility
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Reactor 0 tHM 0 2029 2089 Planned facility
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet away from
Reactor, Storage Pool
ISFS 0 tHM 0 2034 2135 Planned facility
Spent Fuel Disposal
Deep geological
repository
Final disposal 0 tHM
Unknown (Site not
Selected)
0 2124 2135 Planned facility
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Waste Storage
building
0 m3 0 2029 2089 Planned facility
Final Repository for spent fuel
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Spent Fuel Disposal
Deep geological
repository
Final Repository for
spent fuel
0 tHM
Crystalline Rock
(Gneiss)
420 2025 2120
Final disposal facility
for spent fuel is
under construction.
The operation will
start in 2020's.
Radioactive Waste Inventory
Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class Location Facility Total activity Main Radionuclides
Waste Origin Distribution
(RO, FFE, RP, NA, DF, DC,
RE, ND - Total 100%)
Volume Disposed(m3) Note
LLW Loviisa NPP Maintenance waste hall 1 128.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 1276.00
LLW Loviisa NPP Maintenance waste hall 2 182.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 775.00
ILW Loviisa NPP Solidified waste hall 1 25.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 12.00
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ)
28.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 4490.00
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ)
69.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 2105.00
Storage of Conditioned Waste
Waste Class Location Facility
Current Volume
Stored(m3)
Total activity Main Radionuclides
Waste Origin
Distribution (RO, FFE,
RP, NA, DF, DC, RE,
ND - Total 100%)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
VLLW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage (on
site)
135.00 212.00 MBq Ni-63, Co-60, Ag-110m 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Other Clearance
LLW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(RCA)
171.00 42.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Maintenance waste hall
3
318.00 947.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(RCA)
138.00 944.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste
storage(KAJ)
1462.00 16.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
VLLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste
storage(MAJ)
69.00 0.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Near Surface
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
81.00 0.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
58.00 0.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class Location Facility Total activity
Main
Radionuclides
Waste Origin
Distribution (RO,
FFE, RP, NA, DF,
DC, RE, ND - Total
100%)
Current Stored
Quantity
Estimated
Disposal
Volume(m3)
Physical Form
Current Planned
Management
Route
Note
ILW Loviisa NPP
Liquid waste
storage (TW)
13.00 TBq
Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-
137
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
1318.00 m3 5400.00 Liquid Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(silos, RCA)
0.00 TBq
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
49.00 m3 203.00 Liquid Geological
ILW Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 site 0.16 TBq
Eu-152, Eu-154,
Co-60, H-3, C-14,
Cl-36
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
4.00 m3 0.00 Solid Geological
Thermal column
graphite, activity
inventory is based
on calculations in
year 2016. Main
nuclides are chosen
based on activity
importancy in final
disposal
LLW Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 site 13.00 MBq
Cs-137, Co-60, Eu-
152, Eu-154
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
2.00 m3 0.00 Solid Geological
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Liquid waste
storage(OL1 and
OL2)
0.00 TBq
Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-
137
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
60.00 m3 0.00 Liquid Geological
Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources
Location Facility Total activity Number of Sources Main Radionuclides
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 DSRS 0.00 MBq 2.00 Sb-124, Po-210 Geological
Neutron source, PoBe, ID R30,
inside of triga element Neutron
source, SbBe, ID R33, in reactor
core position F23
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
11.70 TBq 12100.00
Am-241, Cs-137, Pu-238, Kr-85,
H-3
Geological
The number of sealed sources
is rough estimate. The exact
number of sealed sources in
the storage is not known as
they have been packed in the
past. At that time only total
activity of radionuclides and
dose rate at package surface
was saved in the database. The
bookkeeping is developed and
currently also the number of
sealed sources is stored into
database.
Spent Fuel Inventory
Storage of Power Reactor Spent Fuel
Reactor Type Origin Location Facility Country Current Inventory(tHM)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Loviisa 1 reactor building 31.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Loviisa 2 reactor building 31.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Spent fuel storage 1 29.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Spent fuel storage 2 591.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building
97.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building
118.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP Spent fuel storage (KPA) 1364.00 Direct Disposal
Disposal of Power Reactor Spent Fuel
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Storage of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Origin Facility Location Facility Country Current Inventory(kgHM)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
LEU Own SF in MS Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 reactor pool 15.70
Subject to supplier return
agreement
LEU Own SF in MS Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 reactor building 5.60
Subject to supplier return
agreement
Disposal of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Total Inventory
Total Radioactive Inventory
Waste Class Total Amount (Stored / Disposed) (m3) Decommissioning Amount (m3) Total Activity Note
VLLW 204.00 0.00 TBq
LLW 8234.00 0.00 28.40 TBq
ILW 4085.00 0.00 71.00 TBq
HLW 0.00 0.00 TBq
Total Spent Fuel Inventory
Spent Fuel Total Amount (Stored / Disposed)(m3) Total Activity Note
Spent Fuel 2261.00 TBq
Outlook Facilities
Planned Capacity for Facilities
Facility Materials Managed Current Capacity Capacity in 2030 Capacity in 2050 Other year Capacity Note
Solid waste storage (RCA)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
805.00 m3 805.00 m3 805.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (on
site) [1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
900.00 m3 1700.00 m3 1700.00 m3 2022 1700.00 m3
Liquid waste storage (TW)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (silos,
RCA) [1977 - 2033]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
74.00 m3 74.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 1
[1997 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 2
[2005 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 3
[2012 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 m3
Solidified waste hall 1
[2019 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
24500.00 m3 8650.00 m3 8650.00 m3 m3
Loviisa 1 reactor building
[1977 - 2030]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Loviisa 2 reactor building
[1980 - 2033]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 1 [1980
- 2050]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 2 [1983
- 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 827.00 tHM tHM tHM tHM
FiR 1 reactor pool [1962 -
2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 site [1962 - 2023]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
10.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Radioactive waste will be
transported to Loviisa NPP
site for storage and
disposal.
FiR 1 reactor building
[1962 - 2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 DSRS [1962 - 2023] DSRS / Storage 2.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building [1978 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 260.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building [1980 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 266.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage (KPA)
[1989 - 2080]
Spent Fuel / Storage 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(KAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(MAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage(OL1
and OL2) [1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
380.00 m3 380.00 m3 380.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 m3
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
[1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
410.00 m3 410.00 m3 410.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage OL3
(KPE,KPK) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
122.00 m3 122.00 m3 122.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage OL3
(KPA) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
156.00 m3 156.00 m3 156.00 m3 m3
Olkiluoto 3 reactor
building [2020 - 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM tHM
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste [1999 -
2038]
DSRS / Storage 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 m3
VLLW [2035 - 2140]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 500.00 m3 2130 14000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
LLW/ILW [2037 - 2139]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 5100.00 m3 2090 21000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Reactor [2029 - 2089] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 250.00 tHM 250.00 tHM tHM
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
ISFS [2034 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 750.00 tHM 2060 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Final disposal [2124 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 2124 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Waste Storage building
[2029 - 2089]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
0.00 m3 500.00 m3 500.00 m3 m3
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
Final Repository for spent
fuel [2025 - 2120]
Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2120 6500.00 tHM
Final disposal facility for
spent fuel is under
construction. The
operation will start in
2020's.
Outlook Radioactive Waste
Planned Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Disposed
Volume(m3)
Total volume
disposed by 2030
2030(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2030(m3)
Total volume
disposed by
2050(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume
disposed (m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed
(m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00 2300.00 6900.00
LLW 6541.00 8761.00 35.00 10661.00 15373.00 2100 41500.00
Decommissioning
waste in 2030 is from
research reactor.
Decommissioning
waste in 2050 is from
LO1 and LO2 units.
Year 2100 contain
decommissioning
wastes from OL1,
OL2 and OL3.
According current
time schedule OL1
and OL2 will be
decommissioned and
wastes disposed by
2070 and OL3 by
2100. This estimate
contains all for now
waste types (VLLV,
LLW, ILW and HLW)
as more detailed
information is not yet
available.
ILW 2117.00 8278.00 9.00 9078.00 2266.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Conditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume of
stored waste(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 204.00
LLW 1691.00
ILW 537.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste (m3)
Other year
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00
LLW 0.00
ILW 5603.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Disuses Sealed Radioactive Sources
Site
Currently Stored Nr. of
Sources
Total stored in 2030 Total stored in 2050 Other year Total stored Note
Loviisa NPP 0
Otaniemi FiR 1 2.00
Sources are transported to
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste during
decommissioning of FiR 1 at
latest in 2023 or to Storage in
Loviisa NPP.
Olkiluoto NPP 0
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
12100.00 13000.00 155000.00
These are only very rough
estimates. The radiation
legislation from 2018 requires
that sealed sources should be
sent back to the manufacturer
in country of origin. This
estimate do not take it into
account.
Hanhikivi NPP 0
Final Repository for spent fuel 0
Outlook Spent Fuel
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Own SF in MS 2261.00 3154.00 4169.00
The whole inventory of spent
fuel is still reported as stored.
The final disposal of spent fuel
is planned to start in 2020's.
This has not yet been taken
into account in this reporting
as the disposal rate is not
known exactly.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(kgHM)
Mass(kgHM) Note
Own SF in MS 21.30
The spent fuel of Research
reactor is planned to be
shipped back to USA. The
timing of the shipment is not
known. The current returning
agreement is valid until 2029.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
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Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Olkiluoto 3 reactor
building
485 tHM 0 2020 2060
Interim Storage of State Owned Waste
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
DSRS Storage
Interim Storage of
State Owned Waste
60 m3 0 1999 2038
Hanhikivi NPP
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Near surface -
earthen trenches
VLLW 0 m3
Unknown (Site not
Selected)
0 2035 2140 Planned facility
Radioactive Waste Disposal
Geological silos or
caverns
LLW/ILW 0 m3
Crystalline Rock
(Other)
0 2037 2139 Planned facility
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet at Reactor, SNF
pool
Reactor 0 tHM 0 2029 2089 Planned facility
Spent Fuel Storage
Wet away from
Reactor, Storage Pool
ISFS 0 tHM 0 2034 2135 Planned facility
Spent Fuel Disposal
Deep geological
repository
Final disposal 0 tHM
Unknown (Site not
Selected)
0 2124 2135 Planned facility
Radioactive Waste Storage Shielded building
Waste Storage
building
0 m3 0 2029 2089 Planned facility
Final Repository for spent fuel
Materials Managed Usage Type of Facility Facility Name Total Cap. Host Rock
Nominal Depth
(meters)
Operation from Operation to Note
Spent Fuel Disposal
Deep geological
repository
Final Repository for
spent fuel
0 tHM
Crystalline Rock
(Gneiss)
420 2025 2120
Final disposal facility
for spent fuel is
under construction.
The operation will
start in 2020's.
Radioactive Waste Inventory
Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class Location Facility Total activity Main Radionuclides
Waste Origin Distribution
(RO, FFE, RP, NA, DF, DC,
RE, ND - Total 100%)
Volume Disposed(m3) Note
LLW Loviisa NPP Maintenance waste hall 1 128.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 1276.00
LLW Loviisa NPP Maintenance waste hall 2 182.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 775.00
ILW Loviisa NPP Solidified waste hall 1 25.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 12.00
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ)
28.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 4490.00
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ)
69.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 2105.00
Storage of Conditioned Waste
Waste Class Location Facility
Current Volume
Stored(m3)
Total activity Main Radionuclides
Waste Origin
Distribution (RO, FFE,
RP, NA, DF, DC, RE,
ND - Total 100%)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
VLLW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage (on
site)
135.00 212.00 MBq Ni-63, Co-60, Ag-110m 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Other Clearance
LLW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(RCA)
171.00 42.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Maintenance waste hall
3
318.00 947.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(RCA)
138.00 944.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste
storage(KAJ)
1462.00 16.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
VLLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste
storage(MAJ)
69.00 0.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Near Surface
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
81.00 0.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
58.00 0.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class Location Facility Total activity
Main
Radionuclides
Waste Origin
Distribution (RO,
FFE, RP, NA, DF,
DC, RE, ND - Total
100%)
Current Stored
Quantity
Estimated
Disposal
Volume(m3)
Physical Form
Current Planned
Management
Route
Note
ILW Loviisa NPP
Liquid waste
storage (TW)
13.00 TBq
Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-
137
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
1318.00 m3 5400.00 Liquid Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(silos, RCA)
0.00 TBq
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
49.00 m3 203.00 Liquid Geological
ILW Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 site 0.16 TBq
Eu-152, Eu-154,
Co-60, H-3, C-14,
Cl-36
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
4.00 m3 0.00 Solid Geological
Thermal column
graphite, activity
inventory is based
on calculations in
year 2016. Main
nuclides are chosen
based on activity
importancy in final
disposal
LLW Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 site 13.00 MBq
Cs-137, Co-60, Eu-
152, Eu-154
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
2.00 m3 0.00 Solid Geological
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Liquid waste
storage(OL1 and
OL2)
0.00 TBq
Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-
137
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
60.00 m3 0.00 Liquid Geological
Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources
Location Facility Total activity Number of Sources Main Radionuclides
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 DSRS 0.00 MBq 2.00 Sb-124, Po-210 Geological
Neutron source, PoBe, ID R30,
inside of triga element Neutron
source, SbBe, ID R33, in reactor
core position F23
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
11.70 TBq 12100.00
Am-241, Cs-137, Pu-238, Kr-85,
H-3
Geological
The number of sealed sources
is rough estimate. The exact
number of sealed sources in
the storage is not known as
they have been packed in the
past. At that time only total
activity of radionuclides and
dose rate at package surface
was saved in the database. The
bookkeeping is developed and
currently also the number of
sealed sources is stored into
database.
Spent Fuel Inventory
Storage of Power Reactor Spent Fuel
Reactor Type Origin Location Facility Country Current Inventory(tHM)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Loviisa 1 reactor building 31.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Loviisa 2 reactor building 31.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Spent fuel storage 1 29.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Spent fuel storage 2 591.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building
97.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building
118.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP Spent fuel storage (KPA) 1364.00 Direct Disposal
Disposal of Power Reactor Spent Fuel
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Storage of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Origin Facility Location Facility Country Current Inventory(kgHM)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
LEU Own SF in MS Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 reactor pool 15.70
Subject to supplier return
agreement
LEU Own SF in MS Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 reactor building 5.60
Subject to supplier return
agreement
Disposal of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Total Inventory
Total Radioactive Inventory
Waste Class Total Amount (Stored / Disposed) (m3) Decommissioning Amount (m3) Total Activity Note
VLLW 204.00 0.00 TBq
LLW 8234.00 0.00 28.40 TBq
ILW 4085.00 0.00 71.00 TBq
HLW 0.00 0.00 TBq
Total Spent Fuel Inventory
Spent Fuel Total Amount (Stored / Disposed)(m3) Total Activity Note
Spent Fuel 2261.00 TBq
Outlook Facilities
Planned Capacity for Facilities
Facility Materials Managed Current Capacity Capacity in 2030 Capacity in 2050 Other year Capacity Note
Solid waste storage (RCA)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
805.00 m3 805.00 m3 805.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (on
site) [1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
900.00 m3 1700.00 m3 1700.00 m3 2022 1700.00 m3
Liquid waste storage (TW)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (silos,
RCA) [1977 - 2033]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
74.00 m3 74.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 1
[1997 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 2
[2005 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 3
[2012 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 m3
Solidified waste hall 1
[2019 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
24500.00 m3 8650.00 m3 8650.00 m3 m3
Loviisa 1 reactor building
[1977 - 2030]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Loviisa 2 reactor building
[1980 - 2033]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 1 [1980
- 2050]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 2 [1983
- 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 827.00 tHM tHM tHM tHM
FiR 1 reactor pool [1962 -
2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 site [1962 - 2023]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
10.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Radioactive waste will be
transported to Loviisa NPP
site for storage and
disposal.
FiR 1 reactor building
[1962 - 2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 DSRS [1962 - 2023] DSRS / Storage 2.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building [1978 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 260.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building [1980 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 266.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage (KPA)
[1989 - 2080]
Spent Fuel / Storage 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(KAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(MAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage(OL1
and OL2) [1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
380.00 m3 380.00 m3 380.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 m3
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
[1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
410.00 m3 410.00 m3 410.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage OL3
(KPE,KPK) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
122.00 m3 122.00 m3 122.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage OL3
(KPA) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
156.00 m3 156.00 m3 156.00 m3 m3
Olkiluoto 3 reactor
building [2020 - 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM tHM
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste [1999 -
2038]
DSRS / Storage 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 m3
VLLW [2035 - 2140]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 500.00 m3 2130 14000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
LLW/ILW [2037 - 2139]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 5100.00 m3 2090 21000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Reactor [2029 - 2089] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 250.00 tHM 250.00 tHM tHM
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
ISFS [2034 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 750.00 tHM 2060 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Final disposal [2124 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 2124 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Waste Storage building
[2029 - 2089]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
0.00 m3 500.00 m3 500.00 m3 m3
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
Final Repository for spent
fuel [2025 - 2120]
Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2120 6500.00 tHM
Final disposal facility for
spent fuel is under
construction. The
operation will start in
2020's.
Outlook Radioactive Waste
Planned Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Disposed
Volume(m3)
Total volume
disposed by 2030
2030(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2030(m3)
Total volume
disposed by
2050(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume
disposed (m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed
(m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00 2300.00 6900.00
LLW 6541.00 8761.00 35.00 10661.00 15373.00 2100 41500.00
Decommissioning
waste in 2030 is from
research reactor.
Decommissioning
waste in 2050 is from
LO1 and LO2 units.
Year 2100 contain
decommissioning
wastes from OL1,
OL2 and OL3.
According current
time schedule OL1
and OL2 will be
decommissioned and
wastes disposed by
2070 and OL3 by
2100. This estimate
contains all for now
waste types (VLLV,
LLW, ILW and HLW)
as more detailed
information is not yet
available.
ILW 2117.00 8278.00 9.00 9078.00 2266.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Conditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume of
stored waste(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 204.00
LLW 1691.00
ILW 537.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste (m3)
Other year
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00
LLW 0.00
ILW 5603.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Disuses Sealed Radioactive Sources
Site
Currently Stored Nr. of
Sources
Total stored in 2030 Total stored in 2050 Other year Total stored Note
Loviisa NPP 0
Otaniemi FiR 1 2.00
Sources are transported to
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste during
decommissioning of FiR 1 at
latest in 2023 or to Storage in
Loviisa NPP.
Olkiluoto NPP 0
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
12100.00 13000.00 155000.00
These are only very rough
estimates. The radiation
legislation from 2018 requires
that sealed sources should be
sent back to the manufacturer
in country of origin. This
estimate do not take it into
account.
Hanhikivi NPP 0
Final Repository for spent fuel 0
Outlook Spent Fuel
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Own SF in MS 2261.00 3154.00 4169.00
The whole inventory of spent
fuel is still reported as stored.
The final disposal of spent fuel
is planned to start in 2020's.
This has not yet been taken
into account in this reporting
as the disposal rate is not
known exactly.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(kgHM)
Mass(kgHM) Note
Own SF in MS 21.30
The spent fuel of Research
reactor is planned to be
shipped back to USA. The
timing of the shipment is not
known. The current returning
agreement is valid until 2029.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Storage of Conditioned Waste
Waste Class Location Facility
Current Volume
Stored(m3)
Total activity Main Radionuclides
Waste Origin
Distribution (RO, FFE,
RP, NA, DF, DC, RE,
ND - Total 100%)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
VLLW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage (on
site)
135.00 212.00 MBq Ni-63, Co-60, Ag-110m 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Other Clearance
LLW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(RCA)
171.00 42.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Maintenance waste hall
3
318.00 947.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(RCA)
138.00 944.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste
storage(KAJ)
1462.00 16.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
VLLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste
storage(MAJ)
69.00 0.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Near Surface
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
81.00 0.00 GBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
LLW Olkiluoto NPP
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
58.00 0.00 TBq Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137 100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 Geological
Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class Location Facility Total activity
Main
Radionuclides
Waste Origin
Distribution (RO,
FFE, RP, NA, DF
DC, RE, ND - Total
10 %)
Current Stored
Quantity
Estimated
Disposal
Volume(m3)
Physical Form
Current Planned
Management
Route
Note
ILW Loviisa NPP
Liquid waste
storage (TW)
13.00 TBq
Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-
137
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
1318.00 m3 5400.00 Liquid Geological
ILW Loviisa NPP
Solid waste storage
(silos, RCA)
0.00 TBq
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
49.00 m3 203.00 Liquid Geological
ILW Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 site 0.16 TBq
Eu-152, Eu-154,
Co-60, H-3, C-14,
Cl-36
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
4.00 m3 0.00 Solid Geological
Thermal column
gr phite, activ ty
inventory is based
on calculations in
year 2016. Main
nuclides are chosen
based on activity
importancy in final
disposal
LLW Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 site 13.00 MBq
Cs-137, Co-60, Eu-
152, Eu-154
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
2.00 m3 0.00 Solid Geological
ILW Olkiluoto NPP
Liquid waste
storage(OL1 and
OL2)
0.00 TBq
Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-
137
100, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0
60.00 m3 0.00 Liquid Geological
Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources
Location Facility Total activity Number of Sources Main Radionuclides
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 DSRS 0.00 MBq 2.00 Sb-124, Po-210 Geological
Neutron source, PoBe, ID R30,
inside of triga el m nt Neutron
source, SbBe, ID R33, in reactor
core position F23
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
11.70 TBq 12100.00
Am-241, Cs-137, Pu-238, Kr-85,
H-3
Geological
T e numb r of sealed sources
is rough stimate. Th exact
number of sealed sources in
the storage is not known as
they h v been p cked in the
p t. At that time only total
activity of rad onuclides and
dos rate at package surface
was saved in the database. The
bookkeeping is developed and
currently also the number of
sealed sources is stored into
database.
Spent Fuel Inventory
Storage of Power Reactor Spent Fuel
Reactor Type Origin Location Facility Country Current Inventory(tHM)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Loviisa 1 reactor building 31.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Loviisa 2 reactor building 31.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Spent fuel storage 1 29.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Spent fuel storage 2 591.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building
97.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building
118.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP Spent fuel storage (KPA) 1364.00 Direct Disposal
Disposal of Power Reactor Spent Fuel
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Storage of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Origin Facility Location Facility Country Current Inventory(kgHM)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
LEU Own SF in MS Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 reactor pool 15.70
Subj ct to supplier return
agreement
LEU Own SF in MS Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 reactor building 5.60
Subject to supplier return
agreement
Disposal of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Total Inventory
Total Radioactive Inventory
Waste Class Total Amount (Stored / Disposed) (m3) Decommissioning Amount (m3) Total Activity Note
VLLW 204.00 0.00 TBq
LLW 8234.00 0.00 28.40 TBq
ILW 4085.00 0.00 71.00 TBq
HLW 0.00 0.00 TBq
Total Spent Fuel Inventory
Spent Fuel Total Amount (Stored / Disposed)(m3) Total Activity Note
Spent Fuel 2261.00 TBq
Outlook Facilities
Planned Capaci y for Facilities
Facility Materials Managed Current Capacity Capacity in 2030 Capacity in 2050 Other year Capacity Note
Solid waste storage (RCA)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
805.00 m3 805.00 m3 805.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (on
site) [1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
900.00 m3 1700.00 m3 1700.00 m3 2022 1700.00 m3
Liquid waste storage (TW)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (silos,
RCA) [1977 - 2033]
Radi active Waste /
Storage
74.00 m3 74.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 1
[1997 - 2068]
Radi active Waste /
Disp sal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 2
[2005 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disp sal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 3
[2012 - 2068]
Radi active Waste /
Storage
2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 m3
Solidified waste hall 1
[2019 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
24500.00 m3 8650.00 m3 8650.00 m3 m3
Loviisa 1 reactor building
[1977 - 2030]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Loviisa 2 reactor building
[1980 - 2033]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 1 [1980
- 2050]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 2 [1983
- 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 827.00 tHM tHM tHM tHM
FiR 1 reactor pool [1962 -
2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
Ac rding curr nt time
schedule FiR 1 r search
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 site [1962 - 2023]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
10.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
Ac rding curr nt time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Radi active waste will be
transported to Loviisa NPP
ite for storage and
disposal.
FiR 1 reactor building
[1962 - 2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
Ac rding curr nt time
schedule FiR 1 r search
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 DSRS [1962 - 2023] DSRS / Storage 2.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
Olkiluoto reactor
building [1978 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 260.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
buil ing [1980 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 266.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage (KPA)
[1989 - 2080]
Spent Fuel / Storage 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(KAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(MAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 m3
iquid waste storage(OL1
and OL2) [1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
380.00 m3 380.00 m3 380.00 m3 m3
LL (silos, MAJ) [1992 - 8060 8060 8060
storage
ILW(silos,KAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Disposal
5642. 0 m3 5642. 0 m3 5642. 0 m3
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
[1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
410.00 m3 410.00 m3 410.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage OL3
(KPE,KPK) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
122.00 m3 122.00 m3 122.00 m3 m3
Soli waste storage OL3
(KPA) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
156.00 m3 156.00 m3 156.00 m3 m3
lkiluoto 3 r actor
building [2020 - 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM tHM
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste [ 999 -
2038]
DSRS / Storage 60. 0 m3 60. 0 m3 6 .0 m3 m3
V LW [2035 - 2140] 0 .0 m3 13 14
LLW/ILW [2037 - 2139]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
m3 0.00 m3 51 0. 0 m3 2090 21000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Reactor [2029 - 2089] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 250.00 tHM 250.00 tHM tHM
Oper tion ti es are
estimat s based on current
plans.
ISFS [2034 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 750.00 tHM 2060 1500.00 tHM
Estima ed am unt of fuel
produced i expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capaci y and peration
times are e timates based
on current plans.
Final disposal [2124 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 2124 1500.00 tHM
Estima ed am unt of fuel
produced i expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Waste Storage building
[2029 - 2089]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
0.00 m3 500.00 m3 500.00 m3 m3
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
Final Repository for spent
fuel [2025 - 2120]
Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2120 6500.00 tHM
Final d sposal facility for
spent fuel is under
construction. The
operation will start in
2020's.
Outlook Radioactive Waste
Planned Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Disposed
Volume(m3)
Total volume
disposed by 2030
2030(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2030(m3)
Total volume
disposed by
2050(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume
disposed (m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed
(m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00 2300.00 6900.00
LLW 6541.00 8761.00 35.00 10661.00 15373.00 2100 41500.00
3
research reactor.
D commissioning
waste in 2050 s from
LO1 and LO2 units.
Year 2100 contain
de mmissioning
wastes from OL1,
OL2 and OL3.
Ac rding curr nt
time schedule OL1
and OL2 will be
decommissioned and
was es disposed by
2070 and OL3 by
2100. This estimate
contains all for now
waste types (VLLV,
LLW, ILW and HLW)
as more detailed
information is not yet
available.
ILW 2117.00 8278.00 9.00 9078.00 2266.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Conditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume of
stored waste(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 204.00
LLW 1691.00
ILW 537.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste (m3)
Other year
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00
LLW 0.00
ILW 5603.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Disuses Sealed Radioactive Sources
Site
Currently Stored Nr. of
Sources
Total stored in 2030 Total stored in 2050 Other year Total stored Note
Loviisa NPP 0
Otaniemi FiR 1 2.00
Sources are tra sp rted to
In rim Storage of State
Owned Waste during
decommissioning of FiR 1 at
latest in 2023 or to Storage in
Loviisa NPP.
Olkiluoto NPP 0
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
12100.00 13000.00 155000.00
T ese r only very rough
estimates. The radi tion
legislation from 2018 requires
that sealed sources should be
sent back to the manufacturer
in country of origin. This
estimate do not take it into
account.
Hanhikivi NPP 0
Final Repository for spent fuel 0
Outlook Spent Fuel
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Own SF in MS 2261.00 3154.00 4169.00
The whole inventory of spent
fuel is still reported as stored.
The final disposal of s en fuel
is planned to star in 2020's.
This has not yet been taken
into account in this reporting
as the disposal rate is not
known exactly.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(kgHM)
Mass(kgHM) Note
Own SF in MS 21.30
The spent fuel of Research
reactor is planned o be
shipped back to USA. The
timing of the shipment is not
known. The current returning
agreement is valid until 2029.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel
Fuel Type
Th amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
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Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources
Location Facility Total activity Number of Sources Main Radionuclides
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 DSRS 0.00 MBq 2.00 Sb-124, Po-210 Geological
Neutron source, PoBe, ID R30,
inside of triga element Neutron
source, SbBe, ID R33, in reactor
core position F23
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
11.70 TBq 12100.00
Am-241, Cs-137, Pu-238, Kr-85,
H-3
Geological
The number of sealed sources
is rough estimate. The exact
number of sealed sources in
the storage is not known as
they have been packed in the
past. At that time only total
activity of radionuclides and
dose rate at package surface
was saved in the database. The
bookkeeping is developed and
currently also the number of
sealed sources is stored into
database.
Spent Fuel Inventory
Storage of Power Reactor Spent Fuel
Reactor Type Origin Location Facility Country Current Inventory(tHM)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Loviisa 1 reactor building 31.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Loviisa 2 reactor building 31.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Spent fuel storage 1 29.00 Direct Disposal
PWR Own SF in MS Loviisa NPP Spent fuel storage 2 591.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building
97.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building
118.00 Direct Disposal
BWR Own SF in MS Olkiluoto NPP Spent fuel storage (KPA) 1364.00 Direct Disposal
Disposal of Power Reactor Spent Fuel
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Storage of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Origin Facility Location Facility Country Current Inventory(kgHM)
Currently Planned
Management Route
Note
LEU Own SF in MS Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 reactor pool 15.70
Subject to supplier return
agreement
LEU Own SF in MS Otaniemi FiR 1 FiR 1 reactor building 5.60
Subject to supplier return
agreement
Disposal of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Total Inventory
Total Radioactive Inventory
Waste Class Total Amount (Stored / Disposed) (m3) Decommissioning Amount (m3) Total Activity Note
VLLW 204.00 0.00 TBq
LLW 8234.00 0.00 28.40 TBq
ILW 4085.00 0.00 71.00 TBq
HLW 0.00 0.00 TBq
Total Spent Fuel Inventory
Spent Fuel Total Amount (Stored / Disposed)(m3) Total Activity Note
Spent Fuel 2261.00 TBq
Outlook Facilities
Planned Capacity for Facilities
Facility Materials Managed Current Capacity Capacity in 2030 Capacity in 2050 Other year Capacity Note
Solid waste storage (RCA)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
805.00 m3 805.00 m3 805.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (on
site) [1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
900.00 m3 1700.00 m3 1700.00 m3 2022 1700.00 m3
Liquid waste storage (TW)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (silos,
RCA) [1977 - 2033]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
74.00 m3 74.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 1
[1997 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 2
[2005 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 3
[2012 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 m3
Solidified waste hall 1
[2019 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
24500.00 m3 8650.00 m3 8650.00 m3 m3
Loviisa 1 reactor building
[1977 - 2030]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Loviisa 2 reactor building
[1980 - 2033]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 1 [1980
- 2050]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 2 [1983
- 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 827.00 tHM tHM tHM tHM
FiR 1 reactor pool [1962 -
2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 site [1962 - 2023]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
10.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Radioactive waste will be
transported to Loviisa NPP
site for storage and
disposal.
FiR 1 reactor building
[1962 - 2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 DSRS [1962 - 2023] DSRS / Storage 2.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building [1978 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 260.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building [1980 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 266.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage (KPA)
[1989 - 2080]
Spent Fuel / Storage 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(KAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(MAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage(OL1
and OL2) [1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
380.00 m3 380.00 m3 380.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 m3
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
[1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
410.00 m3 410.00 m3 410.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage OL3
(KPE,KPK) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
122.00 m3 122.00 m3 122.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage OL3
(KPA) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
156.00 m3 156.00 m3 156.00 m3 m3
Olkiluoto 3 reactor
building [2020 - 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM tHM
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste [1999 -
2038]
DSRS / Storage 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 m3
VLLW [2035 - 2140]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 500.00 m3 2130 14000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
LLW/ILW [2037 - 2139]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 5100.00 m3 2090 21000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Reactor [2029 - 2089] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 250.00 tHM 250.00 tHM tHM
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
ISFS [2034 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 750.00 tHM 2060 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Final disposal [2124 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 2124 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Waste Storage building
[2029 - 2089]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
0.00 m3 500.00 m3 500.00 m3 m3
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
Final Repository for spent
fuel [2025 - 2120]
Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2120 6500.00 tHM
Final disposal facility for
spent fuel is under
construction. The
operation will start in
2020's.
Outlook Radioactive Waste
Planned Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Disposed
Volume(m3)
Total volume
disposed by 2030
2030(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2030(m3)
Total volume
disposed by
2050(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume
disposed (m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed
(m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00 2300.00 6900.00
LLW 6541.00 8761.00 35.00 10661.00 15373.00 2100 41500.00
Decommissioning
waste in 2030 is from
research reactor.
Decommissioning
waste in 2050 is from
LO1 and LO2 units.
Year 2100 contain
decommissioning
wastes from OL1,
OL2 and OL3.
According current
time schedule OL1
and OL2 will be
decommissioned and
wastes disposed by
2070 and OL3 by
2100. This estimate
contains all for now
waste types (VLLV,
LLW, ILW and HLW)
as more detailed
information is not yet
available.
ILW 2117.00 8278.00 9.00 9078.00 2266.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Conditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume of
stored waste(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 204.00
LLW 1691.00
ILW 537.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste (m3)
Other year
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00
LLW 0.00
ILW 5603.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Disuses Sealed Radioactive Sources
Site
Currently Stored Nr. of
Sources
Total stored in 2030 Total stored in 2050 Other year Total stored Note
Loviisa NPP 0
Otaniemi FiR 1 2.00
Sources are transported to
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste during
decommissioning of FiR 1 at
latest in 2023 or to Storage in
Loviisa NPP.
Olkiluoto NPP 0
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
12100.00 13000.00 155000.00
These are only very rough
estimates. The radiation
legislation from 2018 requires
that sealed sources should be
sent back to the manufacturer
in country of origin. This
estimate do not take it into
account.
Hanhikivi NPP 0
Final Repository for spent fuel 0
Outlook Spent Fuel
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Own SF in MS 2261.00 3154.00 4169.00
The whole inventory of spent
fuel is still reported as stored.
The final disposal of spent fuel
is planned to start in 2020's.
This has not yet been taken
into account in this reporting
as the disposal rate is not
known exactly.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(kgHM)
Mass(kgHM) Note
Own SF in MS 21.30
The spent fuel of Research
reactor is planned to be
shipped back to USA. The
timing of the shipment is not
known. The current returning
agreement is valid until 2029.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Disposal of Spent Fuel from Other Sources (Non-Power)
Reactor Type Location Facility Current Inventory(tHM) Note
Total Inventory
Total Radioactive Inventory
Waste Class Total Amount (Stored / Disposed) (m3) Decommissioning Amount (m3) Total Activity Note
VLLW 204.00 0.00 TBq
LLW 8234.00 0.00 28.40 TBq
ILW 4085.00 0.00 71.00 TBq
HLW 0.00 0.00 TBq
Total Spent Fuel Inventory
Spent Fuel Total Amount (Stored / Disposed)(m3) Total Activity Note
Spent Fuel 2261.00 TBq
Outlook Facilities
Planned Capacity for Facilities
Facility Materials Managed Current Capacity Capacity in 2030 Capacity in 2050 Other year Capacity Note
Solid waste storage (RCA)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
805.00 m3 805.00 m3 805.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (on
site) [1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
900.00 m3 1700.00 m3 1700.00 m3 2022 1700.00 m3
Liquid waste storage (TW)
[1977 - 2065]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 2400.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage (silos,
RCA) [1977 - 2033]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
74.00 m3 74.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 1
[1997 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 2
[2005 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 1270.00 m3 m3
Maintenance waste hall 3
[2012 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 2000.00 m3 m3
Solidified waste hall 1
[2019 - 2068]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
24500.00 m3 8650.00 m3 8650.00 m3 m3
Loviisa 1 reactor building
[1977 - 2030]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Loviisa 2 reactor building
[1980 - 2033]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 1 [1980
- 2050]
Spent Fuel / Storage 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM 60.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage 2 [1983
- 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 827.00 tHM tHM tHM tHM
FiR 1 reactor pool [1962 -
2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 site [1962 - 2023]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
10.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Radioactive waste will be
transported to Loviisa NPP
site for storage and
disposal.
FiR 1 reactor building
[1962 - 2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 DSRS [1962 - 2023] DSRS / Storage 2.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building [1978 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 260.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building [1980 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 266.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage (KPA)
[1989 - 2080]
pent Fuel / Storage 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(KAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(MAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage(OL1
and OL2) [1978 - 2038]
i ti t
Storage
380.0 m3 380.0 m3 380.0 m3
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 m3
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
[1978 - 2038]
i ti t
t r
410. 410. 410.
Liquid waste storage OL3
(KPE,KPK) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
122.00 m3 122.00 m3 122.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage OL3
(KPA) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
156.00 m3 156.00 m3 156.00 m3 m3
Olkiluoto 3 reactor
building [2020 - 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 485. 0 tHM 485. 0 tHM 485. 0 tHM tHM
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste [1999 -
2038]
DSRS / Storage 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 m3
VLLW [2035 - 2140]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 500.00 m3 2130 14000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
LLW/ILW [2037 - 2139]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 5100.00 m3 2090 21000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Reactor [2029 - 2089] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 250.00 tHM 250.00 tHM tHM
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
ISFS [2034 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 750.00 tHM 2060 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Final disposal [2124 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 2124 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Waste Storage building
[2029 - 2089]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
0.00 m3 500.00 m3 500.00 m3 m3
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
Final Repository for spent
fuel [2025 - 2120]
Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2120 6500.00 tHM
Final disposal facility for
spent fuel is under
construction. The
operation will start in
2020's.
Outlook Radioactive Waste
Planned Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Disposed
Volume(m3)
Total volume
disposed by 2030
2030(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2030(m3)
Total volume
disposed by
2050(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume
disposed (m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed
(m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00 2300.00 6900.00
LLW 6541.00 8761.00 35.00 10661.00 15373.00 2100 41500.00
Decommissioning
waste in 2030 is from
research reactor.
Decommissioning
waste in 2050 is from
LO1 and LO2 units.
Year 2100 contain
decommissioning
wastes from OL1,
OL2 and OL3.
According current
time schedule OL1
and OL2 will be
decommissioned and
wastes disposed by
2070 and OL3 by
2100. This estimate
contains all for now
waste types (VLLV,
LLW, ILW and HLW)
as more detailed
information is not yet
available.
ILW 2117.00 8278.00 9.00 9078.00 2266.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Conditioned Radioac ive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume of
stored waste(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 204.00
LLW 1691.00
ILW 537.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste (m3)
Other year
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00
LLW 0.00
ILW 5603.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Disuses Sealed Radioactive Sources
Site
Currently Stored Nr. of
Sources
Total stored in 2030 Total stored in 2050 Other year Total stored Note
Loviisa NPP 0
Otaniemi FiR 1 2.00
Sources are transported to
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste during
decommissioning of FiR 1 at
latest in 2023 or to Storage in
Loviisa NPP.
Olkiluoto NPP 0
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
12100.00 13000.00 155000.00
These are only very rough
estimates. The radiation
legislation from 2018 requires
that sealed sources should be
sent back to the manufacturer
in country of origin. This
estimate do not take it into
account.
Hanhikivi NPP 0
Final Repository for spent fuel 0
Outlook Spent Fuel
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Own SF in MS 2261.00 3154.00 4169.00
The whole inventory of spent
fuel is still reported as stored.
The final disposal of spent fuel
is planned to start in 2020's.
This has not yet been taken
into account in this reporting
as the disposal rate is not
known exactly.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(kgHM)
Mass(kgHM) Note
Own SF in MS 21.30
The spent fuel of Research
reactor is planned to be
shipped back to USA. The
timing of the shipment is not
known. The current returning
agreement is valid until 2029.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Disposa of Spent Fuel
Fue Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Planned Disposa of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
153STUK-B 259 / OCTOBER 2020
SECTION L ANNEXES – L.5 SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE INVENTORY AT THE END OF 2019
FiR 1 reactor pool [1962 -
2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 site [1962 - 2023]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
10.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Radioactive waste will be
transported to Loviisa NPP
site for storage and
disposal.
FiR 1 reactor building
[1962 - 2023]
Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM 2023 0.00 tHM
According current time
schedule FiR 1 research
reactor will be
decommissioned in 2023.
Spent fuel will be shipped
to USA or stored in Loviisa
NPP site.
FiR 1 DSRS [1962 - 2023] DSRS / Storage 2.00 m3 0.00 m3 m3 2023 0.00 m3
Olkiluoto 1 reactor
building [1978 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 260.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Olkiluoto 2 reactor
building [1980 - 2038]
Spent Fuel / Storage 266.00 tHM 260.00 tHM 0.00 tHM tHM
Spent fuel storage (KPA)
[1989 - 2080]
Spent Fuel / Storage 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM 1666.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(KAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM 14000.00 tHM tHM
Solid waste storage(MAJ)
[1985 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 11000.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage(OL1
and OL2) [1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
380.00 m3 380.00 m3 380.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
LLW(silos, MAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 8060.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage
ILW(silos,KAJ) [1992 -
2080]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 5642.00 m3 m3
Solid waste drum
storage(OL1 and 0L2)
[1978 - 2038]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
410.00 m3 410.00 m3 410.00 m3 m3
Liquid waste storage OL3
(KPE,KPK) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
122.00 m3 122.00 m3 122.00 m3 m3
Solid waste storage OL3
(KPA) [2020 - 2060]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
156.00 m3 156.00 m3 156.00 m3 m3
Olkiluoto 3 reactor
building [2020 - 2060]
Spent Fuel / Storage 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM 485.00 tHM tHM
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste [1999 -
2038]
DSRS / Storage 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 m3
VLLW [2035 - 2140]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 500.00 m3 2130 14000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
LLW/ILW [2037 - 2139]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 5100.00 m3 2090 21000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Reactor [2029 - 2089] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 250.00 tHM 250.00 tHM tHM
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
ISFS [2034 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 750.00 tHM 2060 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Final disposal [2124 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 2124 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Waste Storage building
[2029 - 2089]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
0.00 m3 500.00 m3 500.00 m3 m3
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
Final Repository for spent
fuel [2025 - 2120]
Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2120 6500.00 tHM
Final disposal facility for
spent fuel is under
construction. The
operation will start in
2020's.
Outlook Radioactive Waste
Planned Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Disposed
Volume(m3)
Total volume
disposed by 2030
2030(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2030(m3)
Total volume
disposed by
2050(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume
disposed (m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed
(m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00 2300.00 6900.00
LLW 6541.00 8761.00 35.00 10661.00 15373.00 2100 41500.00
Decommissioning
waste in 2030 is from
research reactor.
Decommissioning
waste in 2050 is from
LO1 and LO2 units.
Year 2100 contain
decommissioning
wastes from OL1,
OL2 and OL3.
According current
time schedule OL1
and OL2 will be
decommissioned and
wastes disposed by
2070 and OL3 by
2100. This estimate
contains all for now
waste types (VLLV,
LLW, ILW and HLW)
as more detailed
information is not yet
available.
ILW 2117.00 8278.00 9.00 9078.00 2266.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Conditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume of
stored waste(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 204.00
LLW 1691.00
ILW 537.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste (m3)
Other year
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00
LLW 0.00
ILW 5603.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Disuses Sealed Radioactive Sources
Site
Currently Stored Nr. of
Sources
Total stored in 2030 Total stored in 2050 Other year Total stored Note
Loviisa NPP 0
Otaniemi FiR 1 2.00
Sources are transported to
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste during
decommissioning of FiR 1 at
latest in 2023 or to Storage in
Loviisa NPP.
Olkiluoto NPP 0
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
12100.00 13000.00 155000.00
These are only very rough
estimates. The radiation
legislation from 2018 requires
that sealed sources should be
sent back to the manufacturer
in country of origin. This
estimate do not take it into
account.
Hanhikivi NPP 0
Final Repository for spent fuel 0
Outlook Spent Fuel
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Own SF in MS 2261.00 3154.00 4169.00
The whole inventory of spent
fuel is still reported as stored.
The final disposal of spent fuel
is planned to start in 2020's.
This has not yet been taken
into account in this reporting
as the disposal rate is not
known exactly.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(kgHM)
Mass(kgHM) Note
Own SF in MS 21.30
The spent fuel of Research
reactor is planned to be
shipped back to USA. The
timing of the shipment is not
known. The current returning
agreement is valid until 2029.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste [1999 -
2038]
DSRS / Storage 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 60.00 m3 m3
VLLW [2035 - 2140]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 500.00 m3 2130 14000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
LLW/ILW [2037 - 2139]
Radioactive Waste /
Disposal
0.00 m3 0.00 m3 5100.00 m3 2090 21000.00 m3
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Reactor [2029 - 2089] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 250.00 tHM 250.00 tHM tHM
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
ISFS [2034 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Storage 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 750.00 tHM 2060 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Final disposal [2124 - 2135] Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 0.00 tHM 2124 1500.00 tHM
Estimated amount of fuel
produced is expected to be
around 1 200 - 1 800 tons.
Capacity and operation
times are estimates based
on current plans.
Waste Storage building
[2029 - 2089]
Radioactive Waste /
Storage
0.00 m3 500.00 m3 500.00 m3 m3
Operation times are
estimates based on current
plans.
Final Repository for spent
fuel [2025 - 2120]
Spent Fuel / Disposal 0.00 tHM tHM tHM 2120 6500.00 tHM
Final disposal facility for
spent fuel is under
construction. The
operation will start in
2020's.
Outlook Radioactive Waste
Planned Disposal of Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Disposed
Volume(m3)
Total volume
disposed by 2030
2030(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2030(m3)
Total volume
disposed by
2050(m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed by
2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume
disposed (m3)
Volume of
Decommissioning
Waste disposed
(m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00 2300.00 6900.00
LLW 6541.00 8761.00 35.00 10661.00 15373.00 2100 41500.00
Decommissioning
waste in 2030 is from
research reactor.
Decommissioning
waste in 2050 is from
LO1 and LO2 units.
Year 2100 contain
decommissioning
wastes from OL1,
OL2 and OL3.
According current
time schedule OL1
and OL2 will be
decommissioned and
wastes disposed by
2070 and OL3 by
2100. This estimate
contains all for now
waste types (VLLV,
LLW, ILW and HLW)
as more detailed
information is not yet
available.
ILW 2117.00 8278.00 9.00 9078.00 2266.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Conditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume of
stored waste(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 204.00
LLW 1691.00
ILW 537.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste (m3)
Other year
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00
LLW 0.00
ILW 5603.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Disuses Sealed Radioactive Sources
Site
Currently Stored Nr. of
Sources
Total stored in 2030 Total stored in 2050 Other year Total stored Note
Loviisa NPP 0
Otaniemi FiR 1 2.00
Sources are transported to
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste during
decommissioning of FiR 1 at
latest in 2023 or to Storage in
Loviisa NPP.
Olkiluoto NPP 0
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
12100.00 13000.00 155000.00
These are only very rough
estimates. The radiation
legislation from 2018 requires
that sealed sources should be
sent back to the manufacturer
in country of origin. This
estimate do not take it into
account.
Hanhikivi NPP 0
Final Repository for spent fuel 0
Outlook Spent Fuel
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) No e
Own SF in MS 2261.00 3154.00 4169.00
The whole inventory of spent
fuel is still reported as stored.
The final disposal of spent fuel
is planned to start in 2020's.
This has not yet been taken
into account in this reporting
as the disposal rate is not
known exactly.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(kgHM)
Mass(kgHM) N te
Own SF in MS 21.30
The spent fuel of Research
reactor is planned to be
shipped back to USA. The
timing of the shipment is not
known. The current returning
agreement is valid until 2029.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
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LLW 6541.00 8761.00 35.00 10661.00 15373.00 2100 41500.00
Decommissioning
waste in 2030 is from
research reactor.
Decommissioning
waste in 2050 is from
LO1 and LO2 units.
Year 2100 contain
decommissioning
wastes from OL1,
OL2 and OL3.
According current
time schedule OL1
and OL2 will be
decommissioned and
wastes disposed by
2070 and OL3 by
2100. This estimate
contains all for now
waste types (VLLV,
LLW, ILW and HLW)
as more detailed
information is not yet
available.
ILW 2117.00 8278.00 9.00 9078.00 2266.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Conditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Other year
Total volume of
stored waste(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 204.00
LLW 1691.00
ILW 537.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Unconditioned Radioactive Waste
Waste Class
Currently Stored
Volume(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2030(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2030(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste in
2050(m3)
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste in 2050(m3)
Total volume of
stored waste (m3)
Other year
Volume of Stored
Decommissioning
Waste (m3)
Note
VLLW 0.00
LLW 0.00
ILW 5603.00
HLW 0
Planned Storage of Disuses Sealed Radioactive Sources
Site
Currently Stored Nr. of
Sources
Total stored in 2030 Total stored in 2050 Other year Total stored Note
Loviisa NPP 0
Otaniemi FiR 1 2.00
Sources are transported to
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste during
decommissioning of FiR 1 at
latest in 2023 or to Storage in
Loviisa NPP.
Olkiluoto NPP 0
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
12100.00 13000.00 155000.00
These are only very rough
estimates. The radiation
legislation from 2018 requires
that sealed sources should be
sent back to the manufacturer
in country of origin. This
estimate do not take it into
account.
Hanhikivi NPP 0
Final Repository for spent fuel 0
Outlook Spent Fuel
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Own SF in MS 2261.00 3154.00 4169.00
The whole inventory of spent
fuel is still reported as stored.
The final disposal of spent fuel
is planned to start in 2020's.
This has not yet been taken
into account in this reporting
as the disposal rate is not
known exactly.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(kgHM)
Mass(kgHM) Note
Own SF in MS 21.30
The spent fuel of Research
reactor is planned to be
shipped back to USA. The
timing of the shipment is not
known. The current returning
agreement is valid until 2029.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Interim Storage of State
Owned Waste
12100.00 13000.00 155000.00
The e are only very rough
estimates. The radiation
legislation from 2018 requires
that sealed sources should be
sent back t the manufac urer
in ry of origin. This
estimate do not take it into
account.
Hanhikivi NPP 0
Final Repository for spent fuel 0
Outlook Spent Fuel
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(tHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Own SF in MS 2261.00 3154.00 4169.00
whole inventory of spent
fuel is still reported as stored.
e final disposal of spent fuel
s planned to start in 2020's.
This has not yet been taken
int accoun in this reporting
as the disposal rate is not
known exactly.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Storage of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Origin
The amount of currently
spent fuel(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2030(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
2050(kgHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(kgHM)
Mass(kgHM) Note
Own SF in MS 21.30
T e spent fuel f Research
reactor is planned to be
shipped back to USA. The
timing of the shipment is not
known. The current returning
agreement is valid until 2029.
SF outside MS 0
Foreign SF in MS 0
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year(tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
Planned Disposal of Spent Fuel (Non-Power)
Fuel Type
The amount of currently
spent fuel(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
(tHM)
The planned inventory in
Year (tHM)
Mass(tHM) Note
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L.6 Overview matrix of Finland
Type of Liability Long-term 
management 
policy
Funding of 
Liabilities
Current practice / Facilities Planned facilities
Spent fuel Disposal of SF 
in bedrock
Licensees 
have full 
financial 
liability.
Interim storage at the NPP 
sites and in the FiR1 research 
reactor. 
Construction License for an 
encapsulation plant and a 
disposal facility for SF from 
existing NPPs was granted 
in 2015. 
Construction of the 
encapsulation plant and the 
disposal facility started in 
2016.
Future NPP operators 
negotiate cooperation 
agreement with the owners 
of existing facilities or build 
their own facilities.
Nuclear fuel cycle 
wastes
Disposal 
of LILW in 
intermediate 
depth bedrock 
(Loviisa & 
Olkiluoto)
Operating LILW disposal 
facilities at the both NPP 
sites. 
(Loviisa & Olkiluoto)
Future NPP operators build 
own disposal facilities at NPP 
site
Non-nuclear 
radioactive wastes
Disposal for 
most of the 
waste and 
storage for a 
small quantity of 
waste (Olkiluoto)
Handling, repacking 
and transport to storage 
by authorized private 
entrepreneur. Storage at 
Olkiluoto. 
Disposal to LILW silos 
started in 2016 in Olkiluoto.
Disposal in LILW silos
Decommissioning 
liabilities
Preliminary 
plans required 
in construction 
license phase
Decommissioning of FiR 1 
research reactor is in a 
licensing phase
Decommissioning of FiR 1 
research reactor
Decommissioning plans of 
NPPs updated every six years 
Disused Sealed 
Sources
Return to 
manufacturer or 
disposal
Licensees 
and state 
for orphan 
sources 
See non‑nuclear radioactive 
waste section 
Disposal in LILW silos 
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